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Young's Bus Lines v. Redmon 43 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1931)

Appellee blind newspaper vendor had a trained seeing eye dog that was run over and killed by a public bus, driven by appellant. The court held that the measure of damages was the market value of the dog at the time and place where it was killed. If the dog had no market value, then the intrinsic or actual value to appellee was the measure of damages.

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Woodside Village v. Hertzmark 1993 WL 268293 (Conn. 1993) 4 NDLR P 104 The question in this case is whether federal and state laws outlawing discrimination in housing prohibit the eviction of a mentally disabled defendant from his federally subsidized apartment because of his failure to comply with the plaintiff's pet policy. The plaintiff here had disabilities including schizophrenia and severe learning disabilities. The plaintiff-landlord allowed tenants to keep pets, but required pet care, which included walking the dogs in a designated area and requiring that tenants use a "pooper scooper" to clean up behind their pets. The tenant-defendant here does not dispute that he failed to comply, but claims the plaintiff-landlord, as a recipient of federal funds, failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. The court found that plaintiff-landlord did in fact accommodate the defendant-tenant's disability by either waiving the provisions of its pet policy or permitting the defendant to build a fenced in area for the dog in the rear of the defendant's apartment. The eviction here was not based on the fact that defendant-tenant possesses a dog, but on his "demonstrated inability to comply with the plaintiff's pet policy." This, said the court, put other residents' health, safety and comfort at risk. Case
Wilkison v. City of Arapahoe 926 N.W.2d 441 (Neb.,2019) 302 Neb. 968 (2019) Brooke Wilkison (Brooke) got an American Staffordshire Terrier (pit bull) in 2015. In 2016, the city of Arapahoe passed an ordinance regarding dangerous dogs which contained a restriction on owning a Rottweiler or an American Staffordshire Terrier within city limits. The ordinance allowed for dogs licensed prior to January 1, 2017 to be grandfathered in as acceptable. Brooke did not have his dog licensed prior to the that date. Law enforcement told Brooke he could not keep the dog. Brooke filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent Arapahoe from implementing and enforcing the ordinance. The trial court found for Brooke and Arapahoe appealed. Arapahoe's first assignment of error is that the court erred by applying the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to the ordinance. The Court found that Arapahoe was not exempt from the strictures of the FHA. Arapahoe's second assignment of error was that the Court erred by enjoining enforcement of the ordinance against Brooke because Brooke's accommodation is not reasonable and necessary. The Court found that Brooke failed to meet his burden of proof that his requested accommodation is necessary for him to receive the same enjoyment from his home as a non-disabled person would receive. Brooke already owned another dog and the ordinance only covered certain dog breeds. Brooke's other claims for relief were remanded to the district court. In conclusion, the district court erred in entering a declaratory judgment and enjoining Arapahoe from enforcing the ordinance as applied to Brooke. Case
Whittier Terrace Associates v. Hampshire 532 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1989)

Defendant was a person with a psychiatric disability and living in public housing. Defendant claimed to have an emotional and psychological dependence on her cat. The court held that the housing authority discriminated against defendant under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to waive the no pets policy as a reasonable accommodation for the mental disability. The court noted that there must be a narrow exception "to the rigid application of a no-pet rule, involving no untoward collateral consequences," because the handicapped person could fully receive the benefits of the program if provided the accommodation.

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Whiteaker v. City of Southgate 651 F. Supp. 3d 893 (E.D. Mich. 2023) 2023 WL 317457 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 19, 2023) The plaintiff (“Whiteaker”) filed this action against Defendant, the City of Southgate, Michigan for violations of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PDCRA”). Specifically, Whiteaker contends that the City violated the FHA by denying Whiteaker's request for an exemption from City Ordinance 610.13, which prohibits City residents from maintaining chickens (or other typical farm animals) on their property. The events underlying this action began after Whiteaker moved to Southgate in early March 2021. On March 24, 2021, Whiteaker was issued a citation by the City for a violation of Ordinance 610.13. Whiteaker appeared in district court to defend himself, claiming he had a right to keep the chickens under Michigan's Right to Farm Act. However, it turned out the Right to Farm law was inapplicable because Whiteaker's chicken coop was within 250 feet of a dwelling. Thus, Whiteaker was issued a second citation in May and was denied a permit to keep the chickens by the city. Since Whiteaker was a longtime sufferer of depression and anxiety, he sought a waiver from the ordinance as a reasonable accommodation for his disability and presented a letter from his mental health provider as support. Again, his request was denied by the City. In the instant motion for summary judgement by the City, the court examined the "reasonableness" of Whiteaker's request for a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. The court found that the balancing test required under the FHA, to wit, weighing Whiteaker's disability-related need to keep the chickens as a source of comfort and support against the City's claims that the chickens pose a threat to public health, is a triable issue of fact. Indeed, the court observed that the City's citation of documentation from the CDC only lists the "potential dangers" chickens can pose to public health without sufficient evidence to supports its claim that the chickens will burden the City financially and administratively. In contrast, Whiteaker claims a disability and has provided evidence of his disability. Likewise, as to the remaining elements of necessity and equal opportunity for a reasonable accommodation claim, the court again cites Whiteaker's evidentiary support for his claim of disability and need for the chickens to alleviate those symptoms against the fact the City has not presented any testimony, affidavits, or "evidence of any kind" to support its claim. Thus, the court denied the motion for summary judgment. Case
Washington v. Olatoye 173 A.D.3d 467, 103 N.Y.S.3d 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) 2019 WL 2425735 (N.Y. App. Div. June 11, 2019) This New York case involves an appeal by a public housing tenant after his petition to declare his dog an assistance animal was denied and he was placed on probation with instructions to his dog from the premises. The denial stems from an incident where Petitioner's English Bulldog "Onyx" allegedly bit a NYCHA employee when the employee was delivering a hotplate to petitioner's apartment when petitioner was not home. After the incident, NYCHA notified petitioner that it would seek to terminate his tenancy for non-desirability and breach of its rules and regulations. Petitioner suffered from mental illness as well as a traumatic brain injury and was in the process of trying to register Onyx as an assistance animal, which was validated by a letter from the psychiatric support center where he received services. At a hearing, the NYCHA hearing officer sustained the charges against petitioner, required him to remove the dog from his apartment immediately and placed him on probation for one year. It did not address petitioner's request for an assistance animal as a reasonable accommodation and ignored the mental health records submitted into evidence. On appeal, this court first noted that housing providers are required to allow a person who proves their burden of showing that an animal assists them with aspects of their disability to keep an assistance animal. Here, the hearing officer engaged in no such analysis and relied on the "direct threat" exemption to the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Because there was no initial record that addressed petitioner's reasonable accommodation request, the appellate court was left with an insufficient record that precluded adequate review. Thus, the petition was held in abeyance and this court remanded the proceeding to NYCHA for a determination, on the existing record, in accordance with this decision. Case
Warren v. Delvista Towers Condominium Ass'n, Inc. 49 F.Supp.3d 1082 (S.D. Fla. 2014) In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s accommodation request under the Federal Fair Housing Act (the “FHA”) to modify Defendant's “no pet” policy was unreasonable because Plaintiff's emotional support animal was a pit bull and pit bulls were banned by county ordinance. In denying the Defendant’s motion, the District Court found that changing a no pets policy for an emotional support animal was a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. The court also found that enforcing the county ordinance would violate the FHA by permitting a discriminatory housing practice. However, in line with US Department of Housing and Urban Development notices, the court found genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the dog posed a direct threat to members of the condominium association, and whether that threat could be reduced by other reasonable accommodations. Case
Velzen v. Grand Valley State University 902 F.Supp.2d 1038(W.D. Mich. 2012) On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff and the Fair Housing Center of West Michigan (“FHCWM”) brought suit against Defendants, a university, alleging unlawful discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), Federal Rehabilitation Act, and Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”), for denying Plaintiff’s request to keep an emotional support animal in on-campus housing. All claims brought against the individual defendants were brought against them in their official capacities as university administrators. Plaintiffs sought both injunctive and compensatory relief. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The District Court decided the following would be dismissed: (1) all claims under the PWDCRA against all defendants; (2) all claims for compensatory damages under the FHA brought against all defendants; (3) all claims for injunctive relief under the FHA brought against the institutional defendants; (4) all claims for relief under the Rehabilitation Act by the FHCWM; and (5) all claims for relief under the Rehabilitation Act by Plaintiff that depended on disparate treatment. The following claims remained: (1) Plaintiff and the FHCWM's claims under the FHA seeking injunctive relief from the individual defendants; and (2) Plaintiff's claims against all defendants for compensatory damages and injunctive relief under the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to the failure to accommodate theory. Case
United States v. Univ. of Neb. at Kearney 940 F. Supp. 2d 974, 975 (D. Neb. 2013). This case considers whether student housing at the University of Nebraska–Kearney (UNK) is a “dwelling” within the meaning of the FHA. The plaintiff had a service dog (or therapy dog as the court describes it) trained to respond to her anxiety attacks. When she enrolled and signed a lease for student housing (an apartment-style residence about a mile off-campus), her requests to have her service dog were denied, citing UNK's "no pets" policy for student housing. The United States, on behalf of plaintiff, filed this suit alleging that UNK's actions violated the FHA. UNK brought a motion for summary judgment alleging that UNK's student housing is not a "dwelling" covered by the FHA. Specifically, UNK argues that students are "transient visitors" and the student housing is not residential like other temporary housing (migrant housing, halfway houses, etc.) and more akin to jail. However, this court was not convinced, finding that "UNK's student housing facilities are clearly 'dwellings' within the meaning of the FHA." Case
United States v. Robinson Slip Copy, 2017 WL 806655 (D. Neb. Mar. 1, 2017)

In this case, defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute marijuana and conspiracy to launder money after the defendant’s vehicle was searched by law enforcement during a traffic stop. During the stop, the police officer used a service dog while searching the vehicle. The defendants argued that any evidence gained by the police officer be suppressed on the grounds that the search of the vehicle was not constitutional. Specifically, the defendants argued that the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to use the service dog while searching the vehicle. Ultimately, the court found that the search by the police officer and his service dog did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights because the police officer had reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle. The court focused on the fact that the officer had legally stopped the vehicle and while talking to the driver and passengers he had established a reasonable suspicion that the defendants were transporting drugs. Once the police officer had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was transporting drugs, the police officer was legally allowed to use the service dog to search the vehicle. As a result, the court held that none of the evidence found during the search should be suppressed for violating the defendant’s constitutional rights. 

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