Results
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cox v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | 925 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1991) |
USDA had suspended a kennel owner’s license for 90 days and imposed a fine on the owner for violating AWA regulations. These violations included delivering dogs for transportation in commerce, that were under eight weeks old, failing to hold dogs for at least five days after acquiring them, and refusing APHIS inspections. Owner claimed that such sanctions were excessive. However, the court found that there was willful violation of the AWA, since inspections were refused. Also, ignorance is not considered a defense, and although the owners claimed they did not know the age of the eight-week old puppies, they could have found out. Thus, the sanction was appropriate. |
Case | |
| Daul v. Meckus | 897 F. Supp 606 (D.C. 1995) |
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has brought this Bivens action seeking to hold government agents liable in their individual capacities for alleged constitutional violations under the AWA. Plaintiff lost his Class A license of a dealer under the AWA, due to failure to submit the required license fee and annual report. The court held that, even construing plaintiff's allegations in the light most favorable to him, Mr. Daul appears merely to allege without proof that each of these defendants exceeded the scope of his authority. Thus, plaintiff's conclusory allegations failed to show that any defendant violated any clearly established constitutional or statutory right. The named defendants from the USDA were also granted both absolute and qualified immunity in the decision. |
Case | |
| Dehart v. Town of Austin | 39 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 1994) | 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30106 |
The breeder was in the business of buying, breeding, raising, and selling of exotic and wild animals. The town passed an ordinance making it unlawful to keep certain wild animals, and the breeder filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a local ordinance. On appeal, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the town because: (1) the ordinance was not preempted by the Animal Welfare Act; (2) the ordinance was not an impermissible attempt to regulate interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause; and (3) the town did not deprive him of his property interest in his federal and state licenses without due process. |
Case |
| Diercks v. Wisconsin | 2006 WL 3761333 (E.D. Wis. 2006) |
An owner of a greyhound kennel was suspected of giving her dogs illegal steroids because an informant told the government agency this was happening. The particular steroid used was impossible to detect using urine samples, so the government agency, without a warrant, installed covert video cameras in the kennel and that way determined that the owner was injecting her dogs. The owner claimed this violated her Fourth Amendment search and seizure rights, and the court agreed; however, the agency actors were not liable because the state of the law on this issue was not clear and it was reasonable for them to think they could legally install the video surveillance system. |
Case | |
| Doris Day Animal League v. Veneman | 315 F.3d 297 (D.C. Cir. 2003) | Animal rights group brought action challenging validity of regulation exempting breeders who sell dogs from their residences from licensure under Animal Welfare Act. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, J., held that regulation was invalid, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, Randolph, Circuit Judge, held that regulation was reasonable interpretation of Congressional intent. | Case | |
| E. LEE COX AND BECKY COX, D/B/A PIXY PALS KENNEL, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, RESPONDENT | 50 Agric. Dec. 14 (1991) | 1991 WL 294529 (U.S.D.A.) |
Lee and Becky Cox, owners of Pixy Pals Kennel, petitioned for review of a decision of the Department of Agriculture suspending their license for ninety days, imposing a $12,000 civil fine, and ordering the Coxes to cease and desist from specified violations of the Animal Welfare Act. The Coxes claim that (1) the suspension violated s 558(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act because there was insufficient evidence to support the Department's finding that their violations of the Animal Welfare Act were willful; (2) they were unconstitutionally penalized for exercising their first amendment rights; and (3) the sanctions imposed on them were excessive. In affirming the USDA decision, the Eighth Circuit held that the definition of "willfulness" was not called into question; rather the Department had presented substantial evidence to demonstrate willfulness. Further, since petitioners' first amendment claim concerned the Department's "motivations," the court held that proof of motivation is a question of fact rather than law, not subject to de novo review. The sanction imposed by the Department, although severe, was not excessive given the size of petitioners' business and the severity of the violations. |
Case |
| Eckhart v. Department of Agriculture | 8 A.3d 401(Pa. Commw. Ct., 2010) | 2010 WL 4596316 (Pa. Commw. Ct.) |
A dog kennel operator acquired 30 dogs while under a revised notice to cease and desist operating a kennel and from buying dogs. The Commonwealth Court affirmed fines imposed by the Department of Agriculture, holding that the fines for violation of the dog law were not excessive or unreasonable; that fines for failure to comply with conditions of the revised notice were not unconstitutionally excessive or unreasonable; and that enforcement of orders by Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement pending appeal were not staid by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. |
Case |
| Gray v. RSPCA | [2013] EWHC 500 (Admin) | Mr Gray appealed against the police seizure of 115 horses from his horse trading premises, pursuant to section 18 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Gray had been convicted of numerous counts of cruelty, specifically under sections 4 and 9 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Mr Gray argued that an offence under sections 4 and 9 required either actual knowledge or a form of constructive knowledge that the animal was showing signs of unnecessary suffering, and that negligence was not sufficient. It was held that the plain effect of section 4(1) of the Act is to impose criminal liability for unnecessary suffering caused to an animal either by an act or omission which the person responsible knew would, or was likely to, cause unnecessary suffering, or by a negligent act or omission. Further, it was held that section 9(1) of the Act sets a purely objective standard of care which a person responsible for an animal is required to provide. | Case | |
| Hansen v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | 221 F.3d 1342 (8th Cir. 2000) | 2000 WL 1010575 (8th Cir. 2000) | Judie Hansen petitions for review of a final decision of the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture. Because the 8th Circuit has no jurisdiction over the matter, the petition is dismissed. | Case |
| Haviland v. Butz | 543 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976) | 543 F.2d 169, 36 A.L.R. Fed. 615, 177 U.S.App.D.C. 22 |
This case addresses whether the Secretary of Agriculture intended to include “animal acts” under the AWA. Animal acts are any performance of animals where such animals are trained to perform some behavior or action or are part of a show, performance, or exhibition. Defendant presented an animal act with dogs and ponies to paying audiences and occasionally appeared on commercial television. Defendant asserted that he did not “exhibit” animals simply by showing dogs and ponies and argued that the Secretary unconstitutionally added “animal acts” to the AWA. The court held that the inclusion of “animal acts” was authorized as“[t]he words ‘includes’ and ‘such as’ [in the AWA] point convincingly to the conclusion that the listing of types of exhibitions in the statutory text was intended to be but partial and illustrative.” |
Case |