Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign v. Vilsack | 133 F. Supp. 3d 200 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 5726880 (D.D.C., 2015) | The American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign (Plaintiffs) brought this action against the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) to prevent the implementation of the new Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory Plan (WHT) that Modoc County helped develop. Plaintiffs brought six claims against defendants, all under the Administrative Procedures Act. In Counts I, II, and III, plaintiffs alleged that the boundary clarification was arbitrary and capricious because it violated the Wild Horses Act, the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and in Counts IV, V, and VI, they claimed that the adjustment to the "appropriate management level" (AML) range was arbitrary and capricious because it was contrary to the same three statutes. Because the Forest Service reasonably concluded that the disputed territory was never formally incorporated into the Devil's Garden WHT, and that any references to one contiguous territory were the result of administrative error, the Court found that it was not arbitrary and capricious or in violation of the law for the Forest Service to act to correct the boundary in the 2013 Environmental Assessment and the 2013 Management Plan. Thus, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III. And because the Forest Service articulated a rational basis for its decision to adjust the AML range for the Devil's Garden WHT that was not counter to record evidence or otherwise contrary to the law, the Court found that defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Counts IV, V, and VI. Thus, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied, defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was granted, and because they sought the same relief as defendants, the intervenor-defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was denied as moot. | Case | |
| MT - Bite - Chapter 1. Availability of Remedies--Liability. | MCA 27-1-715 | MT ST 27-1-715 | This Montana statute provides that the owner of any dog which shall without provocation bite any person while such person is on or in a public place or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of such dog, located within an incorporated city or town shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person bitten regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. | Statute | |
| US - Pets and Housing - Subpart C. Pet Ownership for the Elderly or Persons with Disabilities | 24 C.F.R. § 5.300 to .327 |
This subpart implements section 227 of the Housing and Urban Rural Recovery Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C. 1701r-1) as it pertains to projects for the elderly or persons with disabilities under: (1) the housing programs administered by the Assistant Secretary for Housing - Federal Housing Commissioner; (2) projects assisted under the programs contained in chapter VIII of this title 24; and (3) the public housing program. The rule specifically states that it does not apply to assistance or service animals. The rule states that, except as otherwise provided, no project owner that manages a project for the elderly or disabled may restrict or discriminate against any person by reason of the person's ownership or presence of a common household pet in the person's dwelling unit. A "common household pet," is defined as "[a] domesticated animal, such as a dog, cat, bird, rodent (including a rabbit), fish, or turtle, that is traditionally kept in the home for pleasure rather than for commercial purposes" (excluding reptiles with exception of turtles). Notice of the allowance must be provided to tenants and tenants must be given the ability to access to pet rules. The project owner must establish reasonable rules to govern the keeping of pets.
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Administrative | ||
| IL - Pet Shops - Chapter 225. Professions and Occupations. | 225 I.L.C.S. 605/1 - 22 | IL ST CH 225 § 605/1 - 22 | This section comprises Illinois' Animal Welfare Act. The Act is primarily aimed at regulating commercial pet dealers, such as kennels, breeders, and retail pet shops. The provisions include restrictions on the age at which both dogs and cats can be separated from their mothers (8 weeks). | Statute | |
| People v. Cumper | 83 Mich. App. 490 (Mich. 1978) |
Defendants were convicted of being spectators at a fight or baiting between dogs and appealed, charging that the "spectator" portion of the statute was impermissibly vague and unconstitutionally overbroad. The court found that the statute was constitutional because it punished attendance as a spectator at an event legitimately prohibited by law and defendants had fair notice of the conduct proscribed. The defendants also claimed that there was insufficient evidence however, the court found ample evidence upon which the jury rendered their decision. |
Case | ||
| U.S. v. Stenberg | 803 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1986), superceded by statute in U.S. v. Atkinson, 966 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1992) |
These three cases arose out of an undercover investigation by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) into the illegal taking and sale of wildlife in interstate commerce, where defendants were engaged in the guiding and hunting business wherein customers would pay for illegal big game hunts. The court denied defendants' defense of outrageous government conduct and entrapment. It also held that the Lacey Act clearly notifies individuals that participation in prohibited transactions involving wildlife with a market value greater than $350 subjects them to felony prosecutions, thus defeating defendants' challenge of vagueness to the statute. Notably, the court reversed convictions on the fact that the provision of guiding services or providing a hunting permit does not constitute the sale of wildlife for purposes of the Lacey Act (this was amended in 1988 to include guide services, which overturned this decision. See U.S. v. Atkinson, 966 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1992). |
Case | ||
| US - AWA - Senate Report on 1966 Animal Welfare Act | Senate Report 1281 |
The Committee on Commerce, to which was referred the bill (H.R. 13881) to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the transportation, sale, and handling of dogs and cats intended to be used for purposes of research or experimentation, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. |
Administrative | ||
| Deardorff v. Farnsworth | 343 P.3d 687, review denied, 358 Or. 145 (2015) | 268 Or.App. 844 (2015) |
In this case, the Oregon Court of Appeals was reviewing whether or not the trial court erred in holding that an insurance company was estopped from relying on an exclusion in an insurance policy. The plaintiffs in this case were transporting horses in California that were owned by other when the trailer carrying the horses caught fire. The insurers for the horse owners compensated the horse owners and then filed an action against plaintiffs. As a result, plaintiffs charged the defense of the action to their insurer, OMI. OMI refused to provide a defense for the plaintiffs, arguing that it was not covered in the insurance policy. Plaintiffs filed an action against OMI to recover the costs arguing that they were verbally told that this would be covered in the policy. The trial court ordered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that OMI was estopped from denying liability because it had breached its contract with plaintiff. Ultimately, the court of appeals reviewed the issue and determined that the trial court had erred in its decision. The court of appeals found that based on applicable case law, estoppel cannot be used to negate an express exclusion in an insurance policy. As a result, the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case. |
Case | |
| Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal Volume 18 |
SUMÁRIOEDITORIAL Heron Gordilho............... Direito Animal Comparado/Comparative Animal Law |
Policy | |||
| MI - Biological Diversity - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. | M.C.L.A. 324.35501 - 35506 | MI ST 324.35501 - 35506 | These Sections describe the State's desire to conserve biological diversity as well as the State's strategy and considerations in achieving this goal. These sections also create the joint legislative working committee on biological diversity. | Statute |