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Titlesort ascending Author Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Zuniga v. San Mateo Dept. of Health Services (Peninsula Humane Soc.) 267 Cal.Rptr. 755 (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1521 (1990)

In this California case, the owner of a dog that had been seized pending criminal dogfighting charges sought a writ of mandate challenging a county hearing officer's decision finding that puppies born to the dog while she was impounded were dangerous animals. The trial court denied the writ. The Court of Appeal reversed and held that there was insufficient evidence that the puppies were “dangerous animals." The evidence received by the hearing officer relates mainly to appellant's actions and his mistreatment of the parent animal, and the only evidence relevant to the puppies' “inherent nature” was the observed aggressive behavior toward each other while caged together and certain possible assumptions about their nature from the condition and use of their mother.

Case
Zelman v. Cosentino 22 A.D.3d 486 (N.Y. 2005) 803 N.Y.S.2d 652 (2005)

A repairman was knocked over by a dog while working on a telephone line in the neighbor's yard.  The repairman brought claims against the dog's owner under under theories of strict liability and negligence.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the dog's owner and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Case
Yuzon v. Collins 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 4 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1702, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2535

In this California case, a dog bite victim sued a landlord, alleging premises liability in landlord's failure to guard or warn against tenants' dangerous dog.  On appeal from an order of summary judgment in favor of the landlords, the Court of Appeal held that the landlord owed no duty of care, as he had no actual knowledge of dog's dangerous propensities and an expert witness's declaration that the landlord should have known of the dog's vicious propensities was insufficient to warrant reconsideration of summary judgment ruling.  The landlord's knowledge that tenants may have a dog because it is allowed through a provision in the lease is insufficient to impute liability where the landlord has no knowledge of any previous attacks or incidents.

Case
Youngstown v. Traylor 123 Ohio St.3d 132, 914 N.E.2d 1026 (Ohio,2009) 2009 WL 2634570 (Ohio), 2009 -Ohio- 2971 Defendant was charged with two misdemeanors after his unrestrained Italian Mastiff/Cane Corso dogs attacked a wire fox terrier and its owner.   Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that YCO 505.19(b) is unconstitutional and a violation of his procedural due process rights.   The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Youngstown municipal ordinance was constitutional because it was “rationally related to the city's legitimate interest in protecting citizens from vicious dogs,” provided “the dog owner with a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the dog's classification,” and did not “label dogs as dangerous or vicious” solely based on their breed type. Case
YOU DON’T OWN ME: FERAL DOGS AND THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP Stacy A. Nowicki 21 Animal L. 1 (2014) Feral dogs occupy an ambiguous position, challenging standard categories of domestication, wildness, and property ownership. This ambiguity, in turn, complicates the legal status of feral dogs. Feral dogs’ property status is particularly critical, as whether a feral dog is owned by someone, or no one at all, hold implications not only for civil and criminal liability in incidents involving feral dogs, but also the legal ability of animal rescue organizations to intervene in the lives of feral dogs. Part II of this Article summarizes the application of property law to animals, particularly highlighting the role played by an animal’s status as wild or domestic; Part III explores the factors distinguishing feral dogs from other canines, determining that feral dogs should properly be situated as domestic animals; Part IV discusses the legal landscape relevant to feral dogs, focusing particularly on ownership and liability; and Part V examines the ways in which the property status of feral dogs may impact an animal rescue organization’s ability to care for those animals. Article
Wyno v. Lowndes County 824 S.E.2d 297 (Ga., 2019), reconsideration denied (Mar. 13, 2019) 305 Ga. 523 (2019) Misty Wyno was attacked and killed by a neighbor’s dog. Her husband, Jason Wyno brought a wrongful death action against the dog’s owners, Lowndes County, and four individual Lowndes County Animal Control employees. Jason alleged that Lowndes County and the County Employees negligently failed to perform ministerial duties, negligently failed to provide police protection, negligently created and failed to abate a nuisance, were negligent in their control of allegedly dangerous dogs, and were negligent per se by violating several provisions of the Lowndes County Animal Control Ordinance. Jason also alleged that the County Employees acted with actual malice and/or an intent to injure by repeatedly refusing to investigate or take any action with regards to the dangerous dogs. Lowndes County asserted sovereign immunity as a defense for both itself and its employees. In addition, Lowndes County and the County Employees asserted that they were immune from liability due to the provisions of the Dangerous Dog Control Law in effect at the time. The trial court dismissed the suit against the employees in their individual capacities finding that the Dangerous Dog Control Law barred an action against any party except the dog’s owners. The Supreme Court of Georgia ultimately held that the record was devoid of any evidence that any of the County Employees acted with malice or the intent to harm Jason or Misty Wyno to defeat official immunity. Jason, therefore, did not satisfy his burden and the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. Case
Wyno v. Lowndes County 331 Ga. App. 541, 771 S.E.2d 207 (2015), cert. denied (June 15, 2015) 2015 WL 1318263 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) Victim was attacked and killed by her neighbor's dog. Victim's husband, acting individually and as administrator of his wife's estate, brought action against dog owners and several government defendants, whom he alleged failed to respond to earlier complaints about the dog. The trial court dismissed the action against the government for failure to state a claim, concluding that sovereign and official immunity or, alternatively, the Responsible Dog Ownership Law (OCGA § 4–8–30), barred action against the government defendants. Husband appealed. The appeals court held the trial court did not err in dismissing the action against the county and its employees in their official capacities. The former version of OCGA § 4–8–30, effective at the time of the attack, provided immunity to local governments and their employees from liability for all injuries inflicted by dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs. The appeals court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the action against the employees in their individual capacities based on official immunity, however. By applying the former OCGA § 4–8–30 (2012) to dismiss the action against the employees in their individual capacities, the trial court implicitly rejected the husband’s constitutional challenge to the statute. Judgment was therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court to enter a ruling specifically and directly passing on the husband’s constitutional challenge. Case
WY - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws W. S. 1977 § 6-5-211; § 11-31-101 - 108; § 11-31-201 - 214; § 11-31-301; § 15-1-103; § 23-3-109; § 33-30-215 WY ST § 6-5-211; § 11-31-101 - 108; § 11-31-201 - 214; § 11-31-301; § 15-1-103; § 23-3-109; § 33-30-215 These Wyoming statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include damage done to livestock by dogs, rabies vaccination requirements, and municipal powers to regulate dogs. Statute
WY - Dangerous - Article 1. In General. (Dangerous Dog Provisions) W. S. 1977 § 11-31-105 to 108 WY ST § 11-31-105 to 108 This Wyoming statute provides that every person, firm, copartnership, corporation or company owning any dog, which to his knowledge has killed sheep or other livestock, shall exterminate and destroy the dog. In addition, the owner of any dog is liable for all damages that accrue to any person, firm or corporation by reason of the dog killing, wounding, worrying or chasing any sheep or other domestic animals belonging to the person, firm or corporation. Statute
WV - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws W. Va. Code, §§ 5A-4-4; § 7-7-6d; § 19-9-1 - 40; § 19-20-1 - 26; § 19-20A-1 - 8; § 19-20B-1 - 6; § 19-20C-1 - 3; § 19-20D-1 - 3; § 20-2-5; § 20-2-5f; § 20-2-5j; § 20-2-16; § 20-2-56a WV ST §§ 5A-4-4; § 7-7-6d; § 19-9-1 - 40; § 19-20-1 - 26; § 19-20A-1 - 8; § 19-20B-1 - 6; § 19-20C-1 - 3; § 19-20D-1 - 3; § 20-2-5; § 20-2-5f; § 20-2-5j; § 20-2-16; § 20-2-56a These West Virginia statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include registration requirements, rabies control, and hunting laws that impact dogs. Statute

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