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| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animal & Natural Resource Law Review Volume XVI |
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of LawAnimal & Natural Resource Law ReviewVol. |
Policy | ||
| IN - Vehicle - Chapter 30. Immunity for Removing a Domestic Animal from a Locked Motor Vehicle | I.C. 34-30-30-1 - 4 | IN ST 34-30-30-1 - 4 | This Indiana chapter on pets in motor vehicles was enacted in 2017. Under the chapter, "domestic animal" means a dog, cat or other vertebrate animal kept as a household pet (not including livestock). Section 34-30-30-3 provides that a person who forcibly enters a motor vehicle to remove a domestic animal from a motor vehicle is liable for one-half the cost of repairing the damage to the motor vehicle caused by the forcible entry. To meet this immunity, the person must reasonably believe that the domestic animal is in imminent danger of suffering serious bodily harm. The person must do all the following first: (1) determine the motor vehicle is locked and forcible entry is necessary to remove the domestic animal; (2) call 911 or attempt to contact law enforcement/animal control; (3) use no more force than is necessary to remove the domestic animal from the vehicle; and (4) remain with the animal until first responders or law enforcement arrive. The statute gives complete immunity from the costs of damage to any first responder, law enforcement/animal control officer, public safety government employee, or veterinary professional. Finally, the chapter immunizes the owner of the domestic animal from liability for bites or physical injury to the rescuer. | Statute |
| WY - Livestock - Chapter 30. Offenses Concerning Livestock and Other Animals. | W. S. 1977 § 11-30-101 to 115 | WY ST § 11-30-101 to 115 | This Wyoming chapter of laws covers such offenses from misbranding livestock to a prohibition on the desertion and abandonment of sheep. Specific horse offenses are detailed, such as taking possession of any horse or mule found running at large on the open range with the intent of working or riding it, and the use of horses by a stable keeper without consent of the owner. The chapter also makes it a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $750 and/or imprisonment for up to 6 months for willfully or maliciously killing a wild horse. | Statute |
| SC - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | Code 1976 § 16-13-60; Code 1976 § 23-1-100; Code 1976 § 23-23-140; Code 1976 § 1-1-655; Code 1976 § 47-3-10 - 990; Code 1976 § 47-5-10 - 210; Code 1976 § 47-7-10 - 170; Code 1976 § 50-11-65, § 50-11-770, § 50-11-780, and § 51-3-145; Code 1976 § 50-19-960 | ST SC § 16-13-60; ST SC § 23-1-100; SC ST § 1-1-655; SC ST § 47-3-10 - 990; SC ST § 47-5-10 - 210; SC ST § 47-7-10 - 170; SC ST § 50-11-65, § 50-11-770, § 50-11-780; § 51-3-145; § 50-19-960 | These statutes comprise South Carolina's state dog laws. Among the provisions include laws concerning damage done by dogs (especially to livestock), rabies control provisions, and registration requirements. | Statute |
| NH - Hunting - Interference with Hunting, Trapping or Fishing. 207:57 Harassment. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 207:57 | NH ST § 207:57 | This represents New Hampshire's hunter harassment law. The law provides that no person shall purposely obstruct or impede the participation of any individual in the lawful activity of hunting, fishing or trapping while that individual is in a designated hunting area on public lands. The section does not apply to any incidental interference arising from the lawful and normal activities of public land users. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a violation. | Statute |
| Dyess v. Caraway | 190 So.2d (666 La.App., 1966) |
Plaintiff claimed damages for the death of five pedigreed Norwegian Elkhound puppies resulting from the negligence of defendant, Hugh L. Caraway, a duly licensed veterinarian. Specifically, defendant allegedly failed to make proper diagnostic tests, failed to give proper treatment for coccidia from which the puppy died, although the defendant had professional knowledge that the puppy was suffering from that disease, and failed to exercise the standard of care required by the average prudent veterinarian in the community. The court first noted the difficulty in diagnosing distemper. It also found the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in applicable in the instant case, primarily for the reason that the instant case involves a question of diagnosis and treatment of a professional nature which in itself requires judgment. |
Case | |
| Volosen v. State | 192 S.W.3d 597(Tex.App.-Fort Worth, 2006) | 2006 WL 349713 (Tx. 2006) |
In this Texas case, the trial court found Appellant Mircea Volosen guilty of animal cruelty for killing a neighbor's dog. The sole issue on appeal is whether the State met its burden of presenting legally sufficient evidence that Volosen was "without legal authority" to kill the dog. By statute, a dog that "is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked ... fowls may be killed by ... any person witnessing the attack." The court found that no rational trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the dog was not attacking or had not recently attacked chickens in a pen in Volosen's yard; thus, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that Volosen killed the dog "without legal authority" as required to sustain a conviction for animal cruelty. Judgment Reversed by Volosen v. State , 227 S.W.3d 77 (Tex.Crim.App., 2007). |
Case |
| CA - Housing - § 4715. Pets within common interest developments | West's Ann. Cal. Civ. Code § 4715 | CA CIVIL § 4715 | This California statute states that no governing documents shall prohibit the owner of a separate interest within a common interest development from keeping at least one pet. | Statute |
| Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Defense Fund | --- S.W.3d ----, 2018 WL 5075116 (Tex. App. Oct. 18, 2018) | This is an appeal of a dismissal of appellant Landry's claims under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“the TCPA”) and the subsequent required awarding of attorney fees and sanction under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.009. Landry's is a large corporation that owns and operates more than 500 entertainment properties across the country, including the Houston Aquarium, Inc. The aquarium houses four white tigers in an human-made enclosure known as "Maharaja's Temple." Appellees, including the Animal Legal Defense Fund and its attorneys as well as a radio station owner (Cheryl Conley), asserted a variety of claims in connection with the publication of the notice to intend to sue under the Endangered Species Act due to the care and housing of the tigers. As a result of that notice and the associated publicity, Landry's asserted claims in the trial court for defamation, business disparagement, tortious interference with prospective business relations, abuse of process, trespass, conspiracy to commit each of these torts, and conspiracy to commit theft. Conley and ALDF moved to dismiss the claims under the TCPA, arguing that the claims related to exercise of free speech, petition, and association, and that Landry's could not make out a prima facie case. Additionally, they also argued that the claims were barred by the judicial-proceedings privilege. The lower court agreed and granted Conley's motion to dismiss. It also awarded $250,000 to ALDF and $200,000 to Conley. On appeal here, Landry again points to the allegedly defamatory statements released on social media (Twitter and Facebook) and through news media regarding the tigers' care. The court noted that many of the statements were non-actionable because they were not shown to be false statements of fact or were opinions. Nonetheless, even on those statements where Landry's met their burden of proving a defamation claim, the statements were protected by the judicial-proceedings privilege. The court was not convinced by Landry's contention that the statements were not made in contemplation of litigation because they were made after the required federal notice for filing suit under the ESA. Additionally, the court also rejected Landry's claim that the ALDF cannot claim attorney immunity because it is not a law firm and instead is comprised of attorneys who hold law licenses. The court observed that law licenses are not issued to business entities, but to individuals. The court also rejected Landry's remaining causes of action. As to the attorneys' fee and sanctions, the court did modify the attorneys' fees because one attorney at the trial court level did not participate in the appeal. Landry's then argued that the $450,000 in sanctions was excessive. The court first noted the TCPA mandates an award of sanctions and attorneys' fees. In reviewing the award for abuse of discretion, this court reviewed arguments by ALDF concerning Landry's hiring of the third largest law firm to defend a relatively small initial action, the filing of a 157-page response, with Landry's unwillingness to concede any points. The court took that in addition to several factors under the TCPA. The court was particularly concerned with Landry's filing of this suit on day 59 of the 60-day notice to file suit under the ESA (which may have been an indication to preempt the federal suit, according to the court). Despite that and more, the court did conclude that sanctions that were 2.4 and 2.8 times the attorneys' fees awards were excessive. The court suggested a remittitur, which would bring those awards respectively to $103,191.26 and $71,295.00. Thus, the lower court's decision to dismiss Landry's claims was affirmed, but the awards for attorneys' fee and sanctions were modified. | Case | |
| VA - Impound - § 3.2-6549. Releasing agencies other than pounds or animal shelters; confinement and disposition of companion ani | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6549 | VA ST § 3.2-6549 | This Virginia statute outlines the requirements for releasing agencies other than pounds or animal shelters. Included in the provisions are recordkeeping requirements, a requirement that each agency receives a signed statement from each of its directors, operators, staff, or animal caregivers specifying that each individual has never been convicted of animal cruelty, neglect, or abandonment, and owner notice provisions. | Statute |