Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tranchita v. Callahan | 511 F. Supp. 3d 850 (N.D. Ill. 2021) | 2021 WL 50349 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2021) | This case involves a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction by Plaintiff Tranchita against Colleen Callahan, Director of the Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR). In 2019, agents of the IDNR seized four coyotes Tranchita was raising at her home. After the seizure, three of the four coyotes died, and the remaining coyote, Luna, is elderly and in poor health. Tranchita seeks return of Luna from the coyote rescue center where Luna now resides. The IDNR contends that it will not release Luna until a court declares that the Plaintiff can legally possess her. By way of background, Tranchita is a wildlife exhibitor and educator who has cared for orphaned coyote pups since 2006. In 2016, Tranchita forgot to obtain another Breeder Permit and then failed to do so for the successive three years. Consequently, while she possessed a USDA Exhibitor License, she did not possess the required Illinois state licenses to keep coyotes. In 2019, Plaintiff sought relief in Illinois state court, which found that should she regain possession of Luna again, she must possess a Breeder Permit. The court did not consider whether that permit alone was sufficient or whether a Hound Running Permit is also required. Plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed her state court complaint and, four months later, filed a six-count verified complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After that filing, Plaintiff moved for a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from (1) requiring her to hold a Hound Running Permit in order to keep Luna in Illinois; and (2) seizing Luna so long as Tranchita holds a current Breeder Permit. Tranchita seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive remedies that are all directed to allowing her to keep Luna in Illinois without a Hound Running Permit. The court first examined Tranchita 's likelihood of success on the merits for her five claims: her “class-of-one” equal protection claim, preemption claim, free exercise claim, procedural due process claim, and substantive due process claim. As to the first "class-of-one" claim, the court found that Tranchita's displeasure and disagreement with Defendants’ failure to enforce the Hound Running Permit requirement against other alleged violators likely does not give rise to a class-of-one claim. Further, the court found Tranchita was not likely to success on her claim asserting that the AWA preempts the IDNR's policy requiring an individual who wants to possess a coyote to obtain a Hound Running Permit. The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that hound running in Illinois constitutes an “animal fighting venture” that the AWA prohibits. Indeed, the court noted that the state definition for "hound running" includes when an authorized species "pursued with dogs in a hound running area, but not in a manner or with the intent to capture or kill.” Further, the court noted the Seventh Circuit held that Congress did not intend for the AWA to preempt or ban state legislation, like the Wildlife Code, that regulates wild animals. Tranchita also asserts that the Hound Running Permit requirement violates her rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court found that Hound Running Permit requirement is neutral and generally applicable and is rationally related to a legitimate government interest" (i.e., regulating who can keep coyotes (and where) in that it requires an individual who wants to raise a coyote to do so on at least ten contiguous acres of land). Because the Hound Running Permit requirement appears to be supported by a rational basis, Tranchita is not likely to succeed on her Free Exercise claim. Finally, Tranchita brings claims for procedural and substantive due process violations. The court stated that, to succeed on this contention, Plaintiff must provide something that happened after April 2019 that could arguably return her property interest in Luna or provide her with a new, independent property interest in Luna. However, the court found that Plaintiff did not have a property interest in Luna at the time of the seizure because she did not have a Breeder Permit at that time. Because Tranchita has not demonstrated that she is likely to establish a protected property interest in Luna, she has failed to show that she is likely to succeed on either due process claim based on this interest. Tranchita's argument that her current Breeder Permit (issued without the concomitant Hound Running Permit by Illinois) protects her property interest also failed to persuade the court because the law states that "[n]o fur-bearing mammal breeder permits will be issued to hold, possess, or engage in the breeding and raising of striped skunks acquired after July 1, 1975, or coyotes acquired after July 1, 1978, except for coyotes that are held or possessed by a person who holds a hound running area permit under Section 3.26 of this Act." That granting of the Breeder Permit without the necessary Hound Running Permit required by law led Tranchita to her last argument: "the IDNR's custom and policy of issuing her Breeder Permits and allowing her to keep coyotes without a Hound Running Permit created an entitlement to possess a coyote based on a Breeder Permit alone." In fact, Tranchita points out that IDNR issued her a Breeder Permit on several separate occasions without requiring her to first have a Hound Running Permit while she already possessed coyotes. The court noted that a protected property interest may “arise from mutually explicit understandings," but the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of a mutually explicit understanding. Here, the Court was "skeptical" that sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate a department-wide custom or policy. In essence, the court found Tranchita had no likelihood of succeeding on the merits of the claims. The court did briefly engage in addressing the preliminary injunction factors. With regard to her claim that she will suffer irreparable harm in the form of Luna's imminent death, the court noted that the harm must be "likely" rather than just "possible." Tranchita's delay in seeking preliminary injunctive relief (four months after she withdrew her state court claims) undermines her irreparable harm argument. While the court was sympathetic and concludes that Luna's death would constitute irreparable harm to Plaintiff, it was not enough to persuade the court that death is likely absent the issuance of a TRO or injunction. Finally, on balancing the harms and public interests, the court found they do not weigh decidedly in Plaintiff's favor. Thus, the court denied Tranchita's motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction. | Case | |
| Ruiz v. Franklin County Animal Control | 732 S.E.2d 393 (Table), 2012 WL 4510934 (N.C.App.) (unpublished) |
This North Carolina case is an appeal from a denial of summary judgment in favor of Franklin County Animal Control. Defendants argue that the trial court erred by declining to enter summary judgment in their favor on the basis of governmental immunity. The appellate court agreed, reversed the trial court's decision, and remanded for an entry of summary judgment for defendants. The court found that there is no dispute in the record that Franklin County Animal Control and Stallings, in his official capacity as an Animal Control Officer, were performing a governmental function in impounding and euthanizing plaintiff's dog. Further, plaintiff failed to allege in her complaint that defendants waived governmental immunity, subjecting her action to dismissal. |
Case | ||
| European Union - Research - Protection of Animals | Official Journal L 358, 18 December 1986, pp. 1-28 | COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (86/609/EEC) | The aim pursued by this Directive is to ensure the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative provisions in the Member States for the protection of animals used for research avoid affecting the market. In this directive, an experiment not entailing the use of animals is preferred over one that does if that experiment can obtain the same result and is reasonably and practically available. Furthermore, each Member State shall ensure that experiments using animals considered as endangered under Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora and Annex C.I of Regulation (EEC) No. 3626/82 are prohibited unless they are in conformity with the above-mentioned Regulation and the objects of the experiment are research aimed at preservation of the species in question, or essential biomedical purposes where the species in question exceptionally proves to be the only one suitable for those purposes. | Administrative | |
| European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes |
This treaty applies to animals kept for farming purposes. It outlines the keeping, caring for and housing of farm animals on the farm and especially in modern stock farming systems. Freedom of movement is especially important for animals kept in these systems as well as appropriate lighting, ventilation, temperature and environmental conditions |
Treaty | |||
| PA - Permits - Subchapter M. Exotic Wildlife Dealer | 58 PA ADC §147 .241 - 246 | 58 Pa. Code § 147.241 - 246 | These Pennsylvania regulations relate to the housing and care of exotic wildlife and public protection from wildlife that is being held or transported by exotic wildlife dealers. Under the regulations, it is unlawful to keep exotic wildlife in confinement in an unsanitary or unsafe condition, or in a manner which results in maltreatment, mistreatment or neglect. The regulations outline requirements for housing, cage construction, food and water provision, waste removal. and drainage. | Administrative | |
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE MADHYA PRADESH GOVANSH VADH PRATISHEDH ADHINIYAM, 2004 | 6 of 2004 | The law, specific to the state of Madhya Pradesh, criminalizes the slaughter of cows and their progeny, including bulls and bullocks. The Act criminalizes the possession and transport of beef and the transport of cows and their progeny for slaughter. The Act authorizes a competent authority to enter and inspect premises where they believe an offence under this Act has been or is likely to be committed. The state government must make rules for the economic rehabilitation of persons whose livelihoods have been affected by the Act. The Act imposes the burden or proof for an offence under the Act on the accused. | Statute | ||
| NJ - Humane Societies - 40:48-5.1. Contracts with humane societies where no pound established; advertisement unnecessary | N. J. S. A. 40:48-5.1 | NJ ST 40:48-5.1 | This law relates to municipalities that do not have public pounds for the keeping of stray dogs or cats.Those municipalities may contract with nonproift humane societies or similar associations that have been operating for one or more years for the keeping and redemption of those animals. | Statute | |
| Smith v. City of New York | 889 N.Y.S.2d 187 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2009) | 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 08969 |
This New York appeal reversed the lower court's judgment finding Officer Smith strictly liable for dog-bite injuries sustained by infant plaintiffs. The court found that, in the limited time the officer spent with the dog, the dog acted friendly, playful, and "rambunctious." He did not see the dog growl or lunge at the plaintiff and her family, who were sitting in the precinct house. The testimony adduced at trial did not establish that Officer Smith knew or should have known of the dog's vicious propensities. Further, the court found the evidence was insufficient to show that Officer Smith owned the dog. Rather, he took temporary custody of the abandoned dog with the intention to transport him to the ASPCA, and the dog was in his possession for, at most, a few hours. |
Case | |
| American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc. v. Lyng | 681 F.Supp. 949 (D.D.C.,1988) |
This case resulted from a remand by the Court of Appeals after the USDA denied the plaintiff's application for additional rulemaking for the Horse Protection Act to expressly prohibit the use of ten ounce chains and padded shoes in the training of show horses. The use of these materials, argues plaintiff, constitutes soring (the act of deliberately injuring a horse's hooves to obtain a particular type of gait prized at certain horse shows. The object of soring is to cause a horse to suffer pain as its feet touch the ground). This Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In doing so, it directed the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture to institute rulemaking procedures concerning the use of action devices on show horses. The Court further held that the existing regulations are contrary to law and that the Secretary ignored his mandate from Congress under the Horse Protection Act. |
Case | ||
| VT - Veterinary - CHAPTER 44. Veterinary Medicine. | 26 V.S.A. § 2401 - 2433 | VT ST T. 26 § 2401- 2433 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |