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Displaying 6091 - 6100 of 6636
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ME - Fish and Wildlife Management Research - Chapter 925. Fish and Wildlife Management and Research | 12 M. R. S. A. § 12701 to 12708 | ME ST T. 12 § 12701 to 12708 | The following statutes give the Maine Commissioner of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife the authority to make regulations for hunting, fishing, trapping or other public use of any wildlife management area or wildlife sanctuary. These statutes also provide civil and criminal penalties for violating the rules regulating state-owned wildlife management areas, state game farms, and scientific permits, while also detailing prohibited activity in wildlife sanctuaries. Additionally, these statutes also reveal the wildlife management areas and wildlife sanctuaries that are under the commissioner's authority. | Statute |
| Nonhuman Rights Project on behalf of Tommy and Kiko v. | 31 N.Y.3d 1054, 100 N.E.3d 846 (2018) | 2018 WL 2107087 (Mem), 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 03309 | The petitioner, Nonhuman Rights Project brought this appeal on behalf of Tommy and Kiko, who are two captive chimpanzees. The chimpanzees had been confined by their owners in small cages within a warehouse and a cement storefront in a crowded residential area, respectively. Petitioner sought leave to appeal from an order of the Appellate Division, which affirmed two judgments of the Supreme Court declining to sign orders to show cause to grant the chimpanzees habeas relief. The lower courts based their denial of habeas corpus for the chimpanzees on the dictionary definition for "person." The term “person” tends to lean towards an entity that is recognized by law as having most of the rights and duties of a human. The Appellate Division also reasoned that chimpanzees are not considered people because they lack the capacity to bear legal duties or to be held legally accountable for their actions. As a counter, the Petitioner argued that the same can be said for human infants or comatose human adults, yet no one would say that it is improper to seek a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of one of them. The Appellate Division therefore based their denial on the fact that chimpanzees are not a member of the human species. In the instant action, Court of Appeals of New York denied the motion for leave to appeal. In the concurring opinion, Judge Fahey states that the better approach is not to ask whether a chimpanzee fits the definition of a person or whether it has the same rights and duties as a human being, but whether he or she has the right to liberty protected by habeas corpus. The concurring opinion also found that the Appellate Division erred by misreading the case it relied on and holding that a habeas corpus challenge cannot be used to seek transfer; a habeas corpus challenge can be used to seek a transfer to another facility. Although Judge Fahey recognizes that Chimpanzees share at least 96% of their DNA with humans and are autonomous, intelligent creatures, he concurred with the Appellate Division’s decision to deny leave to appeal. However, he ultimately questioned whether the Court was right to deny leave in the first instance. | Case |
| Galgano v. Town of North Hempstead | 41 A.D.3d 536 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2007) | 840 N.Y.S.2d 794, 2007 WL 1704612 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 05223 |
In this New York Case, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint for personal injuries and damages due to a dog bite. The court reaffirmed New York law that to recover in strict liability in tort for a dog bite or attack, the plaintiff must establish that the dog had vicious propensities and that the owner knew or should have known of the dog's propensities. The fact that the subject dog was brought to the animal shelter because another dog in the owner's household did not get along with it is not indicative that it had vicious propensities. |
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| Idaho Dairymen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Gooding County | 227 P.3d 907 (Idaho 2010) | 2010 WL 337939 (Idaho), 148 Idaho 653 (2010) |
After Gooding County adopted an ordinance regulating confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs), cattle ranching and dairy associations brought suit challenging the constitutionality and validity of provisions within the ordinance and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the county, and the associations appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's findings. |
Case |
| TX - Dangerous - Subchapter B: Dogs That Are A Danger to Animals | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 822.011 - 013 | TX HEALTH & S § 822.011 - 013 | Subchapter B prohibits dogs from running at large and enumerates the criminal penalty for such violation. | Statute |
| MT - Veterinary - CHAPTER 18. VETERINARY MEDICINE | MCA 37-18-101 to 37-18-807 | MT ST 37-18-101 to 37-18-807 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| IL - Domesticated Wild Animals Act - Chapter 510. Animals. | 510 I.L.C.S. 60/0.01 - 60/3 | IL ST CH 510 § 60/0.01 - 60/3 | All birds and wild animals in domestication, or kept in enclosures and reduced to possession, are declared to be objects of ownership and absolute title. When fur bearing animals are raised in captivity for breeding, such animals are considered domestic animals. The animals and the products made from them are agricultural products. | Statute |
| RI - Research - Chapter 27. Retirement of Research Dogs and Cats | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-27-1 - 2 | RI ST § 4-27-1 - 2 | This chapter, adopted in 2018, is the “Research Animal Retirement Act." A higher education research facility that receives public money must assess the health of a cat or dog to determine whether it is suitable for adoption once any testing or research on the animal has been completed. The facility must then make reasonable efforts to place those suitable dogs or cats through private adoption or adoption through a shelter or rescue. These efforts shall be made prior to euthanizing the dog or cat. | Statute |
| Sentencia T-760, 2007 | Sentencia T-760/07 | The Plaintiff brought an action of ‘tutela’ (Constitutional mechanism that is preferential and summary created for the purpose of protection of fundamental rights) against Corporación Autónoma Regional de Caldas ‘CORPOCALDAS’, arguing that ‘CORPOCALDAS’ had violated the fundamental rights to health, personal integrity, life and human integrity of the Plaintiff’s wife, who became severely depressed when the Defendant confiscated an amazonian parrot she kept as her pet. The Plaintiff argued that the parrot was the only company the Plaintiff’s wife had for over five years, and that the confiscation of their parrot, was a violation of the Plaintiff's wife's fundamental rights. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argued that his wife was 65 years old, had raised the parrot that was never abused or neglected and who was allowed to move freely as her wings were never trimmed. The Plaintiff sought the the return of the parrot by the environmental authority ‘CORPOCALDAS’ to his wife, as well as the granting of the parrot’s title to her. The Court was able to find that the Plaintiff’s wife’s health was indeed diminished after the confiscation of the bird and the she had to undergo treatment as a result of it. However, the court found that the Plaintiffs were unable to provide evidence tending to prove that they had acquired the animal in a legal manner, as no permit, hunting license, or evidence that the parrot was obtained from a legal breeder were provided. The court determined that CORPOCALDAS did not overstep its responsibilities, as it is its duty to protect the wild fauna of the nation. Touching on the issue of whether the the fundamental rights of the plaintiff had been violated, the court concluded there was not such violation, as the environmental authority’s action was legal, reasonable, necessary and legitimate, and the Plaintiff did not obtained the parrot in accordance with the requirements legally established. In this case, the collective right to a healthy environment prevailed over the personal interest of the Plaintiff. The Constitutional Court affirmed the judgment of the ‘Juzgado Segundo Laboral del Circuito de Manizales’. | Case | |
| Gurtek v. Chisago County | 1988 WL 81554 (Minn.App., 1988) (unpublished) |
Appellants sought review of a denial of a special-use permit to build a large campground adjacent to a bald eagle nesting site. They contended that the denial by the county board was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the denial was reasonable where the county proffered two legally valid reasons for denying the permit: the danger to the sensitive nesting eagle population and the detrimental effect the increased human activity would have on the unspoiled nature of the property. |
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