Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Decision AHC4806－2017 | Decision AHC4806－2017 | (Original case in Spanish below; English translation attached as pdf). The Supreme Court of Justice rules in favor of the spectacled bear, ‘Chucho’, granting him the habeas corpus after the bear’s attorney challenged the lower court decision that denied it. Chucho is a 22 year old spectacled bear that was born and raised in semi-captivity. He lived for 18 years in a natural reserve in the city of Manizales with his sister. After his sister died, Chucho became depressed and started escaping. The environmental authorities thought that it would be in the best interest of the bear to relocate him, for which they decided to move him to a zoo in the northern of Colombia. Unfortunately, the living conditions of Chucho were diminished, as he went from living in semi-captivity to living into a smaller area. Attorney Luis Domingo Maldonado filed an habeas corpus in representation of the bear that was denied on first instance by the civil chamber of the Superior Tribunal of Manizales. Attorney Luis Domingo Maldonado argued that the current legal system did not have a specific proper mechanism that allowed the taking of immediate and urgent measures to protect the rights of animals as sentient beings to retire them for centers of captivity when they have spent their lives in natural reserves. He also used as examples the precedents from Brazil and Argentina where a chimpanzee and an orangutan were granted habeas corpus. Attorney Maldonado sought that the court order the immediate and permanent relocation of Chucho to the natural reserve ‘La Planada’, located in the Department of Narino. The Civil Chamber reversed the decision on first instance, and ordered the relocation of Chucho from the zoo in Barranquilla to a more appropriate location of semi-captivity conditions. In its reasoning, the magistrate judge stated that animals are entitled to rights as sentient beings, not as humans, and that the idea is to insert a morality of respect to counter a global ecological public order where the tendency of men is to destroy the habitat. After long considerations, the chamber stated that it is necessary to modify the concept of ‘subject of rights’ in relation with nature, understanding that who is subject of rights is not necessarily correlatively-bound to have duties. “The legal, ethical and political purpose is the unavoidable need to create a strong conscience to protect the vital environment for the survival of men, conservation of the environment and as a frontal fight against the irrationality in the man-nature relationship.” | Case | |
| Roman v. Carroll | 621 P.2d 307 (Ariz.App., 1980) |
The question on this appeal is whether a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress she suffered from watching defendants' St. Bernard dismember plaintiff's poodle while she was walking the dog near her home. Relying on a case that allowed damages for emotional distress suffered from witnessing injury to a third person, plaintiff contended that her relationship with her poodle was a close one within the confines of that case. However, the court summarily denied her claim, holding that a dog is personal property and damages are not recoverable for negligent infliction of emotional distress from witnessing injury to property. |
Case | |
| PR - Ordinances - Municipal regulation of domestic animals | PR ST T. 24 § 651 | 24 L.P.R.A. § 651 |
This Puerto Rico statute confers authority to the municipal councils of Puerto Rico to regulate by ordinance, the running at large of domestic animals, destruction and impounding of such animals, as well as the regulation of muzzling and licensing of dogs. In addition, the councils are given authority to enact all needful ordinances to protect the public health as affected by the running at large of domestic animals. |
Statute |
| People v. Parker (Unpublished) | 1999 WL 33435342 (Unpublished Mich. 1999) |
Defendants-appellees, who were bound over on the charge of knowingly attending an animal fight and of knowingly organizing, promoting, or collecting money for the fighting of an animal, filed a motion to suppress evidence and motions to quash the information. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed and the appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact, and that evidence that had been obtained in violation of defendant Parker's Fourth Amendment rights was admissible against all defendants except Parker. Finally, as to the defendants' challenge that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the court declared that it had already determined that the language was neither vague nor overbroad. Reversed and remanded for trial. |
Case | |
| Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Engineers | 402 F.3d 846 (9th Cir., 2005) | 2005 WL 525269 (9th Cir.) |
An environmental group brought an action against the U.S. Army Corps Engineers and BP for violating both the National Environmental Policy Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Defendants counter-claimed that the environmental group lacked standing and that the claim was barred by laches. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment, reversed summary judgment against the environmental group, and remanded the case for consideration of the environmental group's request for injunctive relief. |
Case |
| Duncan v. State | 975 N.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. Ind. 2012) | 2012 WL 4470240 (Ct. App. Ind.) |
A complaint regarding the welfare of horses led to the defendant being convicted of 6 charges of animal cruelty, all of which were class A misdemeanors. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that he had not knowingly waived his right to a jury trial, that Indiana’s animal cruelty law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was no sufficient evidence to overcome a defense of necessity. The appeals court agreed that the defendant did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial and therefore reversed and remanded the case on that issue; however, the appeals court disagreed with the defendant on the other issues. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
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| U.S. v. Lopez (Abridged for Purposes of Eagle Topic Area) | 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995) |
Laws governing intrastate activities will be upheld if they substantially affect interstate commerce. Under the Eagle Act, the power to regulate eagles has been summarily upheld as a valid exercise of commerce power, as it protects the eagle as a species by preventing the creation of a legal commercial market for the animal. For further discussion of the Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion. |
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| Christensen v. Lundsten | 863 N.Y.S.2d 886, 2008 WL 4118071 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.) | 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 28320 |
In this New York case, the parent of child injured by a dog brought an action seeking to have the dog declared a “dangerous dog” under the relevant law. The Court conducted a trial of the “dangerous dog” petition filed and rendered an oral decision that declared the respondents' Chesapeake Bay Retriever “Nellie” to be a dangerous dog under New York Agricultural and Markets Law § 121. The parties contested the appropriateness of a finding of “negligence” and “strict liability” and the entry of judgment. The District Court held that the court would not resolve issue of negligence because the issue was not properly joined for disposition; however, the owners were strictly liable for child's unreimbursed medical expenses. |
Case |
| NY - Dangerous Dog - Chapter 69. Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 123, 123-a | NY AGRI & MKTS § 123, 123-a | This New York statute provides that statutory penalties for dog bites and the process for declaring a dog "dangerous." Any person who witnesses an attack or threatened attack, or in the case of a minor, an adult acting on behalf of such minor, may make a complaint of an attack or threatened attack upon a person, companion animal, farm animal, or a domestic animal to a dog control officer or police officer of the appropriate municipality. Such officer shall immediately inform the complainant of his or her right to commence a proceeding as provided in subdivision two of this section and, if there is reason to believe the dog is a dangerous dog, the officer shall forthwith commence such proceeding himself or herself. Upon a finding that a dog is dangerous, the judge or justice may order humane euthanasia or permanent confinement of the dog if one listed aggravating circumstances is established at the judicial hearing. | Statute |