Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign v. Vilsack | 133 F. Supp. 3d 200 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 5726880 (D.D.C., 2015) | The American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign (Plaintiffs) brought this action against the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) to prevent the implementation of the new Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory Plan (WHT) that Modoc County helped develop. Plaintiffs brought six claims against defendants, all under the Administrative Procedures Act. In Counts I, II, and III, plaintiffs alleged that the boundary clarification was arbitrary and capricious because it violated the Wild Horses Act, the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and in Counts IV, V, and VI, they claimed that the adjustment to the "appropriate management level" (AML) range was arbitrary and capricious because it was contrary to the same three statutes. Because the Forest Service reasonably concluded that the disputed territory was never formally incorporated into the Devil's Garden WHT, and that any references to one contiguous territory were the result of administrative error, the Court found that it was not arbitrary and capricious or in violation of the law for the Forest Service to act to correct the boundary in the 2013 Environmental Assessment and the 2013 Management Plan. Thus, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III. And because the Forest Service articulated a rational basis for its decision to adjust the AML range for the Devil's Garden WHT that was not counter to record evidence or otherwise contrary to the law, the Court found that defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Counts IV, V, and VI. Thus, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied, defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was granted, and because they sought the same relief as defendants, the intervenor-defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was denied as moot. | Case |
| VA - Impound - § 3.2-6547. Acceptance of animals for research or experimentation; prohibition | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6547 | VA ST § 3.2-6547 | This Virginia statute provides that no animal bearing a tag, license or tattooed identification shall be used or accepted by any person for the purpose of medical research or experimentation, unless the individual who owns such animal consents in writing. | Statute |
| OH - Humane Slaughter - Chapter 945. Humane Slaughter of Livestock. | R.C. § 945.01 - 99 | OH ST § 945.01 - 99 | These laws comprise Ohio's humane slaughter provisions. After July 1, 1967, no method of slaughtering livestock or handling in connection with the commercial slaughtering of livestock shall be utilized unless it is humane. Humane methods are defined as those that render animals insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical, or other means that is rapid and effective. Slaughter in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain is also allowed. Violation of the act results in a fine of not more than one hundred dollars. | Statute |
| MS - Jackson - Chapter 18 Animals (Article 1: In General) | Code of Ordinances, City of Jackson, Mississippi §§ 18-1, 18-3, 18-4, 18-11, 18-21 |
In Jackson, Mississippi, an animal that damages public or private property is considered a public nuisance and it is the duty the animal's owner to prevent his or her animal from becoming a public nuisance. Additionally, in these ordinances, an animal control officer is authorized to discharge a firearm as the sole effective means for controlling a public nuisance. These ordinances also prohibit any person except a licensed veterinarian from cropping a dog's ears and also provide penalties for any person violating this chapter. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Deardorff v. Farnsworth | 343 P.3d 687, review denied, 358 Or. 145 (2015) | 268 Or.App. 844 (2015) |
In this case, the Oregon Court of Appeals was reviewing whether or not the trial court erred in holding that an insurance company was estopped from relying on an exclusion in an insurance policy. The plaintiffs in this case were transporting horses in California that were owned by other when the trailer carrying the horses caught fire. The insurers for the horse owners compensated the horse owners and then filed an action against plaintiffs. As a result, plaintiffs charged the defense of the action to their insurer, OMI. OMI refused to provide a defense for the plaintiffs, arguing that it was not covered in the insurance policy. Plaintiffs filed an action against OMI to recover the costs arguing that they were verbally told that this would be covered in the policy. The trial court ordered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that OMI was estopped from denying liability because it had breached its contract with plaintiff. Ultimately, the court of appeals reviewed the issue and determined that the trial court had erred in its decision. The court of appeals found that based on applicable case law, estoppel cannot be used to negate an express exclusion in an insurance policy. As a result, the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case. |
Case |
| Mississippi Bluff Motel Inc. v. Rock Island County | 420 N.E.2d 748 (1981) |
The State of Illinois seeks to intervene as a protector of wildlife in a zoning action where the property at issue was adjacent to a bald eagle refuge. The court denied the state's request, finding that it did not have a stake in the litigation as it held no property interest nor was it representing a special class of people. Instead, the court found the state's interest speculative and the immediacy of harm was nonexistent, as it would create "bad law" to allow the State to intervene whenever there was a potential ecological or environmental consequence in a civil lawsuit. For further discussion on the federal Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act . |
Case | |
| Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal Volume 18 |
SUMÁRIOEDITORIAL Heron Gordilho............... Direito Animal Comparado/Comparative Animal Law |
Policy | ||
| Wells v. Brown | 217 P.2d 995 (Cal.App.4.Dist. 1950) | 97 Cal.App.2d 361 (1950) |
In this California case, damages were assessed beyond the purchase price of a dog involved in a hit and run case where the defendant negligently ran over and killed a 15 month old pure-bred Waeimaraner. After the defendant ran over the dog, he shot the dog and buried it. The next morning he contacted the veterinarian listed on the collar, as well as the owner of the dog. The court upheld the jury verdict of $1,500 since the purchase price was determined to not reflect the market value at the time of the dog’s death. |
Case |
| SD - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 40-38. Protection of Animal Facilities | S D C L § 40-38-1 - 5 | SD ST § 40-38-1 - 5 | This chapter comprises South Dakota's animal enterprise interference laws. Under the section, it is illegal for a person to intentionally damage or destroy an animal facility, an animal, or property in or on the animal facility; exercise control over the animal facility or an animal located therein; enter the animal facility with the intent to commit prohibited acts; enter an animal facility and remain concealed with the intent to commit prohibited acts; or intentionally release an animal on an animal facility. Violation is a misdemeanor of varying degrees if the damaged property value is less than $1,000 and a Class 4 felony if above $1,000. Any person who violates subdivisions 40-38-2(2) to (5), inclusive, is guilty of a Class 4 felony. | Statute |
| NH - Hunting - Interference with Hunting, Trapping or Fishing. 207:57 Harassment. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 207:57 | NH ST § 207:57 | This represents New Hampshire's hunter harassment law. The law provides that no person shall purposely obstruct or impede the participation of any individual in the lawful activity of hunting, fishing or trapping while that individual is in a designated hunting area on public lands. The section does not apply to any incidental interference arising from the lawful and normal activities of public land users. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a violation. | Statute |