United States

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Titlesort ascending Summary
Arguello v. Behmke


The adoption of a dog was invalidated and the court ordered its return to the original owner. The shelter's placement of the dog with a new family was invalid because the shelter agreed that it would hold the dog for a certain period of time.

ARFF, Inc. v. Siegel


Resort developer and president of an animal performance company received an injunction against an animal rights group limiting their ability to both picket the resort and distribute pamphlets claiming that the big cats were abused.  Appellate court reversed, finding that the picketing regulations burdened more speech than necessary and that the restriction on distributing pamphlets was a prior restraint not justified by a compelling state interest.

Arellano v. Broward

Plaintiff Lisa Arellano suffered a dog bite and injury to her big toe after being attacked by a guard dog. The Defendant, Broward K–9/Miami K–9 Services, Inc. (“K–9”), owned two guard dogs. The guard dogs escaped K-9 after the business was burglarized, and the chain link fence was cut. The dogs entered Arellano’s neighborhood and she believed that the dogs belonged to one of her neighbors. Arellano fed and sheltered the dogs for about five days, and took steps to find the dogs' owner. However, Arellano also had pet dogs of her own. Eventually, one of the guard dogs attacked one of Arellano's dogs. When Arellano intervened in the attack between the two dogs, she was injured. Eventually, Animal Control determined that K–9 owned the guard dogs. Arellano then brought a statuory damages claim for strict liability against K-9 under Florida’s dog bite statute. The Circuit Court, Miami–Dade County, entered summary judgment in favor of K-9 and determined as a matter of law, that Arellano's actions constituted a superseding, intervening cause, thereby precluding her statutory dog bite claim against the Defendant, K-9.  Plaintiff, Arellano appealed.  The District Court of Appeals, held that triable issues of fact existed as to whether, and to what extent, K-9's liability under the statute should be reduced because of allegedly negligent actions by Arellano. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the circuit court decision and reasoned that Florida's dog bite statute imposes strict liability on dog owners, subject only to a plaintiff's comparative negligence, which in this case must be determined by the trier-of-fact. K-9's liability under the statute should only be reduced because of the allegedly negligent actions of Arellano. The court also reversed the resulting cost judgment in K–9's favor. The case was remanded to the trial court.

ARE WOMEN PERSONS?
ARE CHIMPANZEES ENTITLED TO FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHTS?
Archer v. State Defendant Tim Archer pleaded no contest to felony animal cruelty in Florida. Archer's dog Ponce apparently made a mess in Archer's house and, when Archer "disciplined" Ponce, the dog bit him, leading to Archer violently beating and stabbing the dog to death. Public outcry over mild punishment in the state for heinous acts of animal abuse led to "Ponce's Law," which enhanced penalties (although it did not retroactively apply to Archer). As a condition of Archer's plea agreement, both parties stipulated to a restriction on future ownership of animals as part of Archer's probation. On appeal here, Archer argues that the trial court erred in imposing these special conditions of probation. With regard to special condition 34 and 35, which prohibits him from owning any animal for the duration of his life and prohibits him from residing with anyone who owns a pet, Archer seeks clarification whether this prohibits him from residing with his ex-wife and children who own two cats, respectively. The court found that condition 35 would only be in effect for his three-year probationary term. Additionally, the court found condition 34 that imposes a lifetime ban on ownership exceeded the trial court's jurisdiction regardless of the open-ended language of Ponce's law. The animal restriction is not "a license to exceed the general rule that prohibits a court from imposing a probationary term beyond the statutorily permissible term, which in this case is five years." The case was remanded to the trial court to modify the conditions of probation to be coextensive with the probationary term.
AR - Veterinary - Veterinary Practice Code These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners.
AR - Trusts - Trust for care of animal. This statute represents Arkansas' pet trust law. The law provides that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal.
AR - Racing - Arkansas Greyhound Racing Law This Act gives the Arkansas Racing Commission sole jurisdiction over the business and the sport of greyhound racing. Greyhound racing may only be conducted in the State of Arkansas by a franchise that is approved by the Arkansas Racing Commission. A franchise must be a corporation organized under the state of Arkansas. A franchise may not be a individual, partnerships, associations, or trusts. A franchise may not be granted by the Commission until it is authorized by a majority of the qualified electors within the county in which the franchise intends to operate. The voters will be able to choose whether to allow or reject the Racing Commission's grant to the franchise to conduct greyhound racing. Each county is only allowed to have one franchise conducting greyhound racing.
AR - Primates - Subchapter 6. Nonhuman Primates This 2013 Act prohibits the importing, possession, selling, or breeding of apes, baboons, and macques. It is unlawful under the act for a person to allow a member of the public to come into direct contact with a primate. Further, a person cannot tether a primate outdoors or allow a primate to run at-large. The section does not apply to accredited AZA institutions, AWA regulated research facilities, wildlife sanctuaries, temporary holding facilities, licensed veterinarians providing treatment, law enforcement officers, circuses holding AWA Class C licenses as provided, and those temporarily in the state. The act has a grandfathering provision that allows a person at least 18 years of age to continue to possess the restricted primate if within 180 days after the effective date of the act the person registers the animal per § 20-19-605 and follows other listed requirements.

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