Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
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| CA - Licenses - City dog license tags; compliance with division | West's Ann. Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 30502 | CA FOOD & AG § 30502 | This California statute provides that any dog tag issued pursuant to ordinance by a city or county will be valid provided it complies with this division, provides for the wearing of the license tag upon the collar of the dog, and provides for the keeping of a record which shall establish the identity of the person that owns or harbors the dog. | Statute | ||||||
| EU - Farming - Egg regulation, Number 557 | (EC) Number 557/2007 |
In May 2007, the Commission passed an egg regulation, Number 557, building upon the prior one (Number 1028) and delineating detailed marketing standards for eggs. The Regulation sets out rules, applicable to virtually all hen eggs sold in the EU, for the quality and weight grading, packaging, marking, storage, transport and presentation for retail sale of eggs, to ensure that they are marketed on an evenhanded, competitive basis. Though the regulation’s focus is primarily on egg marketing rather than animal welfare, it includes certain provisions that bear upon animal welfare. For instance, the regulation sets out detailed requirements for hen living conditions that must be met before eggs can qualify as “free range,” including open-air runs of low hen density.
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| Conservation Force v. Salazar | 715 F.Supp.2d 99 (D.D.C., 2010) | 2010 WL 2244122 (D.D.C.) |
Plaintiffs to this suit — organizations and individuals that support sustainable hunting of the Canadian Wood Bison — alleged that the Secretary of the Department of Interior violated several provisions of the ESA in his treatment of that species. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the Secretary failed to: (1) make a twelve-month finding as to the status of the Canadian Wood Bison upon petition and (2) process Plaintiffs’ applications to import bison hunting trophies. In granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss, the court found that Plaintiffs’ intent to sue letter did not specify to the Secretary that they intended to challenge his subsequent failure to issue a twelve-month finding. Since Plaintiffs gave the Secretary inadequate opportunity to review his actions and take corrective measures, the claim was dismissed. Plaintiffs — four individuals who each successfully hunted a Wood Bison in Canada — sought declaratory judgment against the Service under the ESA for failure to process their applications to import bison trophies. The court also held that the request for declaratory judgment was moot where Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they ever intended to again apply for import permits. |
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| Murga v. Yarusso | 215 A.D.3d 979, 187 N.Y.S.3d 762 (2023) | No. 2021-00173, 605534/18, 187 N.Y.S.3d 762, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 02130, 2023 WL 3083108 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., Apr. 26, 2023) | This New York case involved action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained after defendant's dog allegedly ran into street and pushed the plaintiff pedestrian to the ground. The plaintiff described the dog as acting like a "big puppy" and the dog did not bite the plaintiff. In contrast, the defendant testified that the dog was chasing a ball in the defendant's front yard and did not actually go in the street. Rather, defendant asserts that plaintiff tripped upon seeing the dog in the yard. The complaint alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to keep the dog under control and to take protective measures knowing of the aggressive propensity of the dog. The Supreme Court, Suffolk County granted the defendant-owner's motion for summary judgment. On appeal by the plaintiff, the plaintiff also suggested that defendant might be liable for throwing the ball which caused the dog to run in the street and knock the plaintiff down. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the plaintiff cannot recover under such a theory, as New York does not recognize a common-law negligence cause of action to recover damages for an owner's alleged negligence in the handling of a dog. The summary judgment was affirmed as the court found the owner was not liable to pedestrian for injuries sustained. | Case | ||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 7 Núm 4 |
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| Andrews v. City of West Branch Iowa | 454 F.3d 914 (8th Cir., 2006) |
Appellants filed a suit against defendant, City of West Branch, Iowa and former police chief Dan Knight, seeking damages and relief under Section 1983. The dog was killed by Knight in the owners' fenced backyard in view of one of the plaintiffs. The district court's grant of summary judgment for the officer was reversed and the case was remanded for a jury trial. |
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| AZ - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty/Animal Fighting Statutes | A. R. S. § 12-1011; § 13-2910 - 12; § 13-1411 | AZ ST § 12-1011; § 13-2910 - 12; § 13-1411 | The Arizona section contains the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. A person commits cruelty to animals if he or she intentionally, knowingly or recklessly subjects any animal under the person's custody or control to cruel neglect or abandonment, fails to provide medical attention necessary to prevent protracted suffering to any animal under the person's custody or control, inflicts unnecessary physical injury to any animal, or recklessly subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment, among other things. Animal is defined as a mammal, bird, reptile or amphibian. Exclusions include hunting and agricultural activities in accordance with those laws and regulations in Arizona. Intentionally attending a dogfight is a felony under this provision whereas attendance at a cockfight is a misdemeanor. | Statute | ||||||
| Maine Laws: Chapter 182 'Lands reserved for public uses.' | 1883 Me. Laws 182 | The act concerns the allocation of land for the public use within a township. | Statute | |||||||
| Mitchell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. | 188 F.Supp. 869 (D.C.Cal. 1960) |
In Mitchell v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. , 188 F.Supp. 869 (S.D. Cal. 1960), an expert was allowed to testify about a dog’s income-potential based on evidence that the dog could perform special tricks and made numerous appearances at charitable events. A jury verdict amounting to $5,000 was upheld where the court determined that the amount was not excessive and evidence of the dog’s income potential was not improper. |
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| State v. Butler | 175 N.H. 444, 293 A.3d 191 (2022) | 2022 WL 4488304 (N.H. Sept. 28, 2022) | Defendant Kevin Butler was convicted of criminal negligence after he left his dog inside a parked vehicle for 45 minutes when the temperature was over 90 degrees outside. The charge came after a neighbor noticed a dog in the vehicle that was "scratching at the windows and the door" and appeared to be in distress. After calling the police, an animal control officer removed the animal from the unlocked car and transported the distressed dog to a local veterinary clinic. At trial, the defendant testified that he was out running errands on a "very hot" day, and asked his son to get the dog out of the car as Defendant's hands were full. An important phone call distracted him from following up on the dog's removal and only after the police knocked on his door did he realize the dog must still be in the car. On appeal here, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish the mens rea of criminal negligence for both charges. The State must prove that a defendant “fail[ed] to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct" and that this risk constitutes a gross deviation from conduct performed by a reasonable person. Here, the court found that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the defendant failed to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the dog would overheat in the car and that his failure to perceive this risk constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care. The temperature was high that day, the car was parked in direct sunlight with all the windows up, and the dog was left for around an hour. The fact that Defendant relied upon his 8-year-old son to remove the dog under these circumstances constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care. This was not "mere inattention" as Defendant claimed. The conviction was affirmed. | Case |