|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Mendes||72 Cal.Rptr.3d 553 (Cal.App. 5 Dist., 2008)||08 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1999, 160 Cal.App.4th 136, 2008 WL 400393 (Cal.App. 5 Dist.)||
Appellants ALDF asserted causes of action for violation of Penal Code section 597t for confining calves without an “adequate exercise area,” and for commission of unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. In affirming the lower court's decision to dismiss the action, this court held that there is no private cause of action pursuant to Penal Code section 597t under the present circumstances, and none of the appellants have shown an ability to allege any facts of economic injury.
|Smith v. Meyring Cattle Co., L.L.C.||921 N.W.2d 820 (Neb., 2019)||302 Neb. 116 (2019)||Harley Smith worked for Meyring Cattle Company. Smith was injured when a herd dog allegedly nipped at the hoof of one of the cows and the cow charged forward trampling Smith. Smith sustained substantive injuries. Smith sued Meyring under negligence theories and under strict liability as set forth under Nebraska law. The district court found for Meyring. Smith appealed asserting that the district court erred by finding as a matter of law that strict liability did not apply to the facts of the case and for granting Meyring’s motion for partial directed verdict. as matter of first impression, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that the element that a dog be vicious or have dangerous propensities is implicitly part of the strict liability statute. The Court concluded that there was no evidence that the herd dog bit, worried, or chased Smith. There was also no evidence that the herd dog’s actions were directed toward Smith. The language of the strict liability statute was never understood as encompassing bodily hurt to a person by way of a dog worrying or chasing “any sheep or other domestic animals” that collided with that person. The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.||Case|
|Colombia, LEY 1774, 2016||Ley 1774 de 2016||This law modifies the Animal Protection Statute Ley 84, 1989 by modifying the Civil Code and the Criminal Code. Ley 1774 changes the status of the animals in the legal system, by declaring that all animals are ‘sentient beings’, subject to special protection against pain and suffering. The duty of animal protection, is established as a collective responsibility where the government and the citizens are required to assist and protect animals. Citizens have the duty to report when an animal is being subject to cruelty.||Statute|
|CT - Exotic - Sec. 26-55-6. Importation, possession or liberation of wild birds, mammals, reptiles, amphibians and invertebrates||CT ADC § 26-55-6||Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 26-55-6||This Connecticut regulation (effective March 1, 2012) places restrictions on who may import or possess certain categories of wild animals in the state. The regulation puts wild animals into one of four categories: Category One, Two, Three, or Four Wild Animals. With regard to Great Apes, a member within the family Hominidae (including, but not limited to, gorilla, chimpanzee and orangutan) is a Category One Animal. No person, except a municipal park, zoo, public nonprofit aquarium, nature center,museum, exhibitor licensed or registered with the United States Department of Agriculture, laboratory registered with the United States Department of Agriculture, or research facility registered with the United States Department of Agriculture, shall import or possess any Category One Wild Animal.||Administrative|
|United States v. Bowman||43 S.Ct. 39 (1922)||260 U.S. 94 (1922)||
This case involves a conspiracy charge to defraud a corporation in which the United States was a stockholder. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Mitchell referred to this Supreme Court case when it found that the nature of the MMPA does not compel its application to foreign territories.
|Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall||807 F.Supp.2d 972 (D.Mont., 2011)||2011 WL 3359937 (D.Mont.)||
Several wildlife organizations filed suit to challenge the FWS's Final Rule delisting the gray wolf Northern Rocky Mountain distinct population segment. The case was put on hold pending the outcome of several other legal battles regarding the wolf's status on the Endangered Species List, during which gray wolf protections were reinstated. Then, after Congress passed the 2011 fiscal year budget which contained a provision requiring the FWS to delist the Northern Rocky Mountain DPS, the court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
|T. , J. A. s/ infracción Ley 14.346||Id SAIJ: FA12340061||The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court that sentenced the Defendant to eleven months of imprisonment after finding him criminally responsible for acts of cruelty in violation of Article 1 of Ley 14.346 against a stray dog. The Defendant was found guilty of sexually abusing a dog, who he forced into his premises. The dog’s genital area was sheared and she had serious injuries, which the veterinarian concluded were clear signs of penetration. The Supreme Court referred to the Chamber of Appeals on Criminal Matters of Parana "B.J.L. s/ infracción a la Ley 14.346", of October 1, 2003, where the referred court stated that “the norms of Ley 14.346 protect animals against acts of cruelty and mistreatment, is not based on mercy, but on the legal recognition of a framework of rights for other species that must be preserved, not only from predation, but also from treatment that is incompatible with the minimum rationality." Further, "the definition of ‘person’ also includes in our pluralistic and anonymous societies a rational way of contact with animals that excludes cruel or degrading treatment."||Case|
|ND - Hunting - NDCC, 20.1-01-11 Hunting and harassing game from aircraft, motor vehicle, or snowmobile prohibited||ND ST 20.1-01-11||This North Dakota statute states that no person operating or controlling the operation of any aircraft or motor vehicle in the state may intentionally kill, chase, or harass any wild animal or wild bird, protected or unprotected, unless exceptions under the statute apply. Also no person, while operating a snowmobile in the state, may intentionally kill, chase, flush, or harass any wild animal or wild bird, protected or unprotected.||Statute|
|Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka, and Ulises, Plaintiffs, by their Next Friends, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc||In this case of first impression, five wild-captured orcas named Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka, and Ulises (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), seek a declaration that they are held by the Defendants in violation of Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs were forcibly taken from their families and natural habitats, are held captive at SeaWorld San Diego and SeaWorld Orlando, denied everything that is natural to them, subjected to artificial insemination or sperm collection to breed performers for Defendants’ shows, and forced to perform, all for Defendants’ profit. As such, Plaintiffs are held in slavery and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction freeing them from Defendants’ bondage and placing them in a habitat suited to their individual needs and best interests.||Pleading|
|US - Marine Mammals - Feeding Populations of Marine Mammals in the Wild||1991 WL 301955 (F.R.)||Docket No. 900807-1050||
NMFS is issuing a final rule that amends the definition of "take" under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) to include feeding marine mammals in the wild, and adds a new definition of "feeding." As a result, feeding dolphins, porpoise, whales, seals and sea lions in the wild will be prohibited unless the feeding is incidental to another activity such as the routine discard of fish bycatch or discharges from processing plants or vessels.