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Displaying 6121 - 6130 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AR - Marine mammals - Ley 25.577 | Ley 25.577 | This law prohibits hunting or intentional capture of any of the cetacean species specified in the appendix. It establishes fines for those who violate this law of not less than 1 million Argentinian pesos ($1,000,000). | Statute | |
| Scales v. State | 601 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App. 2020) | Defendant, Jade Derrick Scales, was convicted of two counts of cruelty to non-livestock animals which constituted a state felony. Michelle Stopka had found two puppies in an alley and took them in. On February 8, 2015, Defendant confronted Stopka in her front yard holding a knife and wearing a mask and brass knuckles. Leonard Wiley, the man Stopka was residing with, confronted the Defendant and a brief confrontation ensued which resulted in both individuals sustaining a cut. Stopka soon discovered that both puppies had been sliced open and were bleeding. The puppies did not survive their injuries. Defendant’s sentence was enhanced to a second-degree felony based on the finding of use or exhibition of a deadly weapon during the commission of, or during immediate flight following, the commission of the offense and the fact that the Defendant had a previous conviction for a second-degree-felony offense of burglary of a habitation. Defendant was sentenced to seven years and a fine of $2,000. The Defendant subsequently appealed. The first issue raised on appeal by the Defendant was the deadly weapon finding which the the Court found was appropriate. The second issue regarded a jury instruction error. The Defendant contended that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that a deadly-weapon finding is only appropriate when the weapon is used or exhibited against a human being. The Court found that although a deadly-weapon instruction should not have been given, the error was not egregious and therefore overruled the issue because a jury could have reasonably believed that the Defendant used the same knife to both inflict wounds upon the puppies and Leonard. The failure to provide such a jury instruction did not materially affect the jury’s deliberations or verdict. The third issue raised by the Defendant was that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court overruled this issue as well. The Fourth issue raised by Defendant was that his prosecution was based on two identical indictments for the same conduct committed in one criminal episode which violated double jeopardy and due process principles. The Defendant did not preserve his claim of double jeopardy and the Court further found that two separate dogs were the object of the criminal act and each dog could have been prosecuted separately. No double jeopardy violation was found on the face of the record and, therefore, the Defendant did not qualify for an exception to the preservation rule. The fifth issue Defendant raised was that his sentence was illegal because the range of punishment for the offense for which he was convicted was illegally enhanced. The Court overruled this issue because his conviction was not illegally enhanced. The trial court’s judgment was ultimately affirmed. | Case | |
| Pratt v. Pratt | 1988 WL 120251 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1998) (unpublished opinion). |
A childless, divorcing couple sought divorce; trial court awarded couple's registered dogs to wife based on the best interest standard used for determination of custody of children. Appellate court held the best interest statute inapplicable to dogs, but stated that the trial court can award dogs based on evidence of mistreatment of the dogs by one of the parties. Because the trial court's determination had a reasonable basis in fact, the appellate court affirmed its decision. |
Case | |
| AZ - Initiatives - Proposition 102 (voter wildlife initatives) | Proposition 102 (2000) | This 2000 Arizona ballot proposition sought to restrict voter initiatives related to wildlife. It was defeated with only 37.5% voting for the measures. According to the summary by the Arizona Legislative Council, Proposition 102 directs the State to manage wildlife in the public trust to assure the continued existence of wildlife populations. Public trust is a legal concept relating to the ownership, protection and use of natural resources. Under the public trust, the State must manage wildlife for the public benefit, which includes both present and future generations. Proposition 102 would also amend the Arizona Constitution to require that any initiative measure relating to the taking of wildlife does not go into effect unless it is approved by at least two-thirds of the voters who vote on the measure. Currently, the Arizona Constitution requires a simple majority vote for initiative measures. The two-thirds requirement would also apply to measures authorizing or restricting (1) the methods of taking wildlife (2) the seasons when wildlife may be taken. The two-thirds requirement would not apply to legislative enactments or to measures that the Legislature refers to the voters. | Statute | |
| Wyoming Farm Bureau v. Babbitt | 987 F.Supp. 1349 (D. Wyoming 1997) | 46 ERC 1516 (D. Wyoming 1997) |
The Wyoming Farm Bureau, amateur researchers, and environmental groups appealed an agency to introduce experimental population of gray wolves in a national park and central Idaho. After ruling on the various standing issues, the court held that the ESA section allowing experimental population to be maintained only when it is "wholly separate geographically" from nonexperimental populations includes overlap even with individual members of nonexperimental species. However, the defendants' treatment of all wolves found within boundaries of designated experimental population areas as nonessential experimental animals was contrary to law as provided in their own regulations. Therefore, the court ordered that Defendants' Final Rules establishing a nonessential experimental population of gray wolves in Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming, Idaho, Montana, central Idaho and southwestern Montana was unlawful. Further, that by virtue of the plan being set aside, defendants must remove reintroduced non-native wolves and their offspring from the Yellowstone and central Idaho experimental population areas. This decision was reversed in 199 F.3d 1224. |
Case |
| WI - Ordinances - 59.52. County administration | W. S. A. 59.52 | WI ST 59.52 | This Wisconsin statute provides a schedule for destruction of obsolete town records, which includes dog licenses after three years. | Statute |
| MD - Humane officers - § 1-1314. Humane society or animal control officers; education and training requirements | MD Code, Local Government, § 1-1314 | MD LOCAL GOVT § 1-1314 | This Maryland law, added in 2021, creates education and training requirements for new humane and animal control officers. The training requires satisfactory completion of at least 80 hours of animal care and control coursework as described in the law. There are also continuing education requirements on an annual basis. | Statute |
| UT - Invasive Species - Chapter 27. Aquatic Invasive Species Interdiction Act | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-10-101 - 501 (formerly U.C.A. 1953 § 23-27-101 - 501) | UT ST § 23A-10-101 - 501 (formerly UT ST § 23-27-101 - 501) | These statutes comprise the Utah Aquatic Invasive Species Interdiction Act. This Act makes it illegal to possess a Dreissena mussel, release one into a water body, or transport a conveyance or equipment that has been in an infested water without decontaminating it. A violation is an infraction, but a knowing or intentional violation is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon | 515 U.S. 687 (1995) | 115 S.Ct. 2407, 40 ERC 1897, 132 L.Ed.2d 597, 63 USLW 4665, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,194, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8573, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8575, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8566 (1995) | (edited from Syllabus of the Court) As relevant here, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA or Act) makes it unlawful for any person to “take” endangered or threatened species, § 9(a)(1)(B), and defines “take” to mean to “harass, harm, pursue,” “ wound,” or “kill,” § 3(19). In 50 CFR § 17.3, petitioner Secretary of the Interior further defines “harm” to include “significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.” Respondents, persons and entities dependent on the forest products industries and others, challenged this regulation on its face, claiming that Congress did not intend the word “take” to include habitat modification. Held: The Secretary reasonably construed Congress' intent when he defined “harm” to include habitat modification. | Case |
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