Displaying 6121 - 6130 of 6155
|ANIMAL THING TO ANIMAL PERSON-THOUGHTS ON TIME, PLACE, AND THEORIES||Steven M. Wise||5 Animal L. 61 (1999)||The rule that "animals are property," and do not merit legal rights, is ingrained in the law of English-speaking countries. Challenges to this rule must be brought in strategic, thoughtful, sensitive, sophisticated, and coordinated ways. This essay offers seven related strategic considerations for anyone who wishes to battle the "animals as property" rule.||Article|
|Introduction to Animal Law Book||Steven M. Wise||67 Syracuse L. Rev. 7 (2017)||Steven M. Wise gives the introduction to Syracuse Law Review's Animal Law Book from 2017.||Article|
|THUNDER WITHOUT RAIN: A REVIEW/COMMENTARY OF GARY L. FRANCIONE'S RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT||Steven M. Wise||3 Animal L. 45 (1997)||In Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement, Professor Gary L. Francione argues that the modern animal rights movement is propelled similarly like the American abolitionist movement. "New Welfarists," he claims, fruitlessly pursue the goal of ending the exploitation of nonhuman animals through measures that better their welfare but cannot result in what matters most, the abolition of their legal status as property. In this essay, Steven Wise argues that New Welfarism does not contain a "structural defect," but a "structural inconsistency" that is necessary to achieve Gary Francione's goal of abolishing the property status of nonhuman animals in a manner consistent with the moral rights of nonhuman animals.||Article|
|LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NONHUMAN ANIMALS: THE CASE FOR CHIMPANZEES AND BONOBOS||Steven M. Wise||2 Animal L. 179 (1996)||This article was adapted from remarks from Steven M. Wise at a symposium held by the Student Animal Legal Defense Fund of Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College on September 23, 1995 regarding issues affecting domestic and captive animals.||Article|
|An Argument for the Basic Legal Rights of Farmed Animals||Steven M. Wise||106 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 133 (2008)||As legal things, nonhuman animals lack all legal rights and remain entirely the object of the rights held by us legal persons—that is, the beings with rights. Most legal protections for nonhuman animals remain indirect (mostly anti-cruelty statutes), enforceable only by public prosecutors. Even the Endangered Species Act requires a human plaintiff to have standing sufficient under Article III of the United States Constitution. It has become clear that no meaningful percentage of nonhuman animals will ever be treated well or fairly until they attain some minimum degree of legal personhood—that is, until they achieve some minimum level of fundamental legal rights. In his article, Steven M. Wise argues for the fundamental rights of nonhuman animals by relying upon bedrock principles of Western law: liberty and equality.||Article|
|Dismantling the Barriers to Legal Rights for Nonhuman Animals||Steven M. Wise||7 Animal L. 9 (2001)||
This article presents the remarks of Steven M. Wise on the status of animals in the legal system.
|How Nonhuman Animals Were Trapped in a Nonexistent Universe||Steven M. Wise||1 Animal L. 15 (1995)||The first in a series of articles by the author whose overall purpose is to explain why legal rights need not be restricted to human beings and why a handful of rights that protect fundamental interests of human beings should also protect the fundamental interests of such nonhuman animals as chimpanzees and bonobos. The second article in this series traces the development of the common law as it concerns the relationships between human and nonhuman animals from its beginnings in the Mesopotamian "law code" of the third and second millennia, B.C. until today.||Article|
|LEGAL PERSONHOOD AND THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT||Steven M. Wise||17 Animal L. 1 (2010)||
The author gives an overview of the progress of the Nonhuman Rights Project.
|RECOVERY OF COMMON LAW DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, LOSS OF SOCIETY, AND LOSS OF COMPANIONSHIP FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF A COMPANION ANIMAL||Steven M. Wise||4 Animal L. 33 (1998)||Mr. Wise analyzes experiential recognition of the bond that exists between human companions and companion animals in the context of possible recovery of tort damages for the wrongful death of a companion animal. He demonstrates that companion animals are often seen by their human companions as members of the family (holding much the same status as children). He discusses historical aspects of the common law as they relate to current tort law in such cases and examines the tension that exists between principle and policy.||Article|
|ANIMAL LAW-THE CASEBOOK||Steven M. Wise||6 Animal L. 251 (2000)||This is a book review of the casebook "Animal Law."||Article|