Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Importation - Subpart F. Wildlife Declarations | 50 C.F.R. § 14.61 to .64 | Except as otherwise provided by the regulations of this subpart, importers or their agents must file with the Service a completed Declaration for Importation or Exportation of Fish or Wildlife (Form 3-177), signed by the importer or the importer's agent, upon the importation of any wildlife at the place where Service clearance under section 14.52 is requested. | Administrative | ||
| MN - Trust - 501C.0408. Trust for care of animal | M.S.A. § 501C.0408 | MN ST § 501C.0408 | This Minnesota law enacted in 2016 allows for the creation of a pet trust. A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. Interestingly, the trust may not be enforced for more than 90 years. | Statute | |
| Stamm v. New York City Transit Authority | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 2011 WL 1315935 (E.D.N.Y., 2011) | Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and New York State and New York City laws, alleging that the New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”) and the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (“MaBSTOA”) (collectively, “Defendants”) failed to ensure that their vehicles and facilities were accessible to her and other persons with disabilities who utilize service animals. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff (1) was not disabled, (2) was not entitled to use a “service animal,” (3) was seeking to bring dogs which do not qualify as “service animals” onto Defendants' vehicles; had not made out a Title II claim and (5) could not make out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted only with respect to that portion of the eleventh cause of action that alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. The parties were also directed to submit supplemental briefing. | Case | ||
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4543043 (N.D.Cal.) | (only the Westlaw cite is available) |
In an action alleging multiple violations of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) pursuant to Defendants’ final rule designating the polar bear as threatened and promulgation of a special rule under section 4(d) of the ESA, Defendants Kempthorne and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service brought a motion to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Intervenor-Defendant Arctic Slope Regional Corporation brought a separate motion to transfer the case to the District of Alaska, and Intervenor-Defendant Alaska Oil and Gas Association filed a motion with the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL Panel) seeking to transfer the case to the D.C. District Court . The United States District Court, N.D. California denied the motion to transfer the case to the District of Alaska, and decided to take the motion to transfer to the District of Columbia into submission and rule on it once the MDL Panel has issued its decision on whether to transfer the case to the District of Columbia. |
Case | |
| In the Matter of: Darcy Lynn Shawyer | 1980 NOAA LEXIS 2 | 2 O.R.W. 301 (1980) |
This case is a civil penalty proceeding under the MMPA for the unlawful importation of eight bottlenose porpoises into the United States. In this case, the court found that specific intent is not required for importation under the MMPA. The court found that the route taken over the United States, the requirement to land for customs clearance purposes, or weather conditions was known or should have been foreseeable to all parties. |
Case | |
| AL - Impound - Maintenance of pound; notice of impoundment; adoption of animals. | Ala. Code 1975 § 3-7A-7 | AL ST 3-7A-7 | This Alabama statute provides that it is the duty of each and every county in the state to provide a suitable county pound and impounding officer for the impoundment of dogs, cats, and ferrets found running at large in violation of the provisions of this chapter. When dogs and cats are impounded and if the owner thereof is known, such owner shall be given direct notice of the impoundment of said animal or animals belonging to him; or the impounding officer may make said animal or animals available for adoption after a period of not less than seven days. | Statute | |
| Confiscated night monkeys veterinary evaluation | Slideshow Images | ||||
| Animal Law Volume 15 Part 1 Index |
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| IN - Liens - 32-33-8-1 Feed and care bestowed upon livestock; mechanic's and tradesman lien | I.C. 32-33-8-1 | Ind. Code Ann. § 32-33-8-1 (West) | This statute allows the keeper of a livery stable or any person engaged in feeding horses, cattle, hogs, and other livestock to place a lien on any of the animals that he or she cares for. | Statute | |
| Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife v. Kelly | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2015 WL 1293338 (D. Idaho 2015) | Plaintiffs brought an action against the Defendants, challenging the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”)'s November 28, 2012 Final Rule designating 30,010 acres in Idaho and Washington as critical habitat for the southern Selkirk Mountains population of woodland caribou under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged (1) that the Final Rule's critical habitat designation was arbitrary and capricious because the Defendants failed to explain how the limited amount of critical habitat designated was sufficient to recover this population of caribou and (2) that Defendants failed to provide public notice and comment on the substantially revised critical habitat designation before issuing the Final Rule. Defendants and Intervenors argued that the Final Rule satisfied the requirements of the ESA and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA").While the district court stated that the Final Rule's analysis seemed reasonably based on the best available science, it refused to make a conclusive determination on the arbitrary and capricious issue because procedural requirements necessitated a further public review and comment period. The court therefore found the error in this case was a procedural one resulting from the FWS failing to provide a period of public review and comment on the Final Rule's critical change in reasoning. The Court therefore remanded this matter to the FWS to cure the procedural error by affording the necessary public comment period and to consider anew the critical habitat designation in light of those comments. | Case |