United States
Displaying 4531 - 4540 of 4775
Title |
Summary |
|---|---|
| AR - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty/Animal Fighting Laws | This section contains the Arkansas anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. A person commits a misdemeanor if he or she knowingly abandons any animal subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment, fails to supply an animal in his or her custody with a sufficient quantity of wholesome food and water fails to provide an animal in his or her custody with adequate shelter, kills or injures any animal belonging to another without legal privilege or consent of the owner, or carries an animal in or upon any motorized vehicle or boat in a cruel or inhumane manner. Aggravated cruelty to a cat, dog, or horse is a Class D felony if the offense involves the torture. |
| AR - Assistance Animal - Arkansas Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | The following statute comprises the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog law. |
| April in Paris v. Becerra | Plaintiffs are a collection of businesses that distribute and sell products made from alligator and crocodile parts. They brought this suit to enjoin the provisions of a California law that would criminalize the sale and possession of alligator and crocodile parts in California. They argue that these laws would cause them to lose sales, lead to inventory liquidation, and cause job loss. The court found that the injury plaintiff were alleging was economic in nature, and that they would be likely to suffer an irreparable injury by the California law. Plaintiffs also argue that the California law is expressly preempted by the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and that trade in these species is authorized by an exemption under the regulatory "special rules" of the ESA. The court found that these exceptions applied to plaintiff's trade and possession of the animal parts, granted the injunction to enjoin California from enforcing the laws until final disposition of the case. |
| Applbaum v. Golden Acres Farm and Ranch |
|
| Anzalone v. Kragness |
|
| ANSON v. DWIGHT |
|
| ANOTHER WEAPON FOR COMBATING FAMILY VIOLENCE: PREVENTION OF ANIMAL ABUSE | |
| Anne Arundel County v. Reeves | This Maryland case examines the scope of compensatory damages available forf the tortious injury or death of a pet under Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 11-110, a law that allow pet owner to recover damages for the tort-based death or injury of their pet up to a capped level. The incident giving rise to this case occurred when Anne Arundel County Police Officer Rodney Price shot Micheal Reeves' dog in the front yard of Mr. Reeves' home. Officer Price was going door-to-door inquiring with residents after a recent spate of burglaries. Mr. Reeves' dog Vern burst from the front storm door and put his paw on the officer's forearm. While Officer Price stepped back and pushed the dog away, he testified that he did not vocalize any commands to the dog at that time, and, instead, decided to shoot the dog. Testimony by a veterinary pathologist at trial revealed that, if the dog were going for the officer's face as Price testified, this would have been improbable based on the dog's size as compared to the officer. Further, there was no dirt on that area of the officer's arm/chest nor any marks from the dog's paws. After a jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of Mr. Reeves for $10,000 for the trespass to chattel claim, and $500,000 in economic damages and $750,000 in noneconomic damages for the gross negligence claim. The circuit court then reduced the gross negligence damages to $200,000 pursuant to the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). CJP § 5-301 et seq. The circuit court also reduced the trespass to chattel damages to $7,500 pursuant to the then-applicable damages cap in CJP § 11-110.1. The Court of Special Appeals held in an unreported divided decision that the statute did not bar recovery of noneconomic damages. On appeal here, this court now holds that CJP § 11-110 limits the recovery for compensatory damages to the amount specified by that statute and does not allow for recovery of noneconomic compensatory damages. And while the court found there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Officer Price was grossly negligent, it also held that Mr. Reeves could not recover these damages due to Maryland's single recovery rule. As a matter of first impression, this court found CJP § 11-110's plain language evinces an intent to exclude those things not expressed in the statute. In other words, because the legislature defined the specific types of compensatory damages it allows, it intended to exclude other forms of damages like noneconomic damages. Further, the court found the plaintiff's reading of the statute "illogical" because economic damages would be capped, but yet noneconomic damages would not be. Thus, it would be up to the General Assembly to expressly provide for noneconomic damages in amendments to the statute. The court ultimately concluded that the statute defines and caps the recovery of compensatory damages in the case of the tortious death or injury of a pet and the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The dissent noted the majority decision created a "double anomaly" in Maryland law by capping damages for victims of a tortfeasor who kills their dog but allowing a fraudster who intentionally tricks a family into selling a painting of their dog unlimited damages. Further, the dissent argued the majority ignored both judicial and ethical trends regarding pets in society and disregards the legislative debate when the statute was re-enacted showing an intent to include higher damages amounts. |
| Animals in Film | |
| Animals as Property |