Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FL - Domestic Violence - 741.30. Domestic violence; injunction; powers | West's F. S. A. § 741.30 | FL ST § 741.30 | This Florida law allows petitioners to file injunctions for protection against domestic violence. Among the described incidents of domestic violence from which the petitioner may obtain protection is where the respondent has "intentionally injured or killed a family pet." The court may considers this as a factor when determining whether there is reasonable cause to believe the petitioner is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence. In 2020, Florida added this provision to (5)(a)(4): "Awarding to the petitioner the temporary exclusive care, possession, or control of an animal that is owned, possessed, harbored, kept, or held by the petitioner, the respondent, or a minor child residing in the residence or household of the petitioner or respondent. The court may order the respondent to temporarily have no contact with the animal and prohibit the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal. This subparagraph does not apply to an animal owned primarily for a bona fide agricultural purpose, as defined under s. 193.461, or to a service animal, as defined under s. 413.08, if the respondent is the service animal's handler." | Statute | |
| State v. Hearl | 190 A.3d 42 (Con. App. Ct. May 29, 2018) | 182 Conn. App. 237 , 2018 WL 2381893 (Con. App. Ct. May 29, 2018) | Defendant Hearl was convicted of nineteen counts of animal cruelty by jury. The convictions stem from the care of his goat herd used for his goat cheese manufacturing business in Connecticut in 2014. Defendant and his business partner moved a herd from Massachusetts to Cornall, CT in May of 2014, where they rented an open air barn space (mainly used for dairy cows), but did not negotiate any boarding or care of the goats. Another farmer (Betti) rented the other half of the barn space for his dairy cows. Betti became concerned about defendant's goat herd in Fall 2014. As the condition of the goats deteriorated (to the point of death for some of the goats), Betti informed the state Dept. of Agriculture and this spurred the investigation which culminated in the seizure of defendant's remaining living goats in January 2015. On appeal of his conviction, defendant raises four main arguments: (1) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction, (2) the trial court did not provide the jury with a proper instruction on the required mental state; (3) § 53–247 (a) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct; and (4) his conviction and sentencing on nineteen separate counts of animal cruelty violates the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. As to defendant's first insufficiency of the evidence claim, defendant's argument centered on whether he had charge or custody of the goats necessary to impute responsibility to him. The court found that there was ample evidence before the jury to support the finding that the defendant confined, or had charge or custody of, the goats. Not only did the defendant play an active role in the management of the goats according to testimony, but.in converstations with officers, defendant “took the lead on telling me what was being done with the management of the goats” and that he “predominated the conversation” about the mortality rates in the herd. In fact, the court found compelling evidence of defendant's custody role where since he had authority to order the euthanization of the animals. Defendant's attempts to characterize his role as mere "ownership," with no role in the particulars of confinement, were unpersuasive. Ownership itself "can still be probative evidence that the defendant bore the responsibility of caring for the goats and authorizing their confinement." Equally unpersuasive was defendant's claim that his business partner was the was who alone confined the 20 plus goats in the open air barn. However, the court noted that there is "no authority limits liability under the statute to a single actor when the facts demonstrate that more than one person may have confined the goats or had charge or custody of them." The jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant, having confined, or having charge or custody of, the goats, failed to give the goats proper care or food, water, and shelter. On defendant's second claim, the court concluded that the mens rea required for a conviction under the relevant portion of § 53–247 (a) is general intent and that the trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on criminal negligence. Defendant's third argument - that § 53–247 (a), was unconstitutionally vague - was also dispensed by the court. Even if the terms "charge" or "custody" are susceptible to some degree of interpretation, the record here shows that defendant had definite notice that his conduct violated the law. Further, the evidence at trial showed that he had notice from the state on things like heat lamps and shelter from the wind and failed to protect the animals by acting on those instructions. Finally, the court considered defendant's final double jeopardy argument and whether the legislature intended to authorize multiple convictions for cruelty for each goat or one conviction for the cruel treatment of the nineteen goats under § 53–247 (a). In looking at previous versions of the anti-cruelty law and other laws within the chapter, the court found that defendant's separate abuse and maltreatment of each goat supports the nineteen separate counts filed by the prosecutor. The judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| US - AWA - Subpart B. Specifications for the Humane Handling, Care, etc. of Guinea Pigs and Hamsters. | 9 C.F.R. § 3.25 - 3.41 | These regulations provide the specifications for the humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of Guinea Pigs and Hamsters. | Administrative | ||
| Lee v. State | 973 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind.App. 2012) | 2012 WL 3775862 (Ind.App. 2012) |
An attendant of a dog fight was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor under section 35-46-3-4 of the Indiana Code. On appeal, the defendant-appellant argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and that the statute invited arbitrary law enforcement, which violated the Due Process clause of the U.S. Constitution. Though the appeals court found the defendant-appellant had waived her constitutional claims by not filing a motion at the bench trial, the appeals court found her claims lacked merit. The defendant-appellant’s conviction was therefore upheld. |
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| UT - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | U.C.A. 1953 § 10-8-65; § 4-40-101 - 102; § 18-1-1 - 4; § 18-2-101; § 23A-12-204 - 205; § 23A-5-309 - 310; § 26B-7-210 - 211; § 26B-1-236; § 58-28-601 | UT ST § 10-8-65; § 4-40-101 - 102; § 18-1-1 - 4; § 18-2-101; § 23A-12-204 - 205; § 23A-5-309 - 310; § 26B-7-210 - 211; § 26B-1-236; § 58-28-601 | These Utah statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include municipal pound pet sterilization provisions, rabies control laws, hunting laws that impact dogs, and laws concerning injuries caused by dogs. | Statute | |
| Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n | 99 S.Ct. 3055 (1979) | 443 U.S. 658 (1979) |
The United States initiated an action seeking an interpretation of Indian fishing rights under treaties with Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest. The Court held that the language of the treaties securing a "right of taking fish . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory" was not intended merely to guarantee the Indians access to usual and accustomed fishing sites and an "equal opportunity" for individual Indians, along with non-Indians, to try to catch fish, but instead secures to the Indian tribes a right to harvest a share of each run of anadromous fish that passes through tribal fishing areas. Thus, an equitable measure of the common right to take fish should initially divide the harvestable portion of each run that passes through a "usual and accustomed" place into approximately equal treaty and nontreaty shares, and should then reduce the treaty share if tribal needs may be satisfied by a lesser amount. The Court also held that any state-law prohibition against compliance with the District Court's decree cannot survive the command of the Supremacy Clause, and the State Game and Fisheries Departments, as parties to this litigation, may be ordered to prepare a set of rules that will implement the court's interpretation of the parties' rights even if state law withholds from them the power to do so. |
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| CT - Exotic Pets - § 26-40a. Possession of potentially dangerous animal; Chapter 490. Fisheries and Game | C. G. S. A. § 26-1, § 26-40a; § 26-54, 55, 61 | CT ST § 26-1, § 26-40a; § 26-54, 55, 61 | These Connecticut states reflect the state's laws on the keeping of wild animals. Under § 26-40a, no person shall possess a potentially dangerous animal, which includes wildlife such as the lion, leopard, cheetah, jaguar, ocelot, jaguarundi cat, puma, lynx, bobcat, wolf, coyote, all species of bears, gorilla, chimpanzee and orangutan. The Department of Environmental Protection shall issue a bill to the owner or person in illegal possession of such potentially dangerous animal for all costs of seizure, care, maintenance, relocation or disposal of such animal. Additionally, any person who violates any provision of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty not to exceed $2000, and is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Under § 26-55, no person shall import or introduce into the state, possess or let loose, any live fish, wild bird, wild mammal, reptile, amphibian or invertebrate unless such person has obtained a permit. Again, a violator is responsible for expenses from the seizure, maintenance, and relocation of the illegally imported animal. The penalty includes a civil fine up to $1000 and results in a class C misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| England - Slaughter - The Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2012 | 2012 No. 501 | These Regulations amended the Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995. Provisions extend the range of birds that can be killed by gas mixtures in specific circumstances, and extend the time limits under which a prosecution may be brought. | Statute | ||
| LaPorte v. Associated Independents, Inc. | 163 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1964) |
Respondent was a corporation engaged in the garbage collection business. One of its employees maliciously hurled an empty garbage can at plaintiff's pet pedigreed dog, who was tethered at the time, killing it. The issue before the court was the reconsideration not of the issue of liability, but for determination only of compensatory and punitive damages. The court stated that it was obvious from the facts that the act performed by the representative of the respondent was malicious and demonstrated an extreme indifference to the rights of the petitioner. Having this view, there was no prohibition of punitive damages relative to awarding compensation for mental pain, as would be the case if there had been physical injury resulting only from simple negligence. The court went on to say that the restriction of the loss of a pet to its intrinsic value in circumstances such as the ones before us is a principle we cannot accept and that the malicious destruction of the pet provides an element of damage for which the owner should recover, irrespective of the value of the animal because of its special training. |
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| RI - Pet Sales - Chapter 25. Pet Warranties--Dogs | Gen.Laws 1956, § 4-25-1 to 10 | RI ST § 4-25-1 to 10 | This Rhode Island chapter enacted in 2007 created a remedy for purchasers who are sold dogs with disease or hereditary defects. Upon sale, a seller is required to give purchasers a written statement that gives the dog's breed, breeder, license number (if applicable), a record of inoculations, and a record of the dog's veterinary diagnoses and treatments. Both the seller and purchaser must sign and date a written statement from the seller that states that the dog either has not known disease, illness, or hereditary condition that adversely affects its health, or a statement that fully describes the diseases or conditions. A purchaser is entitled to relief from the seller after the purchase of a dog if within twenty (20) days after the purchase of the dog, a licensed veterinarian states in writing that the animal is suffering from or has died from an illness, disease or other defect adversely affecting the animal's health and that this condition existed in the dog on or before delivery to the purchaser, or within two (2) years after the purchase of the animal, a licensed veterinarian states in writing that the animal possesses or has died from a congenital or hereditary condition adversely affecting its health. | Statute |