|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|MI - Initiatives - Michigan Proposal 3 (mourning dove hunting)||2006 Michigan Proposal 3||
In 2006, Michigan voters were presented with Proposal 3 that would have legalized the hunting of mourning doves by adding the species to the state game list. The measure was defeated by a 69 to 31 percent vote.
|Mouton v. State||2008 WL 4709232 (Tex.App.-Texarkana)||
Defendant was convicted of cruelty to an animal, and sentenced to one year in jail, based upon witness testimony and photographs depicting several dogs in varying states of distress. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana, found that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions for a directed verdict or for a new trial to the extent that both motions challenged evidentiary sufficiency, and that ineffective assistance of counsel had not been shown, because the Court could imagine strategic reasons on Defendant’s counsel’s part for not calling a particular witness to testify on Defendant’s behalf, and for allowing Defendant to testify in narrative form during the punishment phase.
|US - Marine Mammals - Feeding Populations of Marine Mammals in the Wild||1991 WL 301955 (F.R.)||Docket No. 900807-1050||
NMFS is issuing a final rule that amends the definition of "take" under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) to include feeding marine mammals in the wild, and adds a new definition of "feeding." As a result, feeding dolphins, porpoise, whales, seals and sea lions in the wild will be prohibited unless the feeding is incidental to another activity such as the routine discard of fish bycatch or discharges from processing plants or vessels.
|Stoffels v. Harmony Hill Farm||2006 WL 3699549 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)||
An owner of a horse farm acquired a new horse that had only recently been broken in and got a woman with some health problems to ride the horse. The horse bucked and threw the defendant off the horse causing injury. The court held that even though riders assume the risk of most injuries, a horse owner can be liable for failure to take reasonable measures to match the rider to a suitable horse.
|Art and Antique Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Seggos||--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL 3817305 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019)||The plaintiffs are trade organizations representing arts and antique dealers. Plaintiff’s members have an “economic and professional interest in. . .the purchase, sale, distribution or trading of antique elephant ivory.” The Defendant is the Commissioner of DEC which is a state agency tasked with protecting New York’s natural resources and environment. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits the import and export of endangered species and the sale, offering for sale, or movement of endangered species in interstate or foreign commerce. The prohibitions, however, had exceptions for “antique articles” that are 100 years of age or older. Those wishing to import such antique articles needed to first obtain a federal permit. Under the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, trade of African elephant ivory is generally prohibited. Only certain items containing a de minimus quantity of ivory are exempt. The state of New York imposed a ban on elephant ivory with even narrower exceptions than the ESA. The DEC only issued licenses authorizing trade in ivory pursuant to the State Ivory Law’s exceptions. The licenses actually issued by the DEC restricted the advertisement and display of ivory products. Plaintiff’s filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the State Ivory Law on preemption and First Amendment grounds. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Defendants and Intervenors crossed-moved to dismiss. The Court examined the ESA and determined that section 1535(f) did not preempt the State Ivory Law because the ESA prohibitions only applied to interstate or foreign commerce while the State Ivory Law applied to intrastate commerce. As result, the exceptions contained in the State Ivory Law did not prohibit what was authorized by the ESA. The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss on Count I because it was not “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt state laws restricting purely intrastate commerce in ivory.” The Plaintiff’s second count alleged that the State Ivory Law’s permit requirement violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The display restriction in the license prohibited the physical display for sale of any item not authorized for intrastate sale under the State Ivory Law even if the merchant was authorized under the ESA to sell the item in interstate commerce. The Court determined that the in-store display of ivory products constituted commercial speech because the display constituted lawful activity, New York had a substantial interest in regulating the sale of ivory within its borders and the display restriction directly advanced that interest. The Court was unable to determine whether the display restriction burdened substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. Ultimately the Court granted the Defendant’s and Intervenor’s cross-motions to dismiss with respect to preemption and denied both the Defendant’s and Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment with respect to the First Amendment Claim.||Case|
|MN - Impound - Chapter 346. Animals||M. S. A. § 346.47||MN ST § 346.47 (formerly MN ST § 35.71)||This is Minnesota's holding period law. This law mandates that all animals seized by public authority must be held for redemption for at least 5 business days by the impounding agency or a longer time if specified by municipal ordinance. The law requires the establishments to preserve records of the animals in custody for at least six months. A person must not release an animal seized and held under this section for research or product testing, either directly or through an animal dealer.||Statute|
|Animals Used in Entertainment||
|McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hospital||644 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio Ct.Cl., 1994)||67 Ohio Misc.2d 40 (1994)||
After defendant filed a stipulation admitting liability for a botched surgery on defendant's show dog that ultimately led to euthanization, a trial was held as to the issue of damages. Evidence adduced at trial showed that "Nemo" had been trained by plaintiff as a Schutzhund or "sport dog" in Schutzhund schooling. The court noted that while dogs are considered personal property in Ohio and market value is the standard award for such personal property, market value in this case was merely a "guideline." In addition to the loss of the specially trained dog, the court also found significant the loss of stud fees for the dog and potential future gains in sustaining the trial court's award of $5,000 in damages.
|Silver v. State||23 A.3d 867 (Md. App., 2011)||2011 WL 2437286 (Md. App., 2011); 420 Md. 415 (2011)||
Defendants were sentenced by the District Court after pleading guilty to one count of animal cruelty. After defendants were convicted in the Circuit Court, they petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court could order that defendants pay restitution for the euthanasia cost for the deceased horse, but it was beyond the court’s authority to order defendants pay restitution for costs of caring for the two surviving horses because defendants had not been convicted in those cases. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike officer's testimony for prosecutor's failure to provide the officer's written report prior to trial. Finally, photos and testimony regarding the surviving horses were “crime scene” evidence and not inadmissible “other crimes” evidence because the neglect of the surviving horses was part of the same criminal episode.
|NH - Importation of Wildlife - Chapter Fis 800. The Importation, Possession and Use of All Wildlife||NH ADC FIS 803.01 - .14||N.H. Code Admin. R. Fis 803.01 - .14||These New Hampshire regulations require an importation permit for any controlled species that are imported into the state; these regulations also state that a permit is not required for a non-controlled species, which are listed in the regulations, and that a prohibited species, which are also listed in the regulations, cannot be imported into the state with or without a permit. The regulations also state the requirements for obtaining an importation permit, the provisions for importing certain species, the pathological standards for inspecting imported fish, and what needs to be included in the form to obtain an importation permit.||Administrative|