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Titlesort descending Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
In re Kenna Homes Cooperative Corporation 557 S.E.2d 787 (W.V. 2001)

The owners of a cooperative unit kept a dog in their dwelling despite a no pets policy. There was, however, an exception in the policy for service animals, and the Jessups argued that the small dog they kept was necessary due to various medical problems they had, including arthritis and depression. The housing authority denied the request, stating that only animals certified for the particular disability qualify as a "service animal." The West Virginia Court of Appeals held that a housing authority may require that a service animal be properly trained without violating federal law.

Case
Janush v. Charities Housing Development Corp. 169 F.Supp.2d 1133 (N.D. Ca., 2000)

Tenant brought action under the Federal Fair Housing Act alleging that her landlord failed to reasonably accommodate her mental disability by refusing to allow her to keep companion animals in her rental unit. Tenant put forth evidence establishing that the animals lessened the effects of her mental disability by providing companionship. The housing authority argued that only service dogs are a reasonable accommodation. The court rejected the housing authority's argument, holding that animals other than service animal can be a reasonable accommodation for a disability. Also, the court noted that whether an accommodation is reasonable is a fact-specific inquiry, requiring an analysis of the burdens imposed on the housing authority and the benefits to the disabled person.

Case
Kennedy House, Inc. v. Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations 143 A.3d 476 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 11, 2016) 2016 WL 3667992 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 11, 2016)

In this case, Kennedy House appealed the lower court’s decision in finding that it had violated Section 9–1108 of the Philadelphia Fair Practice Ordinance when it denied Jan Rubin’s request for a housing accommodation in the form of a waiver of its no-dog policy. Rubin applied for a housing accommodation at Kennedy House because she suffered from multiple physical aliments. In a meeting with Kennedy House, Rubin did state that her dog was not a trained service animal that helped with her physical and mobility issues but rather helped with reminding her to take medication and getting out of bed. The lower court determined that Rubin had satisfied her burden of proving that her dog was necessary in helping with her medical issues. After reviewing the lower court’s decision, the Commonwealth Court held that the lower court had erred in its decisions. Ultimately, the court found that because Ms. Rubin's physician described a disability related to her mobility, and there was no evidence establishing a nexus between her mobility-related needs and the requested assistance animal, Ms. Rubin did not meet her burden necessary for Kennedy House to waive its no-dog policy. As a result, the court reversed the lower court’s decision.

Case
Kromenhoek v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association 77 F.Supp.3d 462 2014 WL 7384784 In this case, a condominium owner, who suffered from an anxiety disorder and had been prescribed use of emotional support animal, brought action against condominium association, its board, and certain association members, alleging, inter alia, imposition of a fine for owner's violation of association's “no dogs” policy violated Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff sent information about her emotional support dog and a letter from a licensed psychologist indicating that plaintiff was diagnosed with Anxiety Disorder to defendant Association's office manager. Plaintiff alleged that the President of the Association shared the content of her documents with some of the Association members, and approximately one year later plaintiff received an e-mail stating plaintiff had violated the "no dogs" policy contained in the Associations Rules and Regulations. The defendants moved for summary judgment, On each of the counts, the could held that: 1) owner's initial request to have emotional support dog was not specific; 2) association's alleged delay in processing condominium owner's request to have emotional support dog did not constitute refusal to grant reasonable accommodation; 3) association's notice of fine did not subject owner to adverse action; 4) there was no causal link between association's implementation of “no dogs” policy and owner's request to have emotional support dog; 5) there was no causal link between alleged disclosure of owner's confidential information and owner's request to have emotional support dog; 6) neighbor's blog posts regarding owner did not rise to level of interference with owner's FHA rights; and 7) condominium building was not public accommodation under ADA. With regard to the ADA claim, the court noted that a condominium can be a place of public accommodation if it operates as a place of lodging. Here, the bylaws specifically provided that Cowpet Bay West was a place of residence and not one of public accommodation. In addition, a single advertisement for a temporary rental on a webpage by one tenant was insufficient to show that owners were likely to rent to the public. On the issue of the blog posts constituting harassment under Section 3617, the court found that they did not rise to the level of interference with plaintiff's rights under the FHA. Instead, they reflected more of a "dispute between neighbors, not unlawful discrimination." The court found that the Board, the Association, and Talkington are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Counts One, Three, Five, and Six. The Court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over local counts, Seven through Eighteen, as against the Board, the Association, Talkington, Verdiramo, and Cockayne, as no federal counts remain as against any of said defendants; an appropriate Judgment was to follow this memorandum. Case
Labor Commission v. FCS Community Management --- P.3d ----, 2024 WL 370160 (Utah App., 2024) 2024 UT App 14 This case concerns the Utah Anti-discrimination and Labor Division's (UALD) determination that a homeowner's association's three-month delay in responding to a member's request for reasonable accommodation to keep chickens on their property as assistance animals for a child with anxiety and PTSD violated the Utah Fair Housing Act. The trial court found that this three month delay was a constructive denial of the request, because under the Utah Fair Housing Act a housing provider must participate in an interactive process to evaluate and discuss the request for accommodation, and no such interactive dialogue or interactive process took place. On appeal, the court found that the three month delay in responding to the request was not unreasonably long, especially considering that the HOA had to review the status of chickens as support animals, chicken waste runoff, and possibility of rodent complaints during this time. The court of appeals also found that the members were not harmed by the HOA's alleged delay, since they were still allowed to keep the chickens at this time. The court of appeals then reversed the trial court's holding granting the members damages, fees, and other relief. Case
LaRosa v. River Quarry Apartments, LLC Slip Copy, 2019 WL 3538951 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2019) No. 1:18-CV-00384-BLW Plaintiffs, Robert and Iva LaRosa filed this action in August of 2018, alleging that the defendants violated their rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). The Court dismissed the complaint and the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The Plaintiffs had applied to live at River Quarry Apartments in August of 2017. They requested a reasonable accommodation to keep their dog at the apartment without paying a fee. The Plaintiffs provided a copy of a note from a nurse practitioner stating that the companion dog helps manage Mr. LaRosa’s post-traumatic stress disorder. The Plaintiffs were approved for the apartment but told that their reasonable accommodation request was still being processed and received forms to fill out regarding the reasonable accommodation. River Quarry required Mr. LaRose’s doctor to fill out a form verifying the need for an assistance animal. Rather than completing the form, the plaintiffs provided a letter from Mr. LaRosa’s primary care physician which stated that in the doctor’s opinion, an emotional support animal would help mitigate the symptoms that Mr. LaRose was experiencing. River Quarry insisted on speaking with Mr. LaRose’s doctor directly to verify the information that the plaintiffs had given. After Kirk Cullimore, an attorney on behalf of River Quarry, spoke with the doctor, River Quarry wrote a letter to the Plaintiffs denying their request for a reasonable accommodation stating that the doctor declined to verify that Mr. LaRosa met the two prong test that one must be handicapped and there must be a nexus between the handicap and the need for the animal. Soon after this, Mr. LaRosa saw his primary care physician and had the actual form completed by his doctor and turned it in to River Quarry. Kirk Cullimore believed that the doctor’s signature on the form was forged and called Mr. LaRose’s doctor to speak with him again. The doctor’s secretary informed Cullimore that the signature was genuine. Mr. and Mrs. LaRosa argued that they were injured by the discrimination of the Defendants in violation of the FHA. The Court denied the Plaintiffs claim under the FHA because they did not sufficiently allege that the Defendants refused to make the requested accommodation. River Quarry allowed the dog to stay in the apartment while their request for an accommodation was reviewed. The Court stated that housing providers are granted a meaningful opportunity to investigate a request for an accommodation. Housing providers do not have to immediately approve a request for an accommodation right away. River Quarry ended up approving the request within 45 days after the initial request. The Court held that this was not an unreasonable delay considering that River Quarry did not have sufficient information to make a determination until after Mr. LaRosa’s doctor completed the verification form. Prior to that the doctor’s letter and the phone call between Cullimore and the doctor did not reveal enough information for River Quarry to make a determination on the accommodation. The Plaintiffs, however, succeeded on their interference claim. The LaRosas were engaged in a protected activity when they applied for a reasonable accommodation and they sufficiently alleged that they were subjected to adverse action and that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. The Defendants misrepresented the contents of Mr. Cullimore and Mr. LaRosa’s doctor’s conversation. The Court ultimately denied in part and granted in part the Defendant’s motion to dismiss and denied in part and granted in part the motion to dismiss claims against Kirk Cullimore and his law office. Case
Leigh v. State 58 So. 3d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 36 Fla. L. Weekly D778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) Philip Leigh (Defendant) appeals from an order summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic. Defendant claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to appear in a leg restraint and for failing to object to the presence of a dog. Apparently, the dog became disruptive on more than one occasion and was visible to the judge and jury. The Florida appellate court reversed and remanded, with a provision that the trial court could attach portions of the record that would refute the possibility that defense counsel’s failure to object to the dog’s presence indicated ineffective assistance of counsel. Since there was apparently no evidence of the dog’s presence in the record at all, the trial court was presumably obligated to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Case
Levine v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation 80 F. Supp. 3d 29 (D.D.C. 2015) 2015 WL 674073 (D.D.C., 2015) This action arose from plaintiff’s experience of bringing her service dog on Amtrak trains. Plaintiff brought claims on her own behalf and on behalf of a putative class of other disabled passengers against Amtrak pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. Each claim related to Amtrak′s alleged practice of storing luggage in its train's “mobility aid” seating areas. Amtrak argued, amongst other things, that plaintiff lacked Article III Constitutional Standing because she had not suffered an injury in fact. The district court agreed and granted Amtrak′s motion to dismiss. The case was dismissed in its entirety. Case
Majors v. Housing Authority of the County of DeKalb Georgia 652 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1981)

Tenant had a history of mental illness and kept a dog in her apartment despite a "no pets" policy. The housing authority refused to waive the "no pets" policy and brought an eviction proceeding. Tenant filed a complaint in federal district court alleging violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to waive the "no pets" policy as a reasonable accommodation for her disability. The district court granted the housing authority's motion for summary judgment and the tenant appealed. The court of appeals held that the housing authority deprived the tenant of the benefits of the housing program by enforcing the no pets rule, reasoning that waiving the no pets rule would allow the tenant to fully enjoy the benefits of the program and would place no undue burdens on the housing authority.

Case
Manzke v. Jefferson County Slip Copy, 2018 WL 5095678 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 21, 2018) 58 NDLR P 49 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 21, 2018) Joshua Pernat and Sara Manzke owned property that had four miniature goats and two geese on it. Sara (plaintiff) applied for a zoning variance and a conditional use permit to accommodate her emotional support animals. Jefferson County and the Town of Ixonia denied her applications. Sara then brought forth claims under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and Wisconsin’s Open Housing Act that she was discriminated against by Jefferson County and the Town of Ixonia. Joshua and Sara also sought a notice of removal of a small claims action brought forth by Jefferson County seeking monetary sanctions for the alleged violations of the zoning variance. Jefferson County argued that the plaintiff’s federal reasonable accommodation claim was not ripe because the County never made a final decision with respect to Sara’s applications for a variance and conditional use permit. When the Town of Ixonia voted to recommend that Jefferson County deny the plaintiff’s variance application, the plaintiff withdrew her applications from consideration. Sara argued that the town’s denial “foretold a denial by the County,” and any further appeal to the County would have been fruitless. The Court did not agree. The County had no obligation to follow the town’s recommendation. The Court dismissed plaintiff’s Fair Housing Amendments Act claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and accordingly dismissed plaintiff’s state law claim without prejudice. Since Sara was unable to state a federal claim, the Court also held that Sara and Joshua could not remove the small claim by Jefferson County to federal court. Case

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