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PA - Ecoterrorism - § 3311. Ecoterrorism 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309 - 3311; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8319 PS ST 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309 - 3311; PS ST 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8319 This collective set of laws comprises Pennsylvania's ecoterrorim and agroterrorism provisions. The state has an agricultural vandalism law (misdemeanor or felony, depending on pecuniary loss) and law prohibiting the destruction of agricultural crops (felony). A person is guilty of ecoterrorism if the person commits a specified offense against property by: intimidating or coercing a person participating in an activity involving animals, plants, or natural resources; or preventing or obstructing a person involved in such an activity. The law has a provision that states a person who is on public property, or on private property with permission, and is peaceable exercising his or her constitutional rights is immune from prosecution and from civil liability under Pa.C.S. Sec. 8319. Statute
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. N. Carolina Farm Bureau Fed'n, Inc. 60 F.4th 815 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 325, 217 L. Ed. 2d 170 (2023), and cert. denied sub nom. Stein v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 144 S. Ct. 326, 217 L. Ed. 2d 170 (2023) Several animal welfare organizations including PETA sought to conduct undercover animal cruelty investigations in North Carolina, but were unable to do so because North Carolina's Property Protection Act prohibited employees from entering nonpublic areas of employer's premises to record or remove information and using that information to breach their duty of loyalty. PETA and other plaintiffs argue that the act violates their protected First Amendment rights and functions as a discriminatory speech restriction. North Carolina argues that the restrictions on speech are incidental, and the act protects against trespass and disloyalty. The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina dismissed the complaint and the organizations appealed. The Court of Appeals then reversed and remanded. On remand here, the District Court held that the information gathered by the animal welfare organizations was protected speech and, thus, subject to strict scrutiny. . Case
Privatizing the Patriot Act: The Criminalization of Environmental and Animal Protectionists as Terrorists Ethan Carson Eddy 22 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 261 (Fall, 2005)

This Article describes the model Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act its permutations currently pending in state legislatures, its proponents, and their motivations. It further explains the legal and rhetorical parallels between the Model Act and the USA Patriot Act. The Article predicts that courts will find the bills' constraints on speech to be undeniably content-based and without a sufficiently compelling state interest. In the end, the Article concludes by explaining how the bills exploit the USA Patriot Act's anti-terrorism rhetoric, and reveal a concerted corporate strategy to manipulate the term “terrorist” and capitalize on its potency, in an anticompetitive effort to secure protectionism from the adverse economic effects of criticism, protests, and boycotts.

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Proposed Fundraising Bills in Oklahoma and Missouri Would Unconstitutionally Target Animal Rights Charities Daina Bray, Samantha Hasey & Candace Hensley 67 Syracuse L. Rev. 217 (2017) Two proposed state bills out of Oklahoma and Missouri would prohibit an “animal rights charitable organization” from soliciting contributions in-state intended for either out-of-state use or “political purposes.” It is worthwhile to examine the bills and the factual context out of which they arose because of the important constitutional rights that they implicate and the potential chilling effect of this sort of legislation on the ability of nonprofits to advocate for their causes. While today it is “animal rights” groups under attack—by way of the bills discussed herein and other legislation such as so-called “ag-gag” bills, which suffer from some of the same constitutional deficiencies—it is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which other nonprofit groups with a viewpoint unwelcome to a legislature, or to powerful private interests, could be similarly targeted. Article
SAVING LIVES OR SPREADING FEAR: THE TERRORISTIC NATURE OF ECO-EXTREMISM Kevin R. Grubbs 16 Animal L. 351 (2010)

Much debate has surfaced surrounding so-called “eco-terrorism.” Some commentators argue that such activity is not and should not be called terrorism. This Comment analyzes these extremist activities through the lens of federal terrorism laws and argues that, while these activists’ goals are laudable, their methods are often terroristic. Consequently, those activities that go too far are-and should be-classified as terrorism.

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SC - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 21. Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act. Code 1976 § 47-21-10 to 90 SC ST § 47-21-10 to 90 The set of law comprises South Carolina's Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act. A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, the person exercises control over an animal facility or the property located there, or if that person damages the facility or its property. A person also commits an offense if he or she enters a facility without the effective consent of the owner and remains concealed with the intent to disrupt or damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility. Violation for disruption or damage to a facility or its property is a misdemeanor with a fine of up to $10,000 and/or 3 years imprisonment. Violation for illegal entry is a misdemeanor with a fine up to $5,000 and/or 1 year imprisonment. Statute
SD - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 40-38. Protection of Animal Facilities S D C L § 40-38-1 - 5 SD ST § 40-38-1 - 5 This chapter comprises South Dakota's animal enterprise interference laws. Under the section, it is illegal for a person to intentionally damage or destroy an animal facility, an animal, or property in or on the animal facility; exercise control over the animal facility or an animal located therein; enter the animal facility with the intent to commit prohibited acts; enter an animal facility and remain concealed with the intent to commit prohibited acts; or intentionally release an animal on an animal facility. Violation is a misdemeanor of varying degrees if the damaged property value is less than $1,000 and a Class 4 felony if above $1,000. Any person who violates subdivisions 40-38-2(2) to (5), inclusive, is guilty of a Class 4 felony. Statute
Shoot First, Talk Later: Blowing Holes in Freedom of Speech Jacqueline Tresl 8 Animal L. 177 (2001)

Ms. Tresl examines the constitutionality of hunter harassment laws. When a five-step doctrinal analysis is applied to hunter harassment statutes, it is clear that the statutes are content-based and subject to the strictest of scrutiny. Because the statutes fail the strict scrutiny test, they therefore violate the American citizenry's First Amendment right to free expression.

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State v. Borowski 231 Or.App. 511 (2009) 220 P.3d 100 (Or.,2009)

Defendants were convicted of interfering with agricultural operations under the anti-picketing provision of a criminal statute. The Court of Appeals held that the anti-picketing provision was not facially over-broad under the free speech or free assembly provision of State Constitution. The provision, which imposed criminal penalties on people engaged in picketing but created an exception for those involved in a labor protest, did not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the State Constitution, but it did violate equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution. The statutory presumption of severability did not apply in this case.

Case
Subverting Justice: An Indictment Of The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act Kimberly E. McCoy 14 Animal Law 53 (2007)

The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) creates yet another obstacle for the animal advocacy movement. This article explores the reasons behind the AETA’s enactment and its implications for those who advocate on behalf of animals. The author notes the AETA targets individuals based solely on their political ideology and can deter these individuals from exercising their right to free speech due to the threat of being permanently branded as a terrorist. It is this infringement on First Amendment rights, coupled with the AETA’s overbreadth and vagueness, that lead the author to conclude the AETA is unconstitutional. The author also notes the many social policy flaws within the AETA and finds that the AETA is unnecessary, as existing laws cover every crime encompassed in its language. These defects lead the author to call for the AETA’s repeal and to suggest that individuals look to the judiciary for change.

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