Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Woodside Village v. Hertzmark | 1993 WL 268293 (Conn. 1993) | 4 NDLR P 104 | The question in this case is whether federal and state laws outlawing discrimination in housing prohibit the eviction of a mentally disabled defendant from his federally subsidized apartment because of his failure to comply with the plaintiff's pet policy. The plaintiff here had disabilities including schizophrenia and severe learning disabilities. The plaintiff-landlord allowed tenants to keep pets, but required pet care, which included walking the dogs in a designated area and requiring that tenants use a "pooper scooper" to clean up behind their pets. The tenant-defendant here does not dispute that he failed to comply, but claims the plaintiff-landlord, as a recipient of federal funds, failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. The court found that plaintiff-landlord did in fact accommodate the defendant-tenant's disability by either waiving the provisions of its pet policy or permitting the defendant to build a fenced in area for the dog in the rear of the defendant's apartment. The eviction here was not based on the fact that defendant-tenant possesses a dog, but on his "demonstrated inability to comply with the plaintiff's pet policy." This, said the court, put other residents' health, safety and comfort at risk. | Case |
| Nason v. Stone Hill Realty Association | 1996 WL 1186942 (Mass. 1996) | A tenant with multiple sclerosis took in her mother's cat when her mother became ill. The housing authority had a no pets policy and requested that the tenant remove the pet from the premises. The tenant in turn offered a letter from her physician stating that "there would be serious negative consequences for her health if she was compelled to remove the cat." The court held that the tenant did not meet her burden of proving a nexus between the cat and her multiple sclerosis, reasoning that the physician's note does not state that the cat is necessary to alleviate her symptoms and that a more reasonable accommodation may be available. | Case | |
| Housing Authority of the City of New London v. Tarrant | 1997 WL 30320 (Conn. 1997) |
A mother renting housing alleged that her son was "mentally challenged" and required the companionship of a dog pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court rejected the tenant's allegations that her son had a qualifying mental disability, reasoning that the son received high marks in school prior to the commencing of the eviction proceedings. The court held that without evidence of a mental or physical disability, no reasonable accommodation is required. |
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| Auburn Woods I Homeowners Ass'n v. Fair Employment and Housing Com'n | 2004 WL 1888284 (Cal.App. 3 Dist.) | 2004 WL 1888284 (Cal.App. 3 Dist.), 4 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8188, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,013 |
In this California case, the Elebiaris sought permission from their condominium association to keep a small dog as a companion (both suffered from severe depression and found that taking care of a dog alleviated their symptoms and enabled them to function more productively). T he association refused their request, leading the Elebiaris to file a claim with the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (the FEHC), which found in favor of the Elebiaris. After the Superior Court granted the condominium's petition, the FEHC and residents appealed. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in overturning the FEHC decision where the FEHC's finding that a companion dog constituted a reasonable accommodation for plaintiff's disability was supported by substantial evidence. |
Case |
| State v. Moore | 2014 WL 1917289 (Wash.App. Div. 2) | --- P.3d ---, 181 Wash.App. 1010 (2014) | Duane Moore appealed his conviction and sentence for second degree assault, domestic violence, after choking his wife during an argument. He argued that (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct during voir dire and closing argument when he argued facts not in evidence, made improper statements about witness credibility, and shifted the burden of proof; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to testify with a service dog; and (3) the prosecutor improperly testified at the sentencing hearing. With regard to the testimony dog issue, the court found that defendant failed to raise the issue at trial and thus failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Further, defendant failed to prove that any alleged errors were manifest. There is no evidence in the record that the dog's presence made Ms. Moore appear traumatized or victimized, and thereby violated Mr. Moore's due process rights, or acted as a comment on the evidence. The court rejected defendant's argument and affirmed the trial court. | Case |
| Ascencio v. ADRU Corporation | 2014 WL 204212 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d) |
A woman, who suffers from a disability that is accompanied by deep depression and anxiety, went to a fast food restaurant with her mother and her two service dogs. Upon entering the establishment, the employees refused to serve them, forced them to leave, and retaliated against them by calling the police and threatening them with arrest. The woman and her mother sued the fast food restaurant for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and related California statutes. When the fast food restaurant failed to file an answer, the court entered a default judgment against the fast food restaurant; awarded the plaintiffs with damages, court costs and attorney fees; and placed a permanent injunction against the fast food restaurant. |
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| Gill Terrace Ret. Apartments, Inc. v. Johnson | 2017 VT 88, 177 A.3d 1087 (Vt. 2017) | 2017 VT 88 (Vt. Oct. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 4453007 (Vt. Oct. 6, 2017) | This is an appeal of a trial court's ruling in favor of a landlord finding that the tenant violated two material terms of her residential rental agreement. One of the material violations involved the keeping of a pet in violation of a no-pets policy. The facts show that the dog, "Dutchess," initially came to the tenant's apartment in 2009 with the tenant's son. While the dog never attacked another person or pet, it did display aggressive behavior, including lunging, baring her teeth, and rearing up on her hind legs. Other tenants expressed fear of Dutchess. After the son moved out in 2013, the dog stayed, and, in 2014, the landlord sent tenant a letter indicating the keeping of the dog was a violation of the lease. Two months after that notice, an informal meeting was held and tenant then claimed the dog as a reasonable accommodation for her disability. The landlord's attorney sent paperwork to effectuate this request, which the tenant said she never received. Months later, the landlord served the tenant with an eviction action to which tenant responded with a request to keep her dog as a reasonable accommodation. The request to keep a pet as a reasonable accommodation was granted shortly thereafter by landlord; however, the landlord did not approve of Dutchess as the specific animal due to concerns of behavior and hostility toward other residents. At an eviction hearing in June of 2016, the landlord's request to terminate the tenant's lease was granted by the court, which concluded that the reasonable accommodation for an assistance animal did not extend to Dutchess. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court noted that a request for an assistance animal as a reasonable accommodation may be denied if "the specific assistance animal in question poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others." While there was no dispute in this case that the tenant has a disability-related need for an ESA, there was credible evidence that supported the lower court's decision that Dutchess posed a threat and/or would cause substantial physical damage to the property. This included testimony from other tenants and tenant's own statements that she might not be able to control Dutchess. The court stated: "[l]ike the trial court, we acknowledge tenant's attachment to Dutchess and her need for an emotional support animal, but the court properly weighed the evidence regarding Dutchess's aggressive behavior against landlord's concerns for the safety and wellbeing of the other residents." The court concluded that the lower court did not err in affirming landlord's denial of tenant's reasonable accommodation request. | Case |
| People v. Spence | 212 Cal.App.4th 478 (Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2012) | 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 374, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 14,151, 13 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 27, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,325 |
In this California case, a jury convicted James Spence of two counts of sexual offenses against a child 10 years old or younger (his housemate's daughter). He was sentenced to a total term of 55 years to life. Among other issues on appeal, Spence argues the court erred by allowing a therapy dog or support canine to be present at the child's feet while she testified, and contends this was “overkill” with the additional support person present on the witness stand. Section 868.5 of the Evidence Code allows up to two support persons during testimony. The court found that the dog was not a "person" for purposes of the code. The trial judge's decision to allow the dog was discretionary. The jury was given instructions to base its decision solely on the evidence presented at trial and not on any sympathies. Further, the court found even if more specific express findings of necessity would have been proper prior to allowing both the dog and support person on the the witness stand, any error was harmless. |
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| Bone v. Vill. Club, Inc. | 223 F.Supp. 3d 1203 (M.D. Fla. 2016) | This case dealt with a woman's request to have her emotional-support dog live with her before purchasing land in a mobile home community, known as Brookhaven. Prior to purchasing her lot, the plaintiff allegedly received permission from the president of Brookhaven's board of directors to keep her dog, even though the plaintiff was purchasing a lot in the "no pet" section of Brookhaven. The plaintiff provided the president of the board with the documentation requested, and the president told plaintiff she had been approved by the board to have her dog. Approximately one year after plaintiff purchased her lot, Brookhaven's attorney sent a letter requesting that plaintiff remove her dog, citing Brookhaven's policies disallowing her dog. After several letters sent back and forth between plaintiff's attorney and Brookhaven's attorney concerning requirements of the Fair Housing Act and the party's respective actions, both parties cross-moved for summary judgement. The court held that 1) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether tenant had an actual disability; 2) landlord was not prejudiced by tenant's untimely disclosure of expert report; 3) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether landlord constructively denied tenant an accommodation; and 4) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether landlord retaliated against tenant for requesting a disability accommodation. As a result, all motions for summary judgement were denied. | Case | |
| People v. Chenault | 227 Cal. App. 4th 1503, review filed (Aug. 25, 2014) | 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal.App.Dist.4, 2014), review filed (Aug. 25, 2014) | Darrell Chenault was convicted on 13 counts of lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age and sentenced to 75 years to life in prison. On appeal he contended that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a support dog to be present during the testimony of two child witnesses without individualized showings of necessity, and that the presence of the dog was inherently prejudicial and violated his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial and to confront the witnesses against him. The appellate court concluded that a trial court has authority under Evidence Code section 765 to allow the presence of a therapy or support dog during a witness’s testimony.” The court did “not believe that the presence of a support dog is inherently more prejudicial than the presence of a support person,” citing the New York case of Tohom. Chinault argued that “individualized showings of necessity” should have been required for F. and C. before the support dog could be present in the courtroom. The appellate court concluded however that “a case-specific finding that an individual witness needs the presence of a support dog is not required by the federal Constitution,” for which Tohom was again cited. Based on the court's review of the record, the appellate court concluded that the trial court made implicit findings that the presence of Asta, the support dog, would assist or enable F. and C. to testify completely and truthfully without undue harassment or embarrassment. The court also took measures to reduce any possible prejudice to Chenault by setting forth logistics for the entry, positioning, and departure of the support dog, along with F. and C., during jury recesses so the dog was as unobtrusive and least disruptive as reasonably possible. The judgment was affirmed. | Case |