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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Missouri Primate Foundation v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. Slip Copy, 2018 WL 1420239 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 22, 2018) This matter is a motion of counterclaim by defendants Missouri Primate Foundation to dismiss PETA's (the counterclaim plaintiff) assertion that two chimpanzees were being held in conditions that deprived the chimpanzees of adequate social groups, space, and psychological stimulation, putting them at risk of and causing physical and psychological injury, such as deteriorated cardiovascular and musculoskeletal health, stress, anxiety and depression. PETA also alleges that the chimpanzees were denied a sanitary environment, proper ventilation, a healthy diet, and adequate veterinary care. PETA claimed that the Missouri Primate Foundation (MPF) (the counterclaim defendants) were holding the two chimpanzees in conditions that “harm” and “harass” the chimpanzees, thus violating the “take” prohibition of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). MPF's motion contends that PETA’s counterclaim is based on allegations that they failed to comply with the Animal Welfare Act, not the ESA. MPF further contends that because the chimpanzees at its facility were lawfully in captivity and under the auspices of the AWA as administered by the USDA–APHIS, so the chimpanzees cannot be subject to a “take” under the ESA. They further argued that PETA lacked standing as the AWA preempts or supersedes the ESA as to animals held at USDA licensed facilities. Because the AWA does not allow citizen suits, MPF argued, the case must be dismissed. After examining similar cases, this court concluded that claims under the AWA and ESA are complementary and do not conflict, and that the ESA protects captive animals regardless of whether the alleged violator is an AWA licensed entity. The court found that the allegations by PETA are sufficient at this stage of the case and issues of proof are reserved for trial. As such, the court denied the motions of the counterclaim defendants. Case
SD - Exotic Pets - Chapter 40-3. State Animal Industry Board (captive wildlife provisions) S D C L § 40-3-23 - 30; SDCL § 7-12-29 SD ST § 40-3-23 - 30; § 7-12-29 These South Dakota statutes establish the Animal Industry Board, which promulgate rules to allow nondomestic mammals that are safe to the public and to the free-roaming animals of the state to be imported or possessed. The Board regulates the breeding, raising, marketing, and transportation of any captive nondomestic mammals. The Board may also develop and implement programs to identify animals and premises involved to further animal health and food safety. Statute
NH - Endangered - Chapter 212-A. Endangered Species Conservation Act N.H. Rev. Stat. § 212-A:1 to 212-A:16 NH ST § 212-A:1 to 212-A:16 These New Hampshire statutes outline the Endangered Species Conservation Act. The definitions of the terms used in the Act are described especially with regard to what constitutes endangered and threatened species. Violation of the Act is accomplished by taking a protected species and incurs a misdemeanor penalty. Statute
Massa v. Department of Registration and Education 507 N.E.2d 814 (Ill. 1987) 116 Ill.2d 376 (1987)

Dr. Massa sought judicial review of the gross malpractice finding and resulting license revocation in the circuit court after the circuit court reversed the Department's finding of gross malpractice as a conclusion against the manifest weight of the evidence. This finding arises from the death of plaintiff’s German Shepard, after Dr. Massa removed the dog’s healthy uterus and ovaries, while failing to treat the dog’s soon-to-be fatal thoracic condition.  The Department's findings in this case could only be disturbed only upon Dr. Massa's showing that they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court held that the record in this case was plainly sufficient to support the Department's determination of gross malpractice in that Dr. Massa ignored the serious nature of Charlie's lung condition and proceeded to remove reproductive organs which, at least at the time of surgery, he knew or should have known to have been healthy.

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Mack v. State of Texas (unpublished) 2003 WL 23015101 (Not Reported in S.W.3d)

The Texas Appeals Court affirmed the trial court's decision that failure to adequately provide for cattle such that they suffered from malnourishment constituted animal cruelty offense under Texas law. The court found that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that malnourished cow was one of the many domesticated living creatures on defendant's ranch, and was therefore an “animal” under the state law.

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Reece v. Edmonton (City) 335 DLR (4th) 600; 513 AR 199; [2011] CarswellAlta 1349; 530 WAC 199 This case dealt with the procedure the applicants used to get their claim heard by the court. The respondent City holds a licence under the Wildlife Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W‑10 to operate a zoo, which houses a lone Asian elephant named Lucy. The appellants commenced this action by originating notice for an order. The chambers judge concluded that the proceedings were an abuse of process because a private litigant cannot seek a declaration that the respondent is in breach of a penal provision in a statute, namely that the elephant was kept in distress because of health concerns. Alternatively, he concluded that the application should have been brought by way of statement of claim, not originating notice. Further, the chambers judge concluded that the appellants had no private interest standing, and that there were barriers to them being awarded public interest standing. On appeal, the parties raised two issues: (1) whether the chambers judge erred in denying the appellants standing to seek a declaration; and (2) whether the chambers judge erred in concluding that the proceedings were an abuse of process. This court held that the chambers judge came to the correct conclusion that these proceedings are an abuse of process. APPEAL DISMISSED. Case
OK - Wildlife - Part 5. Possession of Wildlife. 29 Okl.St.Ann. § 7-501 - 504 OK ST T. 29 § 7-501 - 504 Under these Oklahoma statutes, no person may possess any wildlife or parts thereof during the closed season, any endangered or threatened species or parts thereof at any time, or any native bear or native cat that will grow to reach the weight of 50 lbs. or more, with exceptions. A conviction could result in a fine of $100-$500 and/or by imprisonment up to 30 days. In addition, no person may buy, barter, trade, or sell all or any part of any fish or wildlife or the nest or eggs of any bird protected by law, with exceptions. A first violation could result in a fine of $100 to $500 and/or by imprisonment up to 60 days. Statute
MN - Hunting - Chapter 97A. Game and Fish. General Provisions. M. S. A. § 97A.037 MN ST § 97A.037 This law reflects Minnesota's hunter harassment provision. This law prohibits the intentional interference with the taking of wild animals. A person is also prohibited from disturbing wild animals to prevent or disrupt their lawful taking. Further, a person who has the intent to violate this law may not enter or remain on public lands or private land without permission of the owner. A person must obey the order of a peace officer to stop the harassing conduct that violates this section if the officer observes the conduct. Violation of this subdivision is a misdemeanor. Statute
BREEDLOVE v. HARDY 110 S.E. 358 (Va. 1922) 132 Va. 11 (1922)

This Virginia case concerned the shooting of plaintiff's companion animal where defendant alleged that the dog was worrying his livestock. The court reversed judgment for defendant, finding that defendant’s act of killing dog while not engaged in the act of “worrying the livestock,” was not authorized within the statute.

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State v. Conte Slip Copy, 2007 WL 3257378 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.), 2007 -Ohio- 5924 Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2007 WL 3257378

Plaintiff-appellant, State of Ohio/City of Bexley, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court dismissing the indictment against defendant-appellee, Joseph Conte. Appellant cited appellee for violating Bexley City Code 618.16(e), entitled “Dangerous and Vicious Animal.” Two days later, animal control then issued another citation against appellee for allowing his dog to run free without restraint in violation of Bexley City Code Section 618.16(e). In granting appellee's motion to dismiss, the trial court struck down a portion of Bexley City Code 618.16(e) as unconstitutional that provided that the owner of a vicious or dangerous animal shall not permit such animal to run at large. On appeal, this court found that the ordinance was not unconstitutional where the prosecution must prove at trial that the dog is vicious or dangerous as an element of the offense. 

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