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U.S. v. Stevens |
Note that certiorari was granted in 2009 by --- S.Ct. ----, 2009 WL 1034613 (U.S. Apr 20, 2009).
In this case, the Third Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 48, the federal law that criminalizes depictions of animal cruelty, is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. The defendant in this case was convicted after investigators arranged to buy three dogfighting videos from defendant in sting operation. Because the statute addresses a content-based regulation on speech, the court considered whether the statute survived a strict scrutiny test. The majority was unwilling to extend the rationale of
Ferber
outside of child pornography without direction from the Supreme Court. The majority found that the conduct at issue in § 48 does not give rise to a sufficient compelling interest.
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U.S. v. Stevens |
Defendant was convicted of violating statute prohibiting the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional for being substantially overbroad: it did not require the depicted conduct to be cruel, extended to depictions of conduct that were only illegal in the State in which the creation, sale, or possession occurred, and because the exceptions clause did not substantially narrow the statute's reach. (2011 note:
18 U.S.C. § 48
was amended following this ruling in late 2010).
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U.S. v. Street |
The court held that the "second or subsequent conviction" component of the BGEPA applies to separate convictions charged in a single indictment. For further discussion on the enhanced penalty provision of the BGEPA, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.
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U.S. v. Taylor |
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Maine section 7613 (related to the importation of fish bait species) places an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. While the court noted there is nothing in either the statute or its legislative history which expresses the clear intent of Congress that the Lacey Act Amendments are meant to insulate state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause, it found that the somewhat unique characteristics associated with Maine's wild fish population, the substantial uncertainties surrounding the effects these organisms have on fish and the unpredictable consequences attending the introduction of exotic species into Maine's wild fish population (including the introduction of fish parasites into the native population), the state clearly has a legitimate and substantial purpose in prohibiting the importation of live bait fish.
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U.S. v. Thirty-Eight Golden Eagles |
Defendant appeals a civil forfeiture action under the BGEPA. In applying the three-part
Callahan
test to defendant's free exercise claim, the court holds that while defendant's religious exercise is substantially burdened, the government has a compelling interest in protecting a rare species and effectuates this interest in the least restrictive means. The court declines to consider defendant's free exercise challenge to the permit process, as defendant failed to apply for a permit and thus lacks standing. For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by Native Americans, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act
.
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U.S. v. Thomas |
The issue in this case is whether Edward A. Thomas, a Montana hunting guide and outfitter, may be found guilty of conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act where the alleged object of the conspiracy was "to transport, receive and acquire elk in interstate commerce ... in violation of Montana state hunter's law." The Court held that while a prosecution under the Lacey Act may not be sustained for the substantive acts of selling guiding services and hunting permits, an action can be maintained for conspiracies to violate the Act through these types of acts. In this case, the underlying violations were acts of hunting with a transferred license or permit where the acts were allegedly committed by others.
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U.S. v. Thompson |
Act May 25, 1900, c. 553, Sec. 4, 31 Stat. 188, incorporated in former section 393 of Title 18, was limited in its application to animals or birds killed in violation of game laws, and animals or birds killed during the open season - "the export of which is not prohibited by law," according to the court. The court held an indictment would not stand for a failure to mark a package containing game killed during the open season but the export of which was prohibited by the law of the state where the same was killed.
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U.S. v. Tierney (Unpublished) |
The district court did not err by denying the defendant's proposed entrapment instruction and that Nev. Admin. Code 504.471 is not unconstitutionally vague. He did not present evidence to support his position on either element. Rather than indicating government inducement or lack of predisposition, the evidence showed that the government merely provided the defendant with an opportunity to sell what he was already ready and willing to sell. The court also found the meaning of "wildlife" under Nevada law was not unconstitutionally vague.
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U.S. v. Todd |
Larry Todd and James Short appeal their convictions for conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act which prohibits the sale of wildlife taken or possessed in violation of federal law--here, The Airborne Hunting Act, 16 U.S.C. § 742j-1 (1976). The court held that the judge's failure to give instructions related to the dates of the alleged acts constituting the conspiracy did not raise an ex post facto challenge since the facts allege only two overt acts that occurred prior to the effective date of the Lacey Act amendments; all of the other acts occurred during the effective period of the amendments and most of the evidence focused on events that occurred within the effective date of the amendments. The appellants also contend that the government failed to establish that the game taken had a market value in excess of $350. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support Short's conviction under the substantive violation of the Lacey Act because the government offered no evidence that the value of the dead eagle, deer, or javelina exceeded $350.
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U.S. v. Tomono |
Kei Tomono pleaded guilty to violations of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(1) & 3373(d)(1)(B), and the federal anti-smuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 545, in connection with his illegal importation of reptiles. At sentencing, the district court granted a three-level downward departure for what it termed "cultural differences." The court held that "cultural differences" were not significant enough to remove this case from the body of cases contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines so as to allow for downward departure.
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