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Displaying 1 - 10 of 6636
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IL - Protected species - Article II. Game Protective Regulations. | 520 I.L.C.S. 5/2.1 to 2.5a; 520 I.L.C.S. 5/2.36a | IL ST CH 520 § 5/2.1 to 2.5; § 5/2.36a | This collection of statutes provides that the title of all wild birds and mammals rests with the state. A new section in 2011 vests the Department of Natural Resources with the ability to control the possession and release of species deemed exotic or invasive. Other sections concern the possession of certain wild birds and animals. Possession of any listed wild bird or its parts (including the eagle) is illegal under the statute, except for the bona fide scientific or zoological exhibition. | Statute | |
| US - AWA - Subpart J. Importation of Live Dogs | 9 C.F.R. § 2.150 - 2.153 | This subsection covers the importation of dogs into the United States. No person shall import a live dog from any part of the world into the continental United States or Hawaii for purposes of resale, research, or veterinary treatment unless the dog is accompanied by an import permit issued by APHIS and is imported into the continental United States or Hawaii within 30 days after the proposed date of arrival stated in the import permit. Health and rabies certificates are required as provided. | Administrative | ||
| ME - Endangered Species - Subchapter 3. Endangered Species; Management and Research. | 12 M. R. S. A. § 12801 - 12810 | ME ST T. 12 § 12801 - 12810 | Maine revised its endangered species law in 2019. "Take" means the he act or omission that results in the death of any endangered or threatened species. There are two types of offenses based on whether the conduct is negligent or intentional. Negligent acts concerning an endangered species result in a Class E crime with a fine of $1,000 which may not be suspended. Intentional acts concerning an endangered species result in a Class D crime with a fine of $2,000 which may not be suspended. Each type of taking lists what is prohibited with regard to endangered species, including hunting, possessing, and feeding/baiting. Section 12810 also covers offenses against delisted species (of which the bald eagle is specifically listed). | Statute | |
| FL - Endangered - Endangered and Threatened Species Act | West's F. S. A. § 379.2291 - 2311 | FL ST § 379.2291 - 379.2311 (formerly FL ST § 372.072 - 074) | These Florida statutes define endangered and threatened species and provide the State's intent to protect these species. Under statute, the intentional killing or wounding of a listed species incurs a third degree felony. Interestingly, the state has a reward program for the arrest and conviction of those who violate state endangered species laws. | Statute | |
| NV- Rehabilitation, wildlife - Chapter 504. Wildlife Management and Propagation. | NV ADC 504.492 - 498 | NAC 504.490 - 498 | These Nevada regulations are about permits to rehabilitate wildlife. These regulations reveal where an application for a wildlife rehabilitation permit can be obtained, what must be included on the application, where to return the application, the required documents that must also be submitted with the application, the expiration of the permit, and the roles and the responsibilities of the permit holder. Additionally, the following regulations also provide information about euthanizing wildlife that is not listed as endangered or threatened species, as well as how to euthanize a species that is listed as endangered or threatened. | Administrative | |
| U.S. v. Smith | 29 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1994) |
Defendant was convicted of possessing Bald Eagle feathers in violation of Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) after receiving the feathers in the mail from a friend to complete a craft project. On appeal, defendant challenged her conviction, alleging that she did not possess the requisite knowledge and that the act itself was vague as to the level of intent, or scienter . The court affirmed defendant's conviction finding that the evidence established that defendant knowingly possessed eagle feathers in violation of MBTA, the conviction did not amount to punishment of wholly passive conduct contrary to defendant's suggestion, and that MBTA was not vague nor overbroad with regard to intent. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion of the Eagle Act . |
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| Sentencia C-148/22 - Colombia | Sentencia C-148/22 | El abogado Gabriel Andrés Suárez Gómez presentó una demanda de inconstitucionalidad ante la Corte Constitucional, argumentando que la pesca recreativa violaba el principio de precaución, el derecho a un medio ambiente sano y la prohibición de crueldad animal. Siguiendo el precedente creado con la sentencia C-045 de 2019, que prohíbe la caza deportiva, la Corte Constitucional de Colombia decidió el 2 de mayo del 2022 que las disposiciones relativas a la pesca recreativa contenidas en diversas leyes nacionales eran inconstitucionales, prohibiendo efectivamente esta práctica en todo el territorio. La corte determinó que pescar con fines recreativos, sin ningún otro propósito relevante como comercial o de sustento, constituye una forma de crueldad animal. Específicamente, la corte enfatizó que el mandato de protección animal se deriva del principio de la constitución ecológica, la función social de la propiedad y la dignidad humana. Además, se señaló que, en este contexto, tanto el legislativo como la corte han reconocido previamente a todos los animales como seres sintientes. La corte sostuvo que, aunque no es posible definir con certeza absoluta las consecuencias dañinas de la pesca recreativa en términos de principios de conservación y bienestar animal o la degradación de los recursos hidrobiológicos, existe información científica relevante que debe ser considerada para evitar efectos perjudiciales en los peces y el hábitat. Respecto a la sintiencia animal, tras un exhaustivo análisis, la corte enfatizó que hay razones convincentes para considerar que los peces pueden sentir dolor, y el mandato de protección animal requiere tratar a los seres sintientes con dignidad. De manera similar, según la FAO, actualmente no existe ningún método capaz de eliminar completamente el maltrato a los peces, y hay impactos ambientales que deben ser considerados seriamente junto con los beneficios económicos propuestos a favor de la pesca recreativa. Esta situación llevó a la Corte Constitucional a activar el principio de precaución. La corte determinó que hay un deber de proteger a los animales que implica proteger tanto el equilibrio ecosistémico como a los animales sintientes individuales con valor intrínseco. Esta protección se diferencia y pondera en función del tipo de especie involucrada, ya sea doméstica o silvestre. Además, el deber de protección animal lleva consigo un efecto vinculante indiscutible, que requiere evaluaciones de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad en su aplicación tanto por parte de legisladores como de jueces. Tras un extenso análisis de los efectos positivos y negativos que conllevaría la prohibición de esta actividad, la corte concluyó que la pesca recreativa constituye una forma de crueldad animal que viola el derecho a un medio ambiente sano, específicamente la prohibición contra la crueldad animal de acuerdo con leyes y jurisprudencia constitucional que carecían de respaldo constitucional al no estar fundamentadas en límites permisibles constitucionalmente para el maltrato animal, como (a) la libertad religiosa; (b) los hábitos alimenticios; (c) la investigación médica y experimentación; y (d) prácticas culturales arraigadas. Teniendo en cuenta los intereses de aquellos afiliados a la actividad, que se verían significativamente afectados por la invalidación de las leyes sujetas a esta opinión, y que han estado llevando a cabo actividades bajo leyes previamente consideradas constitucionales, la corte decidió posponer los efectos de la decisión por un año. Esto con el propósito de permitir que aquellos afectados adversamente por ella se adapten a las nuevas circunstancias. | Case | ||
| State v. Smith | 54 A.3d 638 (Conn.App.) | 139 Conn.App. 107 |
A defendant was charged and convicted of one count of permitting a dog to roam at large. Upon appeal, the defendant argued the statute he was convicted under was unconstitutionally vague and that he was convicted under insufficient evidence. Defendant contended that simply having his dog off-leash did not mean that it was roaming at large and not under his control where the dog responded to verbal commands. The court rejected both of defendant's arguments, finding that the plain language of the statute clearly prohibits an owner allowing a dog to move freely on another's property unrestrained and not under the owner's direct influence. |
Case | |
| Jackson v. Georgalos | 133 A.D.3d 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) | 2015 WL 7269769 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 18, 2015) | Plaintiff appealed an order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The personal injury action arises from an incident where defendants' dog, who was barking at the time, jumped on the screen door causing the door to open, whereupon the dog ran out of the house. When the plaintiff turned to get away from the dog, her ankle twisted, causing her to fall on the steps and become injured. To recover in New York on such an action, a plaintiff must prove that the dog had vicious propensities and that the owner of the dog, or a person in control of the premises where the dog was, knew or should have known of such propensities. The court held that plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant was aware of the dog's alleged propensity to run out of the house and chase after people. Defendants' motion summary judgment and dismissal was affirmed. | Case | |
| IN - Hunting - Chapter 37. Harassment of Hunters, Trappers, and Fishermen | I.C. 14-22-37-1 to 14-22-37-3 | IN ST 14-22-37-1 to 14-22-37-3 | This section reflects Indiana's hunter harassment law. A person who knowingly or intentionally interferes with the legal taking of a game animal by another person with intent to prevent the taking commits a Class C misdemeanor. A person who fails to obey the order of a law enforcement officer to desist from conduct in violation of section 2 of this chapter commits a Class B misdemeanor if the law enforcement officer (1) observed the person or (2) has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has engaged in the conduct that day or intends to engage in the conduct that day on specific premises. | Statute |