Results
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| People v. Spence | 212 Cal.App.4th 478 (Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2012) | 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 374, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 14,151, 13 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 27, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,325 |
In this California case, a jury convicted James Spence of two counts of sexual offenses against a child 10 years old or younger (his housemate's daughter). He was sentenced to a total term of 55 years to life. Among other issues on appeal, Spence argues the court erred by allowing a therapy dog or support canine to be present at the child's feet while she testified, and contends this was “overkill” with the additional support person present on the witness stand. Section 868.5 of the Evidence Code allows up to two support persons during testimony. The court found that the dog was not a "person" for purposes of the code. The trial judge's decision to allow the dog was discretionary. The jury was given instructions to base its decision solely on the evidence presented at trial and not on any sympathies. Further, the court found even if more specific express findings of necessity would have been proper prior to allowing both the dog and support person on the the witness stand, any error was harmless. |
Case |
| People v. Tohom | 969 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.,2013) | 109 A.D.3d 253; 2013 WL 3455673 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.); 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 05234 |
This case, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a trial court was authorized to allow a "therapeutic comfort dog" to be present on witness stand for a 15-year-old-girl who was the victim in a predatory sexual assault and child endangerment case. Prosecutors sought to allow a Golden Retriever named Rose to accompany the child on the witness stand while she testified at the defendant’s trial. Prosecutors cited Criminal Procedure Law provisions regarding special witnesses and pointed to Executive Law §642-a, which allows a person supportive of a special witness to be “present and accessible” during testimony by such a witness. On appeal, defendant again argued that the dog would prejudice the jury against the defendant and would convey to the jury that the witness was under stress as a result of testifying and that this stress resulted from telling the truth. In finding that the comfort dog did not violate defendant's right to a fair trial, the appellate court agreed that the trial court's interpretation of Executive Law § 642-a "special witness" provision was correct. Further, the defendant failed to show that the dog Rose's presence was inherently prejudicial. |
Case |
| Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips | 325 Conn. 394, 397, 158 A.3d 772 (2017) | 158 A.3d 772 | In this case, a landlord brought a summary process action against a tenant who lived in the federally subsidized apartment, based on tenant's keeping of “emotional support dog” in violation of a pet restriction clause in the tenant's lease. The trial court entered judgment in favor of tenant, based on equity, and the landlord appealed. The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The Court held that: 1) appeal was not rendered moot by landlord's commencement of second summary process action against tenant, which was dismissed; 2) trial court could not rely on “spirit” of Department of Housing and Urban Development in exercising equitable discretion to enter judgment in favor of tenant; 3) trial court abused its discretion in applying doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture; and 4) summary process action was “civil action” to which medical treatment report exception to hearsay rule could be applied to allow for admission of letter from physician and social worker of tenant's niece concerning dog's benefit to niece. Reversed and remanded. | Case |
| Priebe v. Nelson | 140 P.3d 848 (Cal. 2006) | 39 Cal.4th 1112, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 553 |
A kennel worker who was bitten by a dog while the dog was in the care of the kennel sued the owner of the dog under a theory of strict liability under a statute and under the common law. The court found that the dog owner was not liable to the kennel worker because under the "veterinarian's rule," the kennel owner had assumed the risk of being bitten by the dog. |
Case |
| Prindable v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua | 304 F.Supp.2d 1245 (D. Hawaii, 2003) |
Condominium resident filed a complaint alleging the housing authority violated the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act by failing to waive the "no pets" as a reasonable accommodation for his handicap. The court held that where the primary handicap is mental or emotional in nature, an animal "must be peculiarly suited to ameliorate the unique problems of the mentally disabled," and granted the housing authority's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the housing authority's failure to make a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. |
Case | |
| Pruett v. Arizona | 606 F.Supp.2d 1065 (D.Ariz.,2009) | 21 A.D. Cases 1520 |
A diabetic woman in Arizona attempted to keep a chimpanzee as an assistance animal in spite of the state’s ape ban. Despite the state’s ban, the diabetic woman imported a chimpanzee with the intention of keeping him as a service animal, claiming that she was entitled to do so under the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). In September of 2007, the chimpanzee’s owner sued the State of Arizona, the Game and Fish Commission, and the Director of the Game and Fish Department in federal court claiming that they had violated her rights under the federal disability laws. According to the plaintiff, the ADA requires the state to make “reasonable accommodations” for disabled individuals; and in her case this meant the state must waive its ban on possessing “restricted” apes so that she can keep a chimpanzee in her home as a service animal. The District Court found that the plaintiff’s chimpanzee is “unnecessary” and “inadequate” to meet her disability-related needs and the animal is not a “reasonable” accommodation under the ADA because he threatens the health and safety of the community. |
Case |
| Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association | 853 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2017) | 55 NDLR P 14 | Homeowners brought action against thier condominium association and other homeowners, claiming that the association failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for homeowners' disability in the form of emotional support animals, and that the other homeowners interfered with the fair exercise of their fair housing rights, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The Court of Appeals held that: 1) Fair Housing Act claims survive the death of a party; 2) issue of fact as to whether association reviewed homeowners' paperwork for an emotional support animal precluded summary judgment on claims association failed to make a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act; 3) issue of fact as to whether association reviewed homeowners' paperwork for an emotional support animal precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims; 4) issue of fact as to whether neighbor's comments about homeowners were sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with homeowners' Fair Housing Act rights precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims; and 5) issue of fact as to whether neighbor's blog posts about homeowners were sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with homeowners' Fair Housing Act rights precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. | Case |
| Riley v. Bd. of Commissioners of Tippecanoe Cty. | Slip Copy, 2016 WL 90770, 2016 WL 90770 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2016) (unpublished) | The plaintiff filed suit based on violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA) after he was denied entrance into the Tippecanoe County Courthouse with his service dog. Initially, defendant's claims were dismissed because the Court did not adequately allege that his dog was a service dog. Defendant then filed an amended complaint with plausible allegations that his dog is a service dog. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, stating that the plaintiff had not established that his dog was a service dog according to the definition listed under rules promulgated under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that the plaintiff’s dog was a service dog under the definition because the dog was “individually trained to, among other things, provide [plaintiff] with balance support and assistance during episodes of PTSD.” As a result, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case was denied. | Case | |
| Riverbrook v. Fabode | 963 N.W.2d 415 (2020), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 981 N.W.2d 468 (Mich. 2022) | 333 Mich. App. 645, 2020 WL 5580152 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2020) | This Michigan case centers on the adequacy of the evidence supporting a request for an assistance animal. Antony Fabode lived in a mobile home on property that was leased to his sister by Riverbrook. In the spring of 2018, Antony obtained a puppy, King, which he claims is a Labrador Retriever mix, but was suspected by Riverbrook as being a banned pit bull type dog. Riverbrook consequently notified Antony's sister of the violation and ordered the dog removed from the premises. To that order, Antony first responded to Riverbrook with a certificate claiming that King was an emotional support animal (ESA) and, after that was rejected as insufficient, came back with a letter by limited license professional counselor, Anne Venet. After again denying the request, Riverbrook sought to enforce the consent judgment with an order of eviction. The district court granted the motion and ordered Antony's removal. Antony sought a stay of eviction on the grounds that he and his sister were authorized to possess King as an ESA. At the district court hearing, Venet testified in support of her letter explaining that she determined Antonuy's need for an ESA after a brief phone call. The court then declined to permit questioning by Riverbrook into the credibility of the determination that Antony was disabled and needed King as a therapeutic aid. Ultimately, the district court denied the writ for eviction. The circuit court affirmed that ruling based on the FHA and the caselaw that supports an unobtrusive line of questioning. The crux of this appeals centers on whether the lower court's order denying Riverbrook's writ of eviction was erroneous after the court disallowed Riverbrook's attorney from questioning the reliability of the evidence of disability and need for an assistance animal. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that "the district and circuit courts avoided their gatekeeper role under MRE 702 despite Riverbrook's repeated objections to the reliability and admissibility of the Fabodes’ evidence." This hampered Riverbrook's ability to discover whether the information presented was reliable and supported Antony's disability-related request and whether Riverbrook refused to make a reasonable accommodation for a tenant based on disability or handicap. The circuit court order was vacated the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. | Case |
| Sak v. City of Aurelia, Iowa | 832 F.Supp.2d 1026 (N.D.Iowa,2011) | 44 NDLR P 125 |
After suffering a disabling stroke, a retired police officer’s pit bull mix was trained to become a service dog. However, the town where the retired police officer resided had a Breed Specific ordinance that prohibited pit bulls. The retired police officer and his wife brought this suit against the city alleging that the ordinance violated his rights under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and also sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the city from enforcing the ordinance. The officer’s preliminary injunction was granted after the court found: 1) the officer was likely to succeed on merits of ADA claim; 2) the officer would suffer irreparable harm absent injunction; 3) the balance of equities was in favor of injunctive relief; 4) and the national public interest in enforcement of ADA trumped more local public interest in public health and safety reflected in ordinance. |
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