|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|Kollman Ramos v. U.S. Dept. Of Agr.||322 Fed.Appx. 814 (C.A.11)||Slip Copy, 2009 WL 922661 (C.A.11)||
Petitioner sought to have the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, set aside a Default Decision and Order of a United States Department of Agriculture Judicial Officer concluding that Petitioner had willfully violated multiple provisions of the AWA, including knowingly operating as a dealer without a license by delivering for transportation, or transporting, two lions for exhibition without a valid license to do so, causing injury to two lions that resulted in the death of one of the lions, and lying to investigators about Petitioner’s actions. The Court affirmed the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order, finding, among other things, that the USDA did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to admit or deny any material allegations in the complaint and was thus deemed to have admitted all allegations, the Judicial Officer did not abuse his discretion by revoking Petitioner’s AWA license on a finding of willfulness, and that that the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order did not violate fundamental principles of fairness as embodied in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act, the Animal Welfare Act, and the USDA’s rules.
|U.S. v. Mackie||681 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1982)||
Defendants challenge their eagle convictions under the MBTA, alleging that they should have been charged under the more specific BGEPA. Court holds the government may elect to proceed under either statute; nothing in the language or legislative history proscribes prosecution under the more general MBTA. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.
|US - AWA - 1970 Public Law 91-579||1970 PL 91-579||
There were four areas of significant change to the AWA in the 1970 amendments: (1) the definition of "animal" was expanded to include warm-blooded animals generally, (2) more human entities were brought under the regulatory provisions of the Act: animal exhibitors (i.e., circuses, zoos and roadside shows), and wholesale pet dealers, (3) the lab door of research facilities was opened more, requiring that certain humane standards be maintained at all times, (4) the Secretary's enforcement powers were strengthened and protection for government inspectors was provided from individuals who interfered with enforcement actions under the Act.
|Connecticut General Statutes 1902: Sections 2807-2816||Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 2807 - 2816 (1902)||The 1902 General Statutes of Connecticut sections 2807-2816 cover the following topics: definition of an animal, powers of an agent from humane society, and funding of the humane society.||Statute|
|U.S. v. Stevens||130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010)||176 L.Ed.2d 435, 78 USLW 4267, 38 Media L. Rep. 1577, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4819, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5779, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 221||
Defendant was convicted of violating statute prohibiting the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional for being substantially overbroad: it did not require the depicted conduct to be cruel, extended to depictions of conduct that were only illegal in the State in which the creation, sale, or possession occurred, and because the exceptions clause did not substantially narrow the statute's reach. (2011 note: 18 U.S.C. § 48 was amended following this ruling in late 2010).
|WA - Rabies - 246-100-197. Rabies--Measures to prevent human disease.||WA ADC 246-100-197||WAC 246-100-197||Among other provisions concerning rabies, this Washington regulation states that an owner of a dog, cat, or ferret shall have it vaccinated and revaccinated against rabies following veterinary and USDA-licensed rabies vaccine manufacturer instructions.||Administrative|
|WA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Chapter 16.52)||West's RCWA 16.52.010 - 350||WA ST 16.52.010 - 350||This section of statutes contains Washington's anti-cruelty provisions. Under the section, "animal" means any nonhuman mammal, bird, reptile, or amphibian. Sections 16.52.205 and 16.52.207 are the primary anti-cruelty provisions that categorize cruelty in either the first or second degree. A person is guilty of animal cruelty in the first degree (a class C felony) when he or she intentionally inflicts substantial pain on, causes physical injury to, or kills an animal by a means causing undue suffering, or forces a minor to inflict unnecessary pain, injury, or death on an animal. A person is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree (a misdemeanor) if, under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the person knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence inflicts unnecessary suffering or pain upon an animal. An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree the owner knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence fails to provide the animal with necessary food, water, shelter, rest, sanitation, ventilation, space, or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain as a result of the failure, or if he or she abandons the animal.||Statute|
|Noway - Cruelty - Norwegian Animal Welfare Act (2010)||Norwegian Animal Welfare Act||
This comprehensive Animal Welfare Act from Norway covers nearly all aspects in the treatment of animals, including research, farming, and general care. The intention of this Act is to promote good animal welfare and respect for animals.
|Colleen Harrington v. David Hovanec, and DOES 1 through 20 inclusive||This California complaint for damages raises five causes of action: (1) gross negligence; (2) trespass to chattel; (3) conversion; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) violation of California Civil Code Section 3340 (related to damage to animals as property). The lawsuit arose from the negligent and/or intentional shooting of plaintiff's dog by defendant in May of 2004. According to the complaint, plaintiff's dog was shot at least thirteen times by defendant's two different guns.||Pleading|
|Placey v. Placey||51 So.3d 374 (Ala. Civ. App., 2010)||2010 WL 2342397 (Ala. Civ. App.)||
The appellate court held that the Protection from Abuse Act authorized the trial court to determine and award ownership of Preston the dog in a domestic violence dispute between a mother and daughter. It then awarded ownership rights to the mother because took better care of the Preston and it was in his best interest.