Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Test Map | Other jurisdictions can be added here in the summary or ... | State map | ||
| Susan, Russell and Mary Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Department of Animal Regulation | In this petition for a rehearing, respondents argued that the appellate court's decision (Phillips v. Department, 183 Cal.App.3d 372 (1986)) misstates crucial facts concerning the operation of the subject ordinance; that hearings required under the Atascadero ordinances apply to all dogs, not just strays; and that the appellate court may have been misled in its decision to conclude that no notice had been required. | Pleading | ||
| AZ - License and Vaccination Ordinances - Exemption of cities, towns and counties (dogs/animals) | A. R. S. § 11-1018 | AZ ST § 11-1018 | This Arizona statute exempts cities or towns from the provisions of this article if they impose a license fee and vaccination on dogs by ordinance, provided that such ordinance is equal to or more stringent than the provisions of this article. Further, the provisions of this article shall not apply to counties which regulate the running at large of dogs in the unincorporated areas of the county by ordinance provided that such ordinance is equal to or more stringent than the provisions of this article. | Statute |
| Massachusetts General Law Statutes 1860-1872: Chapter 344: Sections 1-3 | Mass. Gen. L. ch. 344 (1869) | The Massachusetts law from 1869 stated in Chapter 344 concerns the treatment of animals. The first section is a generic animal cruelty act. The second section details the punishment for owners of animals that allow their animals to be treated cruelly by a third party. The third section concerns the treatment of animals during transportation. | Statute | |
| Scott v. Jackson County | 403 F.Supp.2d 999 (D.Or.,2005) |
On July 22, 2003, plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, various state common law claims, and violation of the Oregon Property Protection Act (plaintiff's neighbor complained to animal control in May 2001 after hearing the rabbits "screaming and dying"). Plaintiff's claims arise from the seizure of over 400 rabbits from her property, and the subsequent adoption and/or euthanasia of these rabbits. Defendants move for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, failure to allege the proper defendant, and failure to provide notice under the Oregon Tort Claims Act. In granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court found that even if the officers' entry and seizure of plaintiff's property was unlawful, they reasonably believed their actions to be lawful, therefore affording them qualified immunity protection. Further, the court found no taking occurred where the rabbits were euthanized and/or adopted out as part of a initial criminal forfeiture action. |
Case | |
| Geer v. Connecticut | 16 S.Ct. 600 (1896) (overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322) | 161 U.S. 519 (1896) |
Defendant was charged with the possession of game birds, for the purpose of transporting them beyond the state, which birds had been lawfully killed within the state. The sole issue which the case presents is, was it lawful, under the constitution of the United States (section 8, art. 1) (the Commerce Clause), for the state of Connecticut to allow the killing of birds within the state during a designated open season, to allow such birds, when so killed, to be used, to be sold, and to be bought for use, within the state, and yet to forbid their transportation beyond the state? The Court held that, aside from the authority of the state, derived from the common ownership of game, and the trust for the benefit of its people which the state exercises in relation thereto, there is another view of the power of the state in regard to the property in game, which is equally conclusive. The right to preserve game flows from the undoubted existence in the state of a police power to that end, which may be none the less efficiently called into play, because, by doing so, interstate commerce may be remotely and indirectly affected. This decision was later overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322. |
Case |
| Ley 2.786 | Ley 2.786 | Ley Sarmiento was the first law in South America enacted for the protection of animals. This criminal law prohibited animal cruelty at the national level and imposed on the police the duty to enforce laws protecting animals in cooperation with the Argentinian Society for the Protection of Animals. It imposed fines instead of prison time. The Sarmiento law paved the way for the Peron law (ley 14.346) that was enacted in 1954, which is valid to this day. | Statute | |
| Turner v. Ferguson | 432 F. Supp. 3d 876 (E.D. Wis. 2020) | On March 5, 2017 Lori turner was attacked by her neighbor’s (“Arndt”) dog which required her to receive 11 staples to close the wound on her scalp. She also suffered bites on her shoulder and wrist that would later require surgery. Pursuant to local regulations, the neighbor’s dog was quarantined for a ten-day period. Lori mentioned to officers that the City of Gelndale had recently enacted an ordinance that allowed for an officer to declare a dog vicious which then required the owner of the dog to adhere to certain requirements like securing the dog in a kennel when it was outdoors and maintaining liability insurance for dog bites. On March 14, 2017, Officer Ruppel issued a citation to Ardnt under a Glendale ordinance for damage caused by dogs, however, he did not declare the dog vicious under the vicious-dog ordinance. Officer Ruppel reasoned during deposition that he chose not to do so because he considered Ardnt grabbing the dog by the neck and Lori walking up and petting the dog (prior to Ardnt’s action) provocation. Lori filed suit against the officers she interacted with over the course of the next year claiming that the officers denied her equal protection of the law by refusing to declare Arndt’s dog vicious and by failing to protect her from loose dogs in the neighborhood. Lori had repeatedly contacted the police department over the course of a year about how she did not like the outcome of her dog bite case and about loose dogs in the neighborhood. Lori specifically alleged that the officers treated her with animus. The Court ultimately found that the evidence in the record did not support a class-of-one equal protection claim. Officer Ruppel’s decision to not declare Ardnt’s dog vicious was supported by a rational basis. Additionally, no evidence existed that suggested that the Glendale police department intentionally and irrationally treated Lori’s complaints about loose dogs in the neighborhood differently than it treated similar complaints by other citizens. The Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted. | Case | |
| Baker v. Middleton (unpublished opinion) | No. 29D05-0605-SC-1055 (Ind. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2007) | unpublished opinion | In Baker , the defendant fed and watered four cats that lived in the neighborhood. These cats damaged the plaintiff’s home, destroying insulation, a vapor barrier, and duct work. The cats also urinated and defecated in the crawl space of the home. In the Superior Court, the plaintiff argued that a town ordinance and a county ordinance independently imposed a duty on the defendant to control the cats and prevent them from damaging the plaintiff's property. The court found, however, that since the defendant was participating in a Trap Neuter and Release program, the county ordinance could not serve as a basis for finding that the defendant was negligent in caring for the feral cats. The court went on to reject two alternative theories of negligence also proffered by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had therfore failed to establish that the defendant was negligent in her actions and judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. | Case |
| Portugal - Cruelty - Portugal Animal Welfare Law | 92/95 (Protection of Animals Act) |
This is general national legislation of Portugal for the protection and regulation of animal welfare. There is delegation of authority to grant or deny the use of animals in many commercial settings. Standards are minimal within the act itself. |
Statute |