Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel | 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986) |
Horses protected by the Wild Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Act are not instruments of the federal government, and therefore incursions by wild horses onto private land do not constitute a Fifth Amendment taking requiring just compensation. |
Case | ||
| RI - Vehicle - § 31-26-3.1. Duty to stop in accidents resulting in death or injury to domesticated animals | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 31-26-3.1 | RI ST § 31-26-3.1 | This Rhode Island statute states that the driver of any vehicle knowingly involved in an accident resulting in death or injury to a domesticated animal, shall immediately stop the vehicle and remain at the scene of the accident until the driver renders all possible assistance to the injured animal. The driver shall immediately and by the quickest means known, give notice of the accident to the owner of the animal or to a nearby office of local or state police. Any person failing to stop or comply with the requirements of this section shall upon be punished by a fine of not more than fifty dollars ($50.00). | Statute | |
| US - AWA - Congressional Conference Report on Adoption of 1966 AWA | 1966 Act Conference Report No. 1848 |
There were three main purposes for the proposed law in 1966: to protect the owners of pet dogs and cats from the theft of their pets; to prevent the use or sale of stolen dogs or cats for purposes of research or experimentation; and to establish humane standards for the treatment of dogs, cats, and certain other animals by animal dealers and research facilities. |
Administrative | ||
| Kuehl v. Sellner | 2016 WL 3429679 (unpublished) (N.D. Iowa June 17, 2016) | Five Plaintiffs Tracey K. Kuehl, Lisa K. Kuehl, Kris A. Bell, Nancy A. Harvey, John T. Braumann, and the Animal Legal Defense Fund filed a complaint against Defendants Pamela Sellner, Tom Sellner, and Cricket Hollow Zoo, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), by holding captive endangered species specifically the lemurs and tigers housed at Cricket Hollow Zoo. The United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division ordered the Defendants, to transfer the lemurs and tigers in their possession “to an appropriate facility which is licensed by the USDA and is capable of meeting the needs of the endangered species.” The Defendants proposed transporting the lemurs to Special Memories Zoo in Hortonville, Wisconsin, and transporting the tigers to the Exotic Feline Rescue Center in Centerpoint, Indiana. The Plaintiffs claimed that the proposed placements did not comply with the Court's Order and proposed that the lemurs be placed with the Prosimian Sanctuary in Jacksonville, Florida, and the tigers be transported to the Wild Animal Sanctuary in Keenesburg, Colorado. The Court held that the Special Memories Zoo was capable of meeting the lemurs' needs and should be transported there as the Defendant’s proposed. The court reasoned that even if the Court found Special Memories incapable of meeting the lemurs' needs, the Prosimian Sanctuary as proposed by the Plaintiff's was not licensed by the USDA. The Court also held that the endangered tigers should be transferred to the Exotic Feline Rescue Center as the Defendant’s proposed. The court reasoned that the center was capable of meeting of the needs of the tigers. Therefore the Court approved the Defendants' proposed placement of the lemurs and tigers. | Case | ||
| Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Lyder | 728 F.Supp.2d 1126 (D.Mont., 2010) | 2010 WL 3023652 (D.Mont.) |
Plaintiffs challenge the USFWS' 2009 designation of approximately 39,000 sq. miles of critical habitat for the United States distinct population segment of the Canada lynx. Specifically, they contend that the Service: (1) arbitrarily failed to designate occupied critical habitat in certain national forests in Montana and Idaho, as well as in Colorado entirely; (2) arbitrarily failed to designate any unoccupied critical habitat whatsoever; and (3) failed to base its decision on the "best scientific data available." The court concluded that the FWS arbitrarily excluded areas occupied by lynx in Idaho and Montana and failed to properly determine whether areas occupied by the lynx in Colorado possess the attributes essential to the conservation of the species. |
Case | |
| Earth Island Institute v. Brown | 865 F. Supp. 1364 (1994) |
Plaintiffs sought to prevent the Secretary of Commerce from allowing the American Tunaboat Association ("ATA") to continue killing northeastern offshore spotted dolphins that had been listed as depleted. Defendants argued that such killings were permissible under the ATA's permit, and that the MMPA provisions relied on by the plaintiffs were irrelevant to the dispute. The court concluded that Congress did not intend to allow the continued taking of dolphin species or stock, once the Secretary had determined that their population level was depleted. |
Case | ||
| MI - Habitat Protection - Wilderness, Wild, and Natural Areas (Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act) | M.C.L.A. 324.35101 - 35111 | MI ST 324.35101 - 35111 | These sections define, identify, and set guidelines for the protection of wilderness, wild, and/or natural areas. | Statute | |
| FL - Veterinary - Veterinary Medical Practice. | West's F. S. A. § 474.201 - 221 | FL ST § 474.201 - 221 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| Lachenman v. Stice | 838 N.E.2d 451 (Ind.App.) | 2005 WL 3188394 (Ind.App.) |
In this Indiana case, a dog owner whose dog was attacked and killed by a neighbor's dog, brought an action against the neighbor to recover veterinary bills and emotional distress damages. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of defendant-neighbor, finding that however negligent the neighbor's behavior might have been in controlling his dog, his actions did not constitute outrageous behavior so as to give rise to claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also refused to extend the bystander rule under plaintiff's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim to include the dog owner's witnessing the death of his dog. |
Case | |
| State v. Acker | 160 Conn. App. 734 (2015) | 2015 WL 6142904 (Conn. App. Ct., 2015) | Defendant, the director of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Connecticut, Inc., was charged with 63 counts of animal cruelty for failing to give animals “proper care by exposing [them] to conditions that placed [them] at risk of hypothermia, dehydration, or to conditions injurious to [their] well-being....” Defendant was the director of a nonprofit animal rescue organization and housed rescued dogs in an uninsulated outdoor barn heated solely by space heaters. After a trial, Defendant was convicted of 15 counts and acquitted of the remaining 48 counts of animal cruelty. On appeal, the defendant claimed that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction and (2)C.G.S.A. § 53-247(a) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case. The appellate court rejected defendant’s claims and affirmed the trial court’s decision. | Case |