Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RU - Cruelty - Responsible Treatment of Animals | Responsible Treatment of Animals | Responsible Treatment of Animals | The Law on Responsible Treatment of Animals, signed by Vladimir Putin in 2018, prohibits the killing of animals “under any pretext.” The law also outlaws shooting or poisoning stray dogs and cats, which has occurred in Russian cities in recent years according to news sources. Under the law, owners must keep their pets in proper conditions and homeless animals must be taken-up, vaccinated, sterilized, and then released by local agencies. One of the primary purposes of the laws is to ban petting zoos at malls and the practice of bars and restaurants hosting animals. The conducting of animal fights is also banned under the new law. | Statute |
| Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips | 325 Conn. 394, 397, 158 A.3d 772 (2017) | 158 A.3d 772 | In this case, a landlord brought a summary process action against a tenant who lived in the federally subsidized apartment, based on tenant's keeping of “emotional support dog” in violation of a pet restriction clause in the tenant's lease. The trial court entered judgment in favor of tenant, based on equity, and the landlord appealed. The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The Court held that: 1) appeal was not rendered moot by landlord's commencement of second summary process action against tenant, which was dismissed; 2) trial court could not rely on “spirit” of Department of Housing and Urban Development in exercising equitable discretion to enter judgment in favor of tenant; 3) trial court abused its discretion in applying doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture; and 4) summary process action was “civil action” to which medical treatment report exception to hearsay rule could be applied to allow for admission of letter from physician and social worker of tenant's niece concerning dog's benefit to niece. Reversed and remanded. | Case |
| Jaeger v. Cellco Partnership | Slip Copy, 2010 WL 965730 (D.Conn.,2010) |
The Connecticut Siting Council granted Cellco Partnership a Certificate allowing the company to build a cell tower in Falls Village, Connecticut. Dina Jaeger brought suit against Cellco and the Council to prevent the building of the cell tower. In her complaint, Jaeger cited the harmful effects of radio frequency emissions (RF emissions), and alleged violations of the International Migratory Bird Treaty, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA), the Telecommunications Act (TCA), and the 10 th and 14 th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants moved to dismiss Jaeger's claims on various grounds, including that the Council was preempted from considering the environmental effects of RF emissions under the TCA. The Court found in favor of the Defendants, holding that the TCA preempts local and state regulation of cell towers solely on the basis of RF emissions. |
Case | |
| OK - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | 11 Okl.St.Ann. § 22-115.1; 21 Okl.St.Ann. § 649.1 - 649.3; 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 1717 - 1718; 4 Okl.St.Ann. § 41 - 47; 391 - 402; 499 - 499.10; 501 - 602; 29 Okl. St. Ann. § 7-304; 70 Okl.St.Ann. § 5-117.6 | These statutes comprise Oklahoma's dog laws. Among the provisions include dog control laws, sterilization provisions for adopted animals, and the use of unclaimed animals in scientific research or experimentation. | Statute | |
| Allen v. Camp | 70 So. 290 (Ala.App. 1915) | 14 Ala.App. 341 (1915) |
Defendant shot and killed Plaintiff's dog, which had bitten Defendant's daughter several days earlier, for the purpose of sending the dog's head to a laboratory for examination for rabies. The Court of Appeals of Alabama found that Plaintiff's wife's injuries were too remote to be compensable, when the wife was not home at the time of the incident and became excited and hysterical upon hearing of the incident several hours later. The Appeals Court also held that although one may protect himself or his family from injury by a dog or other animal when on his own private property or on public property, the destruction of an animal is wrongful when the danger of attack and subsequent injury by that animal no longer exists, and where the animal is not trespassing. |
Case |
| MO - Breeding - Proposition B | 2010 Proposition B |
The official ballot title asks voters if Missouri law be amended to (1) require large-scale dog breeding operations to provide each dog under their care with sufficient food, clean water, housing and space; necessary veterinary care; regular exercise and adequate rest between breeding cycles; (2) prohibit any breeder from having more than 50 breeding dogs for the purpose of selling their puppies as pets; and (3) create a misdemeanor crime of “puppy mill cruelty” for any violations. |
Statute | |
| Davison v. Berg | 243 So.3d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018) | 44 Fla. L. Weekly D641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018); 2018 WL 1415485 | Deborah Davison volunteered at her local Humane Society to help take care of a dog park. Three years later, Rebecca Berg’s dog who was chasing other dogs collided with Davison. Davison suffered a broken leg that required extensive medical care. Davison then filed an action against Berg under a Florida statute that “imposes liability on dog owners for damage their dogs cause to other persons and animals.” The trial court granted final summary judgment in favor of Berg for two reasons. The first reason was that the signs outside of the park sufficiently warned Davison of the risks of injury inside. The second reason was that Davison essentially consented to the risk of potential injuries by being a volunteer for the dog park. On appeal, this court stated that the Florida statute was a strict liability statute that makes an owner the insurer of their dog’s conduct. The only defense to the statute is for an owner to display in a prominent place on his or her premises a sign that includes the words “Bad Dog.” Berg presented evidence that the park had two signs prominently displayed at the entrance to the park with the title “Dog Park Rules.” The two signs listed rules for entrance to the dog park. One of these rules stated that park use is at the dog owner’s risk. Another rule stated that rough play and chasing were not allowed if any dogs or owners were uncomfortable with that behavior. The last rule stated that visitors enter at their own risk. Even though Davison entered the park at her own risk, the purpose of the sign requirement in the statute was to give notice that a bad dog is on the premises. The Court found that the trial court erred in finding that the signs at the dog park were sufficiently equivalent to “Bad Dog” signs to preclude liability under the Florida statute. The trial court also found that by virtue of Davison volunteering at the dog park, she was aware that she could be injured during the course of her work and that she signed a volunteer application form that acknowledged that she could be exposed to “bites, scratches, and other injuries.” Davison had also witnessed a prior collision between a dog and an individual that resulted in a broken leg. After witnessing that, Davison began to warn others at the Humane Society about the dangers of being inside the dog park with dogs chasing each other. The Court held that even though there may be evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Davison consented to the risk of injury, “an actual consent or assumption of the risk defense cannot bar liability.” The Court reversed the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment in favor of Berg. | Case |
| Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Engineers | 402 F.3d 846 (9th Cir., 2005) | 2005 WL 525269 (9th Cir.) |
An environmental group brought an action against the U.S. Army Corps Engineers and BP for violating both the National Environmental Policy Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Defendants counter-claimed that the environmental group lacked standing and that the claim was barred by laches. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment, reversed summary judgment against the environmental group, and remanded the case for consideration of the environmental group's request for injunctive relief. |
Case |
| NJ - Fur - Chapter 14. Fur Products. | NJSA 56:14-1 to 56:14-3 | NJ ST 56:14-1 to 56:14-3 | This law represents New Jersey's fur labeling law. Under the 2009 law, no person shall sell or offer to sell any new coat, jacket, garment or other clothing apparel made wholly or in part of fur, regardless of the price or value of the fur, without the name of the animal(s) used to produce the fur and the name of the country of origin of any imported fur. A person who violates this act shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $500 for the first offense and not more than $1,000 for each subsequent offense, to be collected in a civil action by a summary proceeding. | Statute |
| MD - Hunting - Subtitle 9. Captive Wildlife. | MD Code, Natural Resources, § 10-901 - 911 | MD NAT RES § 10-901 - 911 | This Maryland statute states that it is in the state's public interest to preserve native species by strictly regulating the possession, importation, exportation, breeding, raising, protection, rehabilitation, hunting, killing, trapping, capture, purchase, or sale of certain wildlife which pose a possibility of harm to native wildlife. | Statute |