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U.S. v. One Afghan Urial Ovis Orientalis |
Claimant appeals the order granting summary judgment to the government in a order of forfeiture under the Lacey Act for the hide and parts of a sheep killed in Pakistan and exported to the U.S. Claimant argues that because there is no national Pakistani law enacted for the protection of wildlife, no Pakistani law interferes with his right to remove the respondent sheep from Pakistan based upon the provincial permit. The court disagreed, noting the Pakistan Constitution honors provincial law to the extent that it does not conflict with national law and Pakistani law prohibits the export of "wild animal skins and garments made from such skins, products or derivatives of such skins." The Court held that the Government established probable cause for the forfeiture, and Claimant did not demonstrate that any genuine issue of material fact exists which would preclude the award of summary judgment.
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U.S. v. One Bell Jet Ranger II Helicopter |
Sam Jaksick, Michael Boyce, and Chris Christensen were charged with conspiring to violate both the Airborne Hunting Act (AHA), 16 U.S.C. 742j-1 and the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981. They were also charged with knowingly using a helicopter to harass bighorn sheep in violation of the AHA. After a jury acquitted of the last two charges, the government, still convinced that the bighorn sheep had been harassed by the hunters, then brought this forfeiture action. While the court denied the forfeiture based for the most part on actions by the government in the case, it did hold that defendants' use of the helicopter to get as close as possible to identify the best trophy ram constituted sufficient intent for harassment under the Airborne Hunting Act.
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U.S. v. Paluch (unpublished) |
The court first concluded that venue was proper for the smuggling charges and the conspiracy charge. Turning to the convictions, the court found that his convictions of felony conspiracy and smuggling were supported by sufficient evidence. The court rejected his argument that the general smuggling law was inapplicable to the acts for which he was convicted because Congress had separately criminalized this conduct as a misdemeanor under the Endangered Species Act.
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U.S. v. Proceeds from Sale of Approximately 15,538 Panulirus Argus Lobster Tails |
This case arose out of the seizure of some 15,538 lobster tails of the species Panulirus argus, more commonly known as "spiny lobster," imported into the United States by the Claimant Lista Enterprises Seafood, Inc. from the Turks and Caicos Islands, a British territory in the Caribbean. The court held the government had probable cause to seize the lobster tails based on the weight criteria established under Turks and Caicos law. Under the Lacey Act, anyone who "knowingly" imports fish or wildlife taken in violation of foreign law may be assessed a penalty of $10,000 per violation, where "knowingly" refers to situations where the violator knew or should have known that the wildlife was taken in violation of law.
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U.S. v. Rioseco |
After defendant was found fishing in the Cay Sal Bank area of the Bahamas, Coast Guard officers informed appellant that possession of a Bahamian fishing license was necessary to fish in those waters and that failure to possess such a license would render such fishing a contravention of the United States Lacey Act. On appeal, defendant contended that the Lacey Act is unconstitutional in that it incorporates foreign law, thereby delegating legislative power to foreign governments. The court found that the Lacey Act which prohibited the possession or importation of fish and wildlife taken in violation of foreign laws, was not an improper delegation of legislative power simply by its reference to foreign law.
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U.S. v. Santillan |
Santillan was prosecuted under the Lacey Act for bringing ten baby parrots across the border from Tijuana. His appeal raises, among other issues, a significant question about the mens rea needed under the Lacey Act. The court held that the Lacey Act does not require knowledge of the particular law violated by the possession or predicate act, as long as the defendant knows of its unlawfulness.
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U.S. v. Senchenko |
During the two year period alleged in the indictment, between September 1993 and September 1995, government agents found or were directed to four illegal bear snares in Colville National Forest, Washington that were later linked to defendant. The Lacey Act provision that makes it felony to knowingly engage in conduct that involves intent to sell wildlife with market value in excess of $350 encompasses several types of conduct in furtherance of commercial activity (transporting, selling, receiving, acquiring, and purchasing wildlife) and government could aggregate value of parts related to such conduct to arrive at requisite $350 value, because defendant's various acts formed a single continuing scheme.
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U.S. v. Smith |
Defendant was convicted of possessing Bald Eagle feathers in violation of Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) after receiving the feathers in the mail from a friend to complete a craft project. On appeal, defendant challenged her conviction, alleging that she did not possess the requisite knowledge and that the act itself was vague as to the level of intent, or
scienter
. The court affirmed defendant's conviction finding that the evidence established that defendant knowingly possessed eagle feathers in violation of MBTA, the conviction did not amount to punishment of wholly passive conduct contrary to defendant's suggestion, and that MBTA was not vague nor overbroad with regard to intent. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the Eagle Act, see
Detailed Discussion of the Eagle Act
.
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U.S. v. St. Pierre |
Defendant challenged his felony indictment under the MBTA after selling an "invitation stick" that contained golden eagle feathers. The court held that the act encompasses migratory birds parts, not just whole birds so the indictment would stand. However, in a unique decision it held that the imposition of a felony conviction would violate due process where the statute does not specify any degree of intent. As a result, the court said it would sentence defendant under the misdemeanor provision of the statute if convicted. For further discussion on the intersection of the intent component of the MBTA with the BGEPA, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act
.
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U.S. v. Stenberg |
These three cases arose out of an undercover investigation by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) into the illegal taking and sale of wildlife in interstate commerce, where defendants were engaged in the guiding and hunting business wherein customers would pay for illegal big game hunts. The court denied defendants' defense of outrageous government conduct and entrapment. It also held that the Lacey Act clearly notifies individuals that participation in prohibited transactions involving wildlife with a market value greater than $350 subjects them to felony prosecutions, thus defeating defendants' challenge of vagueness to the statute. Notably, the court reversed convictions on the fact that the provision of guiding services or providing a hunting permit does not constitute the sale of wildlife for purposes of the Lacey Act (this was amended in 1988 to include guide services, which overturned this decision. See U.S. v. Atkinson, 966 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1992).
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