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State v. Johnson |
--- S.E.2d ----, 2024 WL 5130828 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2024) |
In this North Carolina case, Defendant Jeffrey Lee Johnson appeals from judgments entered upon guilty verdicts of one count of felony cruelty to animals and two counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals. The conviction stems from a search of defendant's property after a phone call was made to animal control about a strong smell was coming from the property. After failing to reach the defendant by phone, animal control officers drove to the property and observed a "very, very strong odor" of ammonia, feces, and "the smell of rot." As the officers walked up the driveway, they encountered a chained dog ("Chubby") who presented with an irritated neck, worn down teeth, overgrown nails, and multiple scabs. Other dogs were observed without access to water, including a box filled with puppies and dried feces. This prompted the officers to check on the other dogs in the backyard. One dog was breathing shallowly and appeared at first to be deceased. After sending photos of the dogs to the magistrate, probable cause was found to charge the defendant with animal cruelty and impound the dogs for their safety. In total, 21 dogs were seized, two of which had to be euthanized. At trial, the court denied defendant's motion to suppress, and defendant was ultimately convicted at trial. On Appeal, defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred by concluding that a warrantless search of his home's curtilage was reasonable due to exigent circumstances and by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that search and the search of his home. This court found that there was no unreasonable search since it occurred while officers were walking up the driveway and "in a place where the public is allowed to be." The seizure of the dog Chubby was justified under the plain view doctrine. In addition, the officers held a reasonable belief that the other dogs observed on the property needed immediate aid to prevent further suffering. Thus, exigent circumstances existed supporting the seizure of the other dogs. Finally, after the plain view discoveries, there was a substantial basis for probable cause to search the property and its buildings that supported the search warrant that was eventually granted. The dogs were present and would have fallen under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, this court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress. |
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Saulsbury v. Wilson |
--- S.E.2d ----, 2019 WL 493695 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2019) |
This Georgia involves an interlocutory appeal arising from a dog bite lawsuit. In 2016, Plaintiff Saulsbury was walking her English Bulldog past Defendant Wilson's house when Wilson's pitbull dog escaped its crate in the open garage. A fight ensued between the dogs. Wilson then attempted to break up the fight and was allegedly bitten by Saulsbury's dog, suffering a broken arm in the process and necessitating a course of rabies shots. The Saulsburys then sued the Wilsons in magistrate court to recover hospital and veterinary expenses. Wilson counterclaimed for her injuries in excess $15,000, thus transferring the case to superior court. At this time, the Saulsburys moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals here reverses that denial. The court found that Wilson assumed the risk when she intervened in a dog fight with her bare hands. In particular, the court observed that assumption of risk serves as a complete defense to negligence. That finding was bolstered by the fact that Wilson had knowledge that her dog had previously bitten other persons and had admitted to breaking up previous dog fights with a stick. The court relied on previous case law showing that all animals, even domesticated animals, pose a risk as does the act of breaking up even human fights. The court was not persuaded by the fact that Saulsbury may have been in violation of various DeKalb County ordinances related to an owner's responsibility to control his or her animal. A plain reading of those ordinances does not impose a duty on the part of an owner to "dangerously insert herself into a dog fight." The court found the lower court erred in denying the Saulsbury's motion for summary judgment and reversed and remanded the case. |
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SAM LAMBERT & ANDRIA LAMBERT v. SALLY MORRIS & STEVE HAIR |
--- S.E.2d ----, 2018 WL 6314142 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2018) |
Plaintiffs Sam Lambert and Andria Lambert appeal the trial court's granting of summary judgment in this lost dog case. Specifically, plaintiffs filed an action against defendants Sally Morris and Steve Hair alleging conversion, civil conspiracy, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, as well as injunctive relief and damages related to the disappearance of their dog, Biscuit. Biscuit went missing in August of 2015. After searching for Biscuit for several days, plaintiffs contacted the local animal control and posted Biscuit as a lost dog on animal control's unofficial Facebook page. Over a month later, a citizen brought Biscuit (who had no microchip or collar on) to animal control where she was placed in a holding cell. After the 72-hour hold, Biscuit was transferred to the Humane Society. Biscuit was spayed and examined by a veterinarian, and a picture was posted on the Humane Society website. At the vet exam, tumors were discovered in Biscuit's mammary glands and so surgery was performed, some of it paid for by defendant Hair. Hair eventually adopted Biscuit. Almost a year later, plaintiffs found an old picture of Biscuit on the Humane Society Facebook page and attempted to claim Biscuit. Defendant Hair learned of this and requested that plaintiffs reimburse for veterinary expenses, to which they agreed. After some discussion, Hair learned plaintiffs had over 14 dogs and refused to return Biscuit without a home inspection. That caused a heated discussion and the meeting between plaintiffs and defendant ended without the dog returning. About a month later, plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, whereupon defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On appeal here, the court first noted that, per state law, an animal shelter hold a lost or abandoned dog for at least 72-hours. Here, animal control satisfied its legal duty by keeping Biscuit in custody for the required holding period before transferring her to the Humane Society. Thus, plaintiffs lost any ownership rights to Biscuit after the 72-hour mark. Moreover, almost a month had passed between the time Biscuit was taken in by animal control and the formal adoption by defendant Hair at the Humane Society. As a result, the court found that Hair was the rightful owner of Biscuit and was entitled to negotiate with plaintiffs as he saw fit. Thus, no genuine issues of material fact existed for plaintiffs at trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims. |
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State v. Doherty |
--- S.E.2d ---- 2024 WL 2002922 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2024) |
In this North Carolina case, the defendant appeals from his conviction of felony cruelty to animals and suspended sentence of imprisonment. The conviction stems from Defendant's kicking of his neighbor's dog. According to testimony of the dog's owner, Defendant would activate sprinklers in his yard anytime someone with a dog walked by his home. In November of 2019, the dog's owner was walking her fourteen-year-old dachshund-beagle mix, Davis, in front of Defendant's house when she stepped out of the roadway onto Defendant's lawn to avoid a passing car. The occupants of the car then stopped to talk with the dog's owner briefly, whereupon Defendant emerged from his home and proceeded to kick Davis in the stomach. The dog's owner called the police and the dog was transported to an emergency veterinarian because he was "lifeless" and "limp." Defendant was ultimately charged, indicted, and convicted of felonious cruelty to animals. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge of felonious cruelty to animals because a single kick was insufficient to show that Defendant "cruelly beat" the dog; and (2) that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor cruelty to animals. This court first addressed whether a single kick to a dog was sufficient to meet the definition of "cruelly beat." Looking first at the standard dictionary definition of "beat," the court found that the words, “cruelly beat” can apply to any act that causes the unjustifiable pain, suffering, or death to an animal, even if it is just one single act. In fact, the court stated, "[t]o hold otherwise would allow a person to kick a dog so hard they suffer life-threatening injuries—such as the case here—but not be subject to felonious cruelty to animals because it was 'just' one kick." Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. As to the lesser included offense instruction, this court found that there was no evidence of error, let alone plain error, since the jury would have likely found Defendant guilty of felonious animal cruelty based on the evidence presented. No reversible error occurred and Defendant's conviction was affirmed. |
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Garshelis v. Bennett |
--- P.3d ----, 2026 WL 31347 (Idaho Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2026) |
This appeal concerns the valuation of a companion animal and the availability of emotional distress damages arising from its wrongful death. The plaintiff sought to recover for the shooting and disposal of her dog, Stanley, advancing multiple tort theories including conversion, trespass to chattels, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The central legal issue was the proper measure of damages for the loss of a pet, which the court resolved by affirming that, under Idaho law, pets are considered property. Specifically, where a fair market value exists as here, where it was established that Stanley's value was $500, that value is the proper measure for the animal's loss, which precludes a "value to the owner" assessment or loss-of-use damages. Furthermore, the court adhered to precedent limiting the recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of a pet strictly to the independent torts of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and not through property-based torts like conversion. While the district court's nominal damages award for intentional infliction of emotional distress was upheld, its dismissal of the negligent infliction claim was reversed due to insufficient findings. The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings specifically on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. |
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State v. Mercedes |
--- P.3d ----, 2025 WL 715789 (Wash. Mar. 6, 2025) |
State v. Mercedes addresses the constitutionality of a warrantless search under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, which protects against unlawful invasions of privacy. The defendant, Mary Mercedes, challenged the validity of consent given to animal control officers to search her property, where evidence of animal cruelty was discovered. The trial court suppressed the evidence, ruling that Ferrier warnings—requiring officers to inform individuals of their right to refuse, limit, or revoke consent—were necessary. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Ferrier warnings apply only to searches of a person’s home, not outdoor property. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the officers’ investigative purpose—responding to animal cruelty complaints and monitoring compliance—did not trigger Ferrier requirements. The court emphasized that Ferrier applies narrowly to warrantless searches of homes for contraband or evidence of a crime, not to outdoor property inspections for regulatory or investigative purposes. The case was remanded to determine whether consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. |
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Lorenz v. City & Borough of Juneau |
--- P.3d ----, 2025 WL 2180275 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2025) |
Appellant Dorene Lorenz appealed her conviction for two infractions under a municipal nuisance barking ordinance issued after her neighbors complained that her two dogs barked frequently and for prolonged periods on three specified dates. The City and Borough of Juneau prosecuted the case, which proceeded to a bench trial where the central factual issue was whether the dogs' barking disturbed the neighborhood. Lorenz contended the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague for lacking an objective standard, potentially criminalizing ordinary canine behavior and inviting arbitrary enforcement. The appellate court, applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, construed the ordinance to incorporate an implicit "reasonable person" standard to cure the vagueness defect, thereby providing the requisite notice and guarding against arbitrary application. Procedurally, the court found the lower tribunal abused its discretion by precluding Lorenz from presenting potentially exculpatory video evidence of her dogs' conduct, which was central to her defense against the allegations. Additional due process concerns were identified, including limitations placed on Lorenz's right to cross-examine witnesses and potential discovery violations regarding the production of a "bark log" upon which the court relied in its findings. Given the cumulative impact of these errors on the quasi-criminal proceeding, the appellate court vacated the conviction. The appellate court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. |
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Marshall v. City of Tulsa |
--- P.3d ----, 2024 WL 4686865 (Okla.,2024) |
This Oklahoma case centers around a pit bull named Julian, who was being fostered from Tulsa Animal Welfare, a department within the City of Tulsa. The foster went on vacation and left the dog with a pet-sitter named Sarah Marshall. The foster of the dog was under contract with Tulsa Animal Welfare to provide care, but was informed that the dog could be removed at any time and she was not allowed to have others care for the dog without prior approval. The foster needed to go out of town and attempted to contact the Foster Coordinator who did not respond. Ultimately, the foster hired Marshall from Rover.com to care for the dog over the weekend. The dog arrived at Marshall's home and was placed with five other dogs. This caused a fight to break out and Marshall's hand was bitten and fractured in the process of breaking up the fight. Approximately six months later, Marshall sued the City of Tulsa alleging strict liability, common law negligence, and negligence per se. The City filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Marshall was the owner of the dog at the time of the bite and the trial court granted the City's motion, finding Marshall was an “owner” of dog and could not recover under 4 O.S. § 42.1 and the City did not owe a duty to Marshall. Marshall then filed the instant appeal, alleging that she was not an owner of Julian but only a temporary boarder and that City has the legal right of possession of Julian. This court disagreed, finding that the Tulsa ordinance's definition of "owner" applied to Marshall because she was responsible for Julian's care and maintenance at the time. This does not conflict with state law, as state law contemplates a dog having more than one owner. With regard to Marshall's common law negligence claim, the Court found that the City did not owe Marshall a duty because she was not a foreseeable plaintiff. Merely residing in city limits does not automatically make her a foreseeable plaintiff nor did the City's failure to perform a formal behavior evaluation on Julian. In addition, Marshall was not a foreseeable plaintiff from the foster's placement of Julian with her. In fact, the foster's placement of Julian with Marshall violated the Foster Agreement. The trial court's granting of summary judgment and denial of Marshall's motion for partial summary judgement was affirmed. |
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Labor Commission v. FCS Community Management |
--- P.3d ----, 2024 WL 370160 (Utah App., 2024) |
This case concerns the Utah Anti-discrimination and Labor Division's (UALD) determination that a homeowner's association's three-month delay in responding to a member's request for reasonable accommodation to keep chickens on their property as assistance animals for a child with anxiety and PTSD violated the Utah Fair Housing Act. The trial court found that this three month delay was a constructive denial of the request, because under the Utah Fair Housing Act a housing provider must participate in an interactive process to evaluate and discuss the request for accommodation, and no such interactive dialogue or interactive process took place. On appeal, the court found that the three month delay in responding to the request was not unreasonably long, especially considering that the HOA had to review the status of chickens as support animals, chicken waste runoff, and possibility of rodent complaints during this time. The court of appeals also found that the members were not harmed by the HOA's alleged delay, since they were still allowed to keep the chickens at this time. The court of appeals then reversed the trial court's holding granting the members damages, fees, and other relief. |
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Labor Commission, Antidiscrimination and Labor Division v. FCS Community Management |
--- P.3d ----, 2024 WL 1203693 (Utah App., 2024) |
This is an appeal of a complaint filed by the Utah Anti-discrimination and Labor Division (ULAD) seeking review of the determination that an HOA violated members' request for reasonable accommodation by denying homeowner's the ability to keep chickens on their property. The chickens were intended to be assistance animals for the homeowner's daughter, who has anxiety and PTSD. The district court found that the HOA constructively denied the homeowner's request for reasonable accommodation by delaying their response to the request for three months. This court reversed the decision of the lower court, finding that there was no constructive denial of the request since the HOA allowed the homeowners to keep the chickens during the interim period, did not punish them for keeping the chickens, and ultimately granted the request to keep the chickens. |
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State v. Wilson |
--- P.3d ----, 2019 WL 4955178 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019) |
Defendant Robert Wilson appeals his conviction of first degree animal cruelty, which arose from an incident at an archery club when Wilson shot a large dog in the hindquarters (70lb. "Dozer") with an arrow after that dog attacked Wilson’s small dog ("Little Bit"). (Dozer recovered from his injuries.) Wilson argues that his action was lawful under RCW 16.08.020, which states that it is lawful for a person to kill a dog seen chasing, biting, or injuring a domestic animal on real property that person owns, leases, or controls. The trial court declined to give defendant's proposed jury instruction based on this statutory language, finding that it only applied to stock animals and not when a dog was injuring another dog. The court did, however, permit the common law defense that allows owners to take "reasonably necessary action" in defense of their animals, which the State must then disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, this court noted that no Washington court has interpreted RCW 16.08.020 in a published case. Under common law cases that allow a person to kill an animal to defend his or her property, the court found those cases require the killing be "reasonably necessary." While the parties dispute whether the statute requires that the actions be "reasonably necessary," the appellate court first found Wilson was still not entitled to a dismissal of charges because he could not establish that the location where he shot the arrow at Dozer was land that he "owned, leased, or had control over" per the statute. As to the Wilson's next argument that the trial court erred in not giving his proposed instruction for RCW 16.08.020, the appellate court agreed. While the trial court found that the statute only applied to stock animals, the appellate court noted that the law does not define the term "domestic animal." Using the plain dictionary meaning for "domestic" - "belonging to or incumbent on the family" - and for "domestic animal," this court stated that "Little Bit certainly belonged to Wilson's family" and a dog fits the meaning of "domestic animal." Finally, the court found that the "reasonably necessary" requirement from the common law cases on shooting domestic animals cannot be grafted onto the statutory requirements of RCW 16.08.020. Thus, the trial court's refusal to give defendant's proposed instruction based on RCW 16.08.020 cannot be grounded in the reasonably necessary common law requirement. The trial court's refusal to give the proposed instruction was not harmless. As such, the appellate court reversed Wilson's conviction and remanded the action for further proceedings. |
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Goldberger v. State Farm Fire and Casaulty Company |
--- P.3d ----, 2019 WL 3792803 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2019) |
Joel and Kim Goldberger owned residential rental property in Flagstaff that was insured by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company under a rental dwelling policy. The Goldbergers filed a claim asserting that their tenant allowed feral cats to access the property and cause approximately $75,000 in “accidental damage.” State farm subsequently denied the claim asserting that feral cats are domestic animals and therefore the damage was not covered under the policy. The Goldbergers filed suit alleging breach of contract and insurance bad faith. State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. State Farm claimed that the policy stated that accidental losses caused by “birds, vermin, rodents, insects, or domestic animals” were not covered by the policy. The superior court granted State Farm’s motion and this appeal followed. The Goldbergers argued that the superior court erred in dismissing their complaint due to the fact that the term “domestic animals” is reasonably susceptible to differing interpretations and must be construed against State Farm. State Farm argued that the exclusion in the policy was only susceptible to one reasonable interpretation. The Court stated that there were two interpretations to the term “domestic animal.” The first definition is a species-based definition that says that domestic animals are animals belonging to a broader class of animals that have been domesticated at some point in history. The second definition is an individualized definition that says that domestic animals are animals that are kept by a person for any of various purposes, including as pets. The Court ultimately decided that the individualized definition makes more sense in terms of the insurance policy itself as well as case law. In making this determination, the court noted the "nonsensical" outcome that would arise for exotic or nontraditional pets were a species-based definition adopted. Domestic animals encompass animals that are subject to the care, custody, and control of a person. On the facts alleged in the complaint alone, the Court could not say that the tenant was keeping the feral cats in such a manner that the exclusion would preclude coverage. The court therefore resolved all reasonable inferences in the Goldberger’s favor and presumed that the cats were feral. Because the feral cats that caused the damage are not domestic animals under all reasonable interpretations of the facts alleged in the complaint, the court erred in granting the insurer's motion to dismiss. The Court reversed the superior court’s order dismissing the Goldberger’s complaint and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. |
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Matter of Ware |
--- P.3d ----, 2018 WL 3120370 (Wash. Ct. App. June 26, 2018) |
After the Lewis County Prosecuting Attorney's Office's decided not to issue charges in an animal abuse case, two private citizens sought to independently initiate criminal charges. One person filed a petition for a citizen's complaint in district court and, after that was denied, another person filed a petition to summon a grand jury. On appeal, those appellants argue that the lower court erred in not granting their petitions. The animal cruelty claim stems from an incident in 2016, where a woman filed a report with police stating that a neighbor had killed her mother's cat by throwing a rock at the cat and stabbing it with a knife. Witnesses gave similar account of the abuse of the cat by the neighbor. The responding police officer then determined that there was probable cause to arrest the suspect for first degree animal cruelty. The officer found the cat's body and photographed the injuries, although the officer could not determine whether the cat had been stabbed. Subsequently, the prosecuting attorney's office declined to file charges because the actions related to the animal's death were unclear. Additionally, the cat's body was not collected at the scene to sustain a charge. |
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People v. Harris |
--- P.3d ---- 2016 WL 6518566 (Colo.App.,2016) |
Harris was convicted for twenty-two counts of cruelty to animals after dozens of malnourished animals were found on her property by employees of the Humane Society. On appeal, Harris raised two main issues: (1) that the animal protection agent who was an employee of the Humane Society was not authorized to obtain a search warrant to investigate her property and (2) that the mistreatment of the twenty-two animals constituted one continuous course of conduct and that the lower court violated her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause by entering a judgment on twenty-two counts of animal cruelty. The Court of Appeals reviewed the issue of whether the animal protection agent had the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property and determined that the agent did not have the proper authority. The Court looked to the state statute that specifically stated that only “state employees” were able to investigate livestock cases. In this case, the animal protection agent was employed by the Humane Society and was not a state employee; therefore, he did not have the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property. However, the Court found that there was no constitutional violation with regard to the search warrant because it was still obtained based on probable cause. For this reason, the Court denied Harris’ request to suppress evidence that was submitted as a result of the search warrant. Finally, the Court reviewed Harris’ argument regarding her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court found that under the statute dealing with animal cruelty, the phrases “any animal” and “an animal” suggests that a person commits a separate offense for each animal that is mistreated. Essentially, the Court held that the language of the statute “demonstrates that the legislature perceived animal cruelty not as an offense against property but as an offense against the individual animal.” As a result, Harris’ rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were not violated and the Court upheld the lower court’s decision. |
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People v. Restifo |
--- N.Y.S.3d ----, 220 A.D.3d 1113, 2023 WL 7028284 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023) |
This is an appeal of a verdict to convict defendant of aggravated cruelty to animals. Defendant was walking his two pit bull dogs and allowed the dogs enough leash space to reach a pet cat resting on the steps of its owner’s porch. The cat’s owners, who were witnesses to this event, watched as the pit bulls mauled their pet cat. When the witnesses asked defendant to stop his dogs, defendant attempted to flee with his dogs still carrying the cat’s body in its mouth. The witnesses pursued and eventually, the dog dropped the deceased cat’s body. Defendant was charged with aggravated cruelty to animals and overdriving, torturing and injuring animals, and failure to provide proper sustenance. Defendant was convicted, and appealed the aggravated animal cruelty charge. Defendant argues that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence. The court here found that defendant was well aware that the dogs were aggressive, even keeping them separate from his young son because of their propensity to attack smaller animals. There was also testimony from another neighbor of defendant allowing his dogs to chase feral cats off her porch without stopping them, and testimony regarding defendant’s dog previously mauling a smaller dog without defendant intervening to stop them. Defendant was warned by animal control to muzzle them, but refused to do so. Defendant also bragged to co-workers about how he let his pit bulls go after other dogs and attack wild and old animals. Accordingly, the court found that defendant was aware of the dogs’ aggressive behavior and affirmed the holding of the lower court. |
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City of New York v. Ball |
--- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2024 WL 3078319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 2024) |
This New York case concerns a challenge to the New York City Local Law No. 2019/202 that prohibits restaurants and retail food establishments within the City of New York from selling or serving foie gras and other force-fed products. Petitioner City of New York challenges the final determination of respondents Richard A. Ball, as Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets, and the Department of Agriculture and Markets, which found that Local Law 202 unreasonably restricts and regulates farming operations within the agricultural districts where foie gras is produced, contrary to Agriculture and Markets Law (“AML”) § 305-a. The City argued that Local Law 202 does not impact AML § 305-a because it does not have a direct impact on the farms that produce the foie gras in the agricultural district in the county where it is produced. According to the City, Local Law 202 merely prohibits restaurants and food establishments within the City from selling force-fed products, and the Farms remain free to continue producing foie gras in agricultural districts through force-feeding. In looking at the statute text, this court found that a restriction on processes used within farm operations of agricultural districts fits within the purview of the statute. While New York has adopted broad home-rule powers, their scope is limited to regulation in the territorial boundaries. The testimony and legislative history of Local Law 202 demonstrates that the goal of the law was animal welfare as opposed to human health or safety; these practices are reasonably tied to farming practices in outside agricultural districts. Thus, the measure falls within the scope of AML § 305-a as a “local law” that “restrict[s] or regulate[s] farm operations in agricultural districts." While the City has a legitimate desire to protect animals from a cruel practice, it cannot do so in a manner that is inconsistent with state law. The court noted that the state legislature is free to "recalibrate" the statutory construction of AML § 305-a to allow animal welfare concerns, but, in its current form, that would be inconsistent with the language. The motions of intervenors were dismissed, the Petition was denied in all respects, and the proceeding was dismissed. |
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C.M. v. E.M. |
--- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2023 WL 8360025 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 28, 2023) |
This is a family law case concerning, among other issues, the euthanasia of a family companion animal. Defendant argues that Plaintiff violated an order in place by putting the family dog down without reason, necessity, and justification, and that the dog was an emotional support animal whose custody had not been determined. Defendant also argues that plaintiff did not allow defendant the opportunity to spend time with the dog before it was put down, and that he suffered emotional distress due to the dog's death. The court found that the euthanasia of the family dog did not violate the order in place, because the companion animal was not classified as "property" or an "asset" under the order in place, and that animals are afforded additional protection under the Family Court Act. Whether the animal was put down unnecessarily could be considered animal cruelty, but that inquiry would need to be determined in a criminal proceeding, and criminal charges were not filed. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff did not violate the order by euthanizing the family dog. |
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Cantore v. Costantine |
--- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2023 WL 7560690 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2023) |
This is an appeal of a personal injury case brought by plaintiff, the mother of the injured child, against the owners of a dog that caused the injury and the owners of the restaurant where the injury occurred. The injury took place at a dog-friendly restaurant both parties were dining at, where the dog owned by defendants bit a three-year-old infant. Plaintiff alleges that the restaurant owners knew of the dog’s vicious propensities but allowed it on the premises, and are liable along with the owners of the dog for the injuries sustained by her child. Defendant restaurant owners contend that they did not know of the dog’s vicious propensities, and that their restaurant requires that dogs be leashed and the dog was leashed at the time of the bite. Plaintiff argues that, under the Hewitt case, a standard negligence analysis should be used rather than an analysis based on knowledge of vicious propensities. Plaintiffs also argue defendant restaurant owners owed a duty of care to their customers, which was breached by allowing a dangerous dog on the premises. The lower court denied defendants motion for summary judgment because there were unresolved issues of fact as to the restaurant defendants’ duty to their patrons and the foreseeability of the injury. This appeal followed. On appeal, the court reversed the order of the lower court because defendants established that they did not have any knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog and that they exercised reasonable care through their signage and policies to protect restaurant patrons from the risk of harm that allowing animals on the premises poses. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is granted. |
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People v. Brinkley |
--- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2019 WL 3226728 (N.Y. App. Div. July 18, 2019) |
Defendant was convicted of aggravated cruelty to animals. The Defendant appealed the judgment. Defendant and his nephew had purchased a puppy and continually used negative reinforcement, such as paddling or popping the dog on the rear end with an open hand, for unwanted behavior. On one occasion, when the dog was approximately 15 months old, the Defendant’s nephew found that the dog had defecated in the apartment. The nephew attempted to paddle the dog and the dog bit the nephew’s thumb as a result. When the Defendant had returned home, the nephew explained to him what had happened. The Defendant proceeded to remove the dog from his crate, put the dog’s face by the nephew’s injured thumb, and told him he was a bad dog. The dog then bit off a portion of the Defendant’s thumb. The Defendant attempted to herd the dog onto the back porch, but the dog became aggressive and continued to bite him. As a result, the Defendant repeatedly kicked the dog and used a metal hammer to beat the dog into submission. The dog later died due to his injuries. The Defendant argued that he had a justifiable purpose for causing the dog serious physical injury. The Defendant testified that he was in shock from the injury to his thumb and that he was trying to protect himself and his nephew. However, other evidence contradicted the Defendant's testimony. The dog was in a crate when the Defendant got home, and the Defendant could have left him there rather than take the dog out to discipline him. The Defendant was at least partially at fault for creating the situation that led him to react in such a violent manner. The Court reviewed several of the Defendant’s contentions and found them all to be without merit. The judgment was ultimately affirmed. |
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People v. Panetta |
--- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2018 WL 6627442, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 28404 (N.Y. App. Term. Dec. 13, 2018) |
Defendant was convicted of animal cruelty, inadequate shelter, and failing to seek veterinary care for her numerous dogs. After an initial seizure of two dogs, defendant was served with a notice to comply with care and sheltering of her remaining dogs. Following inspections about a month later, inspectors found that defendant had failed to comply with this order, and dogs suffering from broken bones and other injuries (including one dog with "a large tumor hanging from its mammary gland area") were seized and subsequently euthanized. As a result, defendant was arrested and charged with 11 violations of Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 and local code violations. Defendant then moved to suppress the physical evidence and statements taken during the initial warrantless entry onto her property and the evidence obtained after that during the execution of subsequent search warrants, arguing that the initial warrantless entry tainted the evidence thereafter. At the suppression hearing, a building contractor who had visited defendant's residence testified that he contacted the Office for the Aging because he had concerns for defendant. An official at the Office for the Aging also testified that the contractor told her that he observed 6 dogs in the home and about 50-100 dogs in outdoor cages. The investigating officer who ultimately visited defendant's property reported that there were nearly 100 dogs living in "unhealthy conditions" on defendant's property. Upon encountering defendant that day, the officer testified that defendant demanded a search warrant for further investigation (which the officer obtained and executed later that day). Following this hearing, the City Court held that while the officer's entry violated defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy, his actions were justified under the emergency exception warrant requirement and, thus, denied defendant's motion to suppress. On appeal here, defendant argues that the prosecution failed to establish the officer had reasonable grounds to believe there was an immediate need to protect life or property and that all the evidence obtained thereafter should have been suppressed. Relying on previous holdings that allow the emergency exception in cases where animals are in imminent danger of health or need of protection, this court found that the prosecution failed to establish the applicability of the emergency doctrine. In particular, the court was troubled by the fact that, on the first visit, the officers crossed a chain fence that was posted with a no trespassing sign (although they testified they did not see the sign). Because the officers only knew that there were "unhealthy conditions" on defendant's property in a house that the contractor testified that he thought should be "condemned," this did not support a conclusion of a "substantial threat of imminent danger" to defendant or her dogs. While in hindsight there was an emergency with respect to the dogs, the court "cannot retroactively apply subsequently obtained facts to justify the officers' initial entry onto defendant's property." As a result, the court remitted the matter to the City Court for a determination of whether the seizures of evidence after the initial illegal entry occurred under facts that were sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal entry so to have purged the original taint. |
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Hollendale Apartments & Health Club, LLC v. Bonesteel |
--- N.Y.S.3d ---- , 2019 WL 2031263 (N.Y. App. Div., 2019) |
The Plaintiff owns and operates an apartment complex with a policy that prohibits defendants from keeping a dog on the premises. The Defendant, Bonesteel, began renting an apartment at Plaintiff's complex in 2011 under a one-year lease. Defendant continued to renew his one-year lease for additional one-year terms until 2014. Defendant's therapist sent a letter to the Plaintiff requesting an exception to the no dog policy so that the Defendant could have an emotional support animal. The Plaintiff denied the request but stated that it would allow a bird or cat or an early termination of Defendant's lease. The Plaintiff filed an action seeking a judgment declaring that the Plaintiff's refusal to permit the Defendant to have an emotional support dog was not in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Human Rights Law (HRL). The Plaintiff subsequently reduced the Defendant's lease renewal term to three months. The Defendant filed counterclaims on grounds of discrimination. The Supreme Court of New York also granted a motion allowing the Attorney General to intervene. The Attorney General asserted counterclaims on similar grounds to those raised by the Defendant. After a nonjury trial, the trial court issued a judgment that the Plaintiff's actions did not violate the FHA and the HRL. The Defendant then appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Plaintiff's claims were justiciable even though the matter was not raised by the parties. Since the Plaintiff had already denied the Defendant's request for an exception to the policy when it filed the action and no harm to the Plaintiff occurred or was impending, it was essentially asking the Court to issue an advisory opinion which is not an exercise of judicial function. Therefore, the Court dismissed the Plaintiff's declaratory judgment. The Court then considered the Defendant's counterclaims since concrete injuries were alleged. The only two arguments addressed were whether the Defendant actually had a qualifying disability within the meaning of the FHA and the HRL and whether the accommodation requested was necessary to afford the Defendant an equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling. The Court concluded that the Defendant met his burden to establish that he is disabled within the meaning of the FHA and HRL. The Court also found that the Defendant "offered sufficient evidence that having an emotional support dog would affirmatively enhance his quality of life by ameliorating the effects of his disability, and thus demonstrated necessity within the meaning of the FHA and the HRL." Lastly, the Court found that the Plaintiff retaliated against the Defendant by reducing his lease renewal terms to three months. Accordingly, Defendant was entitled to judgment in his favor on the retaliation counterclaims. |
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Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. DeYoung Fam. Zoo, LLC |
--- N.W.3d ----, 2025 WL 2957821 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2025) |
This appellate proceeding concerned a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of seven chimpanzees detained at a private zoo. The central legal question was whether chimpanzees qualify as "persons" capable of possessing a right to "liberty" cognizable under the common-law writ. The court engaged in a historical analysis, concluding that the common law, which the Michigan Constitution incorporates, has consistently confined the category of "persons" to human beings for the purpose of vindicating personal liberty. The court found that animals, irrespective of their cognitive abilities, have traditionally been regarded as property under the law and are incapable of bearing the social responsibilities and legal duties inherent in personhood. The petitioner's argument for a judicial expansion of the common law to recognize animal personhood was rejected, with the court emphasizing that such a fundamental departure from established legal principles falls within the exclusive purview of the state supreme court. The court therefore affirmed the trial court's summary denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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People v. Farrell |
--- N.E.3d ----, No. 30, 2025 WL 1071420 (N.Y. Apr. 10, 2025) |
The Court of Appeals reversed Ulster County Court and reinstated Kingston City Court’s dismissal of the accusatory instrument against Christopher Farrell for violating AML § 353 (failure to provide necessary sustenance to an animal), holding the instrument facially insufficient. The investigator’s allegations, principally that Farrell’s dog suffered from untreated spondylosis, flea infestation, and masses, relied on hearsay and lacked nonhearsay facts linking the conditions to Farrell’s neglect, such as veterinary records or observable signs of suffering. While the prosecution argued that Farrell’s admission to never seeking veterinary care established culpability, the Court found this insufficient without evidence that the lack of care directly caused the dog’s decline. Without factual allegations demonstrating deprivation of sustenance, the instrument failed to meet jurisdictional pleading standards under CPL 100.40, mandating dismissal. The Court declined to resolve whether "sustenance" includes veterinary care, as the pleading deficiencies were dispositive.
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Commonwealth v. Adams |
--- N.E.3d ----, 2025 WL 967033 (Mass. Apr. 1, 2025) |
The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for animal cruelty under G. L. c. 272, § 77, after witnesses observed him repeatedly punch his dog in the head while visibly angry in a public park, purportedly to stop the dog from attacking a groundhog. The defendant claimed he acted to protect the groundhog and minimized harm by "pulling his punches," but eyewitnesses testified he struck the dog forcefully five to ten times over 30–40 seconds, with one bystander confronting him about the beating. At trial, the judge excluded the defense’s veterinary technician expert from testifying about the dog’s pain response and "prey drive," and declined to give requested jury instructions on bona fide discipline and defense of another animal. The court held that excluding the expert testimony was either harmless or cumulative, as the jury heard other evidence about the dog’s lack of injuries and aggressive behavior. Furthermore, the standard jury instructions—which required the Commonwealth to prove the defendant inflicted "severe or unnecessary pain without justifiable cause"—adequately covered his theories of defense, making supplemental instructions unnecessary. Thus, finding no reversible error, the court upheld the conviction. |
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State v. Burst |
--- N.E.3d ----, 2025 WL 1793782 (Ohio Ct. App., 2025) |
The appellate court reversed Donte Burst's conviction for cruelty to companion animals under R.C. 959.131(E)(2), finding insufficient evidence that he was an owner, manager, or employee of a dog kennel, which was a required element of the offense. Burst had surrendered his sick dog to a rescue facility, which later euthanized the animal due to its poor condition. The court determined that the State failed to prove Burst’s connection to a kennel, as the statute required, and that the trial court erred in denying his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. Because the conviction lacked proof of an essential statutory element, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction, barring retrial on double jeopardy grounds. |
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Flanders v. Goodfellow |
--- N.E.3d ----, 2025 WL 1127772 (N.Y. Apr. 17, 2025) |
This landmark decision fundamentally reshapes New York's dog bite jurisprudence by overturning Bard v. Jahnke and reinstating negligence as a viable cause of action for injuries caused by domestic animals. The Court held that Bard's strict liability framework, which required proof of an owner's actual or constructive knowledge of a dog's vicious propensities, created an unfair exception to ordinary tort principles and had proven unworkable in practice. Recognizing that most jurisdictions permit negligence claims under Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 509 and 518, the Court established a dual-path system: plaintiffs may now pursue either strict liability (if vicious propensities are shown) or traditional negligence claims against animal owners. The decision also reversed summary judgment on plaintiff's strict liability claim, finding triable issues regarding whether defendants should have known of their dog's aggressive tendencies based on postal workers' affidavits describing the animal's repeated violent window-banging behavior. The Court's disposition reversed the Appellate Division's order and denied defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety, reinstating both causes of action.
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State v. Kyles |
--- N.E.3d ----, 2024 WL 4546840 (Ohio, 2024) |
The Supreme Court of Ohio addressed whether R.C. 959.131(C), which prohibits causing serious physical harm to a companion animal, applies to all dogs and cats or only those that are "kept." The case arose from the conviction of Alonzo Kyles for animal cruelty after he poured bleach on a cat, causing injury. The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed Kyles's conviction, holding that the statute required the cat to be "kept" (i.e., cared for) to qualify as a companion animal. The Supreme Court disagreed, interpreting the statute’s use of "any dog or cat regardless of where it is kept" as expansive, protecting all dogs and cats irrespective of ownership or care. The Court reversed the appellate decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on Kyles's remaining arguments. |
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City of Columbiana v. Simpson |
--- N.E.3d ----, 2019 WL 4897158 (Ohio Ct. App., 2019) |
Richard G. Simpson, Appellant, lived in a residential district in Columbiana, Ohio. Simpson kept eight hens, a chicken coop, and an enclosure on his property for approximately seven years. On July of 2016, Simpson was informed that keeping chickens in the district he lived in was a zoning violation, however, Simpson found no prohibition in the Code regarding the keeping of chickens in a residential district. The city sent Simpson violation notices and instructed him to remove the chickens from the property. Simpson appealed the violation to the Planning Committee. On June 20, 2017 the City Council voted to place a resolution on the ballot for voters to decide whether chickens could be kept in residential districts. The resolution failed at the general election. A second notice was sent to Simpson and Simpson refused to remove the chickens from his property. The City instituted an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on March 13, 2018. The trial court held that the keeping of chickens was prohibited in the City’s residential districts and that the city ordinances were valid on their face and were not arbitrarily or capriciously applied. Simpson appealed. Simpson argued that keeping the chickens did not constitute an agricultural use or poultry husbandry because he kept them as a hobby and therefore does not violate any of the city ordinances. The Court did not agree and concluded that the keeping of chickens fell within the definition of agriculture and was, therefore, prohibited based on the ordinances. Simpson next argued that since he acquired the chicken and coop prior to the City applying the prohibitions, it was a legal non-conforming use and that the zoning code contained no language that would have put him on notice that such property was not permitted on his real property. The Court concluded that there was no error by the trial court in holding that Simpson’s use of his land was not a legally conforming use. Finally, Simpson argued that the one of the city ordinances was arbitrary and unreasonable because there was no evidence of the chickens, coup, or enclosure constituting a nuisance. The Court concluded that a city is not required to show that a property owner’s proposed use constitutes a nuisance in order to establish the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Court found that the ordinance was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and bears a substantial relation to the public health. The ordinance was a valid exercise of the City’s police power. The Court ultimately held that the City ordinance prohibited the keeping of chickens in residential districts. The prohibition was inferred from reading the ordinance in concert with other Code sections. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. |
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City of Cleveland v. Turner |
--- N.E.3d ----, 2019 WL 3974089 (Ohio Ct. App., 2019) |
Defendant was convicted by bench trial of one count of sexual conduct with an animal (bestiality) in violation of R.C. 959.21(B). He was sentenced to 90 days in jail (with credit for time served), a $750 fine, with five years of inactive community control that included no contact with animals and random home inspections by the Animal Protection League (APL). The evidence supporting his conviction came from explicit letters defendant wrote to his boyfriend (who was incarcerated at the time) that described acts of bestiality. Defendant was also a sex offender parolee at the time of the letter writing. The letter, which was intercepted by jail officials, recounted a sexual act defendant engaged in with a dog that was under his care. Other similarly explicit letters were entered as evidence. In addition to the letters, the dog's owner testified that she left her dog with defendant and, after picking up the dog, the dog's behavior markedly changed from friendly to anxious and afraid. In addition, the dog was skittish for many days after, licked her genitals excessively, and was uncomfortable with any person near her backside, including the veterinarian. On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred by admitting his extrajudicial statements without independent evidence of a crime. Specifically, defendant contends the city failed to establish the corpus delicti to permit introduction of his purported confession. The court noted that this was a case of first impression since there is no Ohio case law that has analyzed the corpus delicti issue in the context of R.C. 959.21. Relying on the Indiana case of Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841 (Ind.2017), this court found that while there was no direct evidence of a crime against the dog, the circumstantial evidence corroborates defendant's statements in his letter. The corpus delicti rule requires that the prosecution supply some evidence of a crime to admit the extrajudicial statements. Here, the city did that with the dog owner's testimony concerning the dog's altered behavior after being left alone with defendant. The court also found the evidence, while circumstantial, withstood a sufficiency of evidence challenge by defendant on appeal. On the issue of sentencing and random home inspections as a condition of his community control sanctions, the court found that the trial court did not have "reasonable grounds" to order warrantless searches of real property for a misdemeanor conviction. The finding of guilt for defendant's bestiality conviction was affirmed, but the condition of community control sanction regarding random home inspections was reversed and remanded. |
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State v. Schuler |
--- N.E.3d ----, 2019 WL 1894482 (Ohio Ct. App., 2019) |
Appellant is appealing an animal cruelty conviction. A deputy dog warden received a report from a deputy sheriff who observed a pit bull on appellant's property who was unable to walk and in poor condition while responding to a noise complaint. Appellant released the dog to the deputy and the dog was later euthanized. While the deputy was on appellant's property she observed two other dogs that were extremely thin which prompted the deputy to return to the appellant's house the next day, but the appellant was in the hospital. The deputy later returned to the appellant's home a few days later and the appellant's ex-wife allowed the deputy to perform an animal welfare check on the property. Two Australian cattle dogs were very muddy and in an outdoor kennel with no food or water. Numerous chickens, rabbits, mice, snakes, and raccoons were also observed inside and outside the house all living in cramped, filthy conditions. The deputy went to the hospital and the appellant signed a waiver releasing the raccoons and snakes to the wildlife officer, but the appellant refused to release the other animals to the deputy. As a consequence a search warrant was obtained. "Two raccoons, 3 black rat snakes, 8 dogs, 7 chickens, 3 roosters, 17 rabbits, 5 rats, 200 mice, and 2 guinea pigs were removed from the property." Appellant was charged by complaints with five counts of cruelty to animals and two counts of cruelty to companion animals. An additional complaint was filed charging appellant with one count of cruelty to a companion animal (the euthanized pit bull). The appellant raised 3 errors on appeal. The first error is that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to convict him of animal cruelty. The Court found that the complaint charging the appellant with animal cruelty in counts B, C, and D were not valid because it did not set forth the underlying facts of the offense, did not provide any of the statutory language, and failed to specify which of the 5 subsections the appellant allegedly violated. Therefore, the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to convict the appellant and the animal cruelty conviction regarding the three counts for the rabbits was vacated. The second error appellant raised was that his conviction for cruelty to companion animals for the two Australian cattle dogs was not supported by sufficient evidence. The Court overruled appellant's second error because it found that the state had presented sufficient evidence to show that the appellant negligently failed to provide adequate food and water for the Australian cattle dogs. The third error the appellant raised was that the Court erred by ordering him to pay $831 in restitution. The Court also overruled appellant's third error since the appellant stipulated to paying the restitution. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed in all other respects. |
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Hetrick v. Ohio Dep't of Agric. |
--- N.E.3d ---- 2017 WL 4464371 (Ohio Ct. App.,2017) |
In this case, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision to grant appellee Hetrick's dangerous wild animal (DWA) permits. Hetrick was the owner of DWA's on his property, and according to an Ohio law he was required to register the DWA's and apply for permits before a certain statutory deadline. This court held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) lacked a statutory basis to deny the application for a rescue facility permit on timeliness grounds but did not err in so finding on caging and care grounds. Further, the court reversed, in part, the judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas in the rescue facility permit case; reversed, in toto, the judgment of the lower court in the wildlife shelter permit case; and with this decision, reinstated the ODA's denial of both permits. Judgments reversed. |
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State v. Agee |
--- N.E.3d ---- , 2019 WL 3504010 (Ohio App., 2019) |
The Humane Society brought this action in response to a complaint regarding a dog tangled in a tether. Three German Shepherds were discovered that belonged to the Defendant, Shawn Agee, Jr. The dogs were suffering from maltreatment. All three had been restrained without access to water or food and one of the dog’s tethers was wrapped so tightly that its leg had started to swell. Two of the dogs were suffering from fly strike. The State charged the Defendant with 12 criminal misdemeanors relating to the treatment of the three animals. The trial court acquitted the Defendant of 10 of those counts because of his unrebutted testimony that he had been out of town for the weekend and had left the dogs in the care of his mother. The Defendant was found guilty to two second-degree misdemeanors relating to the two dogs suffering from fly strike because those particular injuries were long time, very painful injuries that were not being treated and the Defendant was the dogs’ “confiner, custodian, or caretaker.” The Defendant was sentenced to community control, a fine of $100, a suspended jail sentence of 180 days, the surrender of the two dogs with fly strike, and the proviso that the remaining dog be provided with regular vet appointments and various other conditions. This appeal followed. The Defendant asserted that the Court erred by finding that he had in fact violated the statute that he was found guilty of and that his convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence. The Defendant argued that he did not qualify as the type or class of persons subject to criminal liability merely as an owner. The Court noted that the trial court did not impose liability due to his status as the dogs’ owner, but rather due to this having served as the two dogs’ confiner, custodian, or caretaker when they developed fly strike and should have been but were not properly treated. As for the second assignment of error, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to find that the Defendant had violated the statute. The Defendant had admitted that he knew that the two dogs had fly strike “two or three weeks before he left town for the weekend.” The dogs were not treated before he left town. The Court ultimately affirmed both convictions. |
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Hines v. Pardue |
--- F.Supp.3d -------, 2023 WL 5254673 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2023) |
Plaintiff and veterinarian Ronald S. Hines brings this action to challenge a Texas law that mandates a veterinarian conduct a physical examination of an animal before practicing veterinary medicine on the grounds that the law violates his First Amendment right to free speech. Plaintiff, who was unable to maintain a veterinary practice in person due to medical issues, began providing veterinary advice to animal owners via a website without first examining their animals. Plaintiff was disciplined by the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners for doing this, and was fined $500 and sentenced to a year of probation. Plaintiff then sued the members of the Board on two separate occasions, with the second appeal being remanded by the Fifth Circuit with instructions to determine whether the requirement for a physical examination before issuing veterinary advice regulates speech incidentally to the regulation of non-expressive professional conduct, or is a regulation of non-expressive conduct. Here, the district court first examined multiple instances of plaintiff providing veterinary advice to animal owners via the internet. Next, the court asserts that plaintiff has standing to pursue his claims against the board. Lastly, the court examines plaintiff’s First Amendment argument. Plaintiff argues that his email exchanges with animal owners constitutes speech, and the court agrees that this is speech and that the Examination Requirement regulates this speech. However, the court finds that this regulation of plaintiff’s speech is content neutral, because the requirement for a physical examination of the animals before issuing advice applies neutrally to all forms of veterinary care and veterinary speech regardless of content. Therefore, the court held that defendants may enforce the Examination Requirement without violating plaintiff’s free speech rights. |
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Reaves v. Immediate Med. Care, P.A. |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 761467 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2025) |
The United States District Court adjudicated a claim brought by Erin Reaves, an individual with diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and bipolar disorder, against Immediate Medical Care, P.A., a medical clinic in Jacksonville, Florida. Reaves alleged that the clinic violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when staff refused to allow her service dog, Malia—a trained animal that assisted with her psychiatric disabilities—to accompany her during a scheduled April 2023 medical appointment. The clinic based its refusal on the severe dog allergies of one of its physicians, Dr. Gargin, and offered alternative accommodations, including seeing a different doctor or having the dog wait outside. After a three-day bench trial, the court found that while Reaves was disabled under the ADA and Malia qualified as a service animal, Immediate Medical Care had lawfully excluded the dog under the ADA’s "direct threat" exception. The court credited evidence that Dr. Gargin’s allergy posed a genuine health risk, noted that the clinic had conducted an individualized assessment under 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(b), and emphasized that reasonable modifications—such as rescheduling with another provider—had been offered. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of Immediate Medical Care, holding that a public accommodation may exclude a service animal when objective evidence shows it would endanger another’s health and alternative accommodations are available. |
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Johnson v. Smith |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 1651779 (D. Kan. June 11, 2025) |
This case involved a facial constitutional challenge to the Kansas Pet Animal Act (KPAA), specifically its authorization of unannounced, warrantless inspections of boarding and training kennels as a condition of licensure. The plaintiffs, kennel operators, contended that the statutory scheme, which deemed license acceptance as conclusive consent to such searches, violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The court analyzed whether the kennel industry qualified for the "closely regulated industry" exception to the warrant requirement, applying the factors of regulatory history, the extensiveness of the scheme, the prevalence of similar regulations in other jurisdictions, and the threat posed to public welfare. It found the 34-year regulatory history insufficient, noted that only nine other states have similar warrantless inspection regimes, and determined that boarding and training kennels are not inherently dangerous nor do they pose a clear and significant risk to public welfare, especially given the existing oversight by private veterinarians and the self-policing nature of the market through pet owners. Even assuming the industry was closely regulated, the court held the state failed to demonstrate a substantial interest justifying warrantless searches or that such searches were necessary to achieve its regulatory goals, particularly when many violations are not easily concealed and the state possesses but has never utilized its authority to obtain administrative warrants. Consequently, the court found the warrantless inspection provisions facially unconstitutional. The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and permanently enjoined the defendant from conducting surprise, routine warrantless inspections of boarding and training kennels or conditioning licensure on the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.
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Triumph Foods, LLC v. Campbell |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2024 WL 421994 (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2024) |
This case was brought by a group of pork producers and farmers to challenge the Massachusetts' Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act on the grounds that it violates the dormant Commerce Clause by improperly regulating interstate commerce. The Act would require pork producers to phase out certain means of pig confinement in order to sell pork products in Massachusetts. In response, the state filed a motion to dismiss arguing that there is no causally connected harm to the pork producers, which the court denied. The court first evaluated the slaughterhouse exemption, which exempts sales from the requirement that they must take place within Massachusetts if the buyer takes physical possession of the pork while on the premises of an establishment inspected under the Federal Meat Inspection Act. Plaintiff argued that as an out-of-state pork processor, it could not take advantage of this exemption, even though it operates entirely federally inspected facilities, because it ships its product into Massachusetts from out-of-state and, its buyers do not take physical possession of its product while at its facilities. The court found that this exemption has a discriminatory effect, and vacated the order in part to allow the court to consider whether the Act with the slaughterhouse exemption severed is preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act. |
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Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2024 WL 1342597 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 26, 2024) |
Plaintiffs, a nonprofit advocacy organization and a plant-based meat alternative producer, filed this case to challenge the constitutionality of a statute that criminalizes the misrepresentation of a product as meat that is not derived from livestock or poultry. Plaintiffs bring four constitutional claims against the statute: violation of the First Amendment, violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, violation of Due Process, and Declaratory Judgment. For the First Amendment violation, plaintiffs specifically argue that the statute is an unlawful restriction on truthful commercial speech. However, the court finds that the statute does not restrict truthful commercial speech, since plaintiffs are still able to accurately indicate what sort of products they are selling to consumers. For the Dormant Commerce Clause argument, the court finds that the statute does not discriminate in purpose or effect, and that the statute passes the Pike balancing test. For the Due Process claim, the court finds that the statute provides sufficiently specific guidance to both the public and prosecutors as to what actions are prohibited, so it does not violate Due Process. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff's claims and motion for summary judgment. |
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Center for Biological Diversity v. Little |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2024 WL 1178565 (D. Idaho Mar. 19, 2024) |
This case was brought by plaintiffs to challenge an Idaho law that authorizes wolf trapping and snaring in grizzly bear habitat. Plaintiffs argue that the authorization of this trapping activity will lead to the unlawful taking of grizzly bears, in violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the state's authorization of trapping in these areas until the state obtains an incidental take permit from the US Fish and Wildlife Service. The court found that there was ample evidence to show that that lawfully set wolf traps and snares are reasonably likely to take grizzly bears in Idaho. However, the court did not find sufficient evidence to show that trapping needs to be banned year round to protect grizzly bears in the state. Accordingly the court granted the injunction, but limited it to the period when grizzly bears are reasonably certain to be out of their dens. |
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Mogensen v. Welch |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2023 WL 8756708 (W.D. Va. Dec. 19, 2023) |
Plaintiffs owned and operated a zoo containing about 95 animals. Following complaints about suspected abuse and neglect of these animals, defendant executed a search warrant of the zoo. The search led to the seizure of many of these animals, including a tiger in such poor health that it needed to be euthanized. Following the seizure of these animals, plaintiffs filed a motion to argue that their due process rights were violated because a civil forfeiture hearing must be held no more than ten business days after the state seized the animals, and plaintiffs argue that ten days is too little time to prepare for the hearing. To succeed on the claim, plaintiffs must show that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, which they were unable to do because plaintiffs still have the right to appeal if the hearing does not go in their favor. Therefore, the court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. |
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Farm Sanctuary v. United States Department of Agriculture |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2023 WL 8602134 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2023) |
This case was brought by plaintiffs, several nonprofit animal rights organizations, to challenge a Final Rule implementing a new swine inspection system at pig farms and slaughterhouses across the United States against defendants, the United States Department of Agriculture and the Food Safety Inspection Service. The new system requires that employees of the slaughterhouses perform ante-mortem and post-mortem sorting activities before the federal inspection is to take place, which plaintiffs challenge under the argument that this shifting of the sorting activities to slaughterhouse employees is in violation of the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA). Plaintiffs argue that this delegation is improper, would negatively impact the safety of pork being produced by slaughterhouses, and would lead to inhumane slaughter of pigs. Plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the delegation of the sorting process was improper. |
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Club Gallistico de Puerto Rico Inc. v. United States |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL 5566322 (D.P.R. Oct. 28, 2019) |
Club Gallistico de Puerto Rico, Inc. (Club Gallistico) and the Asociacion Cultural y Deportiva del Gallo Fino de Pelea (Asociacion Cultural) both filed civil complaints against the United States Government. The complaints alleged that the Section 12616 amendments to the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) violated bedrock principles of federalism and rights protected under the United States Constitution. Both Club Gallistico and Asociacion Cultural are both non-profit organizations involved in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s cockfighting industry. The amendments to the AWA outlawed all animal fighting ventures in which animals were moved in interstate or foreign commerce in every United States jurisdiction. These amendments extended the ban to United States territories which the Plaintiffs argued the United States did not have the authority to do. Both cases were consolidated and heard by the District Court. The Court analyzed the amendments under the Federalism doctrine, the Commerce Clause, and the Territorial Clause. Extending the ban on live-bird fighting did not violate either of the three. Further, the amendments did not violate the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or any other constitutional rights such as free speech or due process. The Court ultimately denied the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Granted Defendant United States’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. |
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Art and Antique Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Seggos |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL 3817305 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019) |
The plaintiffs are trade organizations representing arts and antique dealers. Plaintiff’s members have an “economic and professional interest in. . .the purchase, sale, distribution or trading of antique elephant ivory.” The Defendant is the Commissioner of DEC which is a state agency tasked with protecting New York’s natural resources and environment. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits the import and export of endangered species and the sale, offering for sale, or movement of endangered species in interstate or foreign commerce. The prohibitions, however, had exceptions for “antique articles” that are 100 years of age or older. Those wishing to import such antique articles needed to first obtain a federal permit. Under the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, trade of African elephant ivory is generally prohibited. Only certain items containing a de minimus quantity of ivory are exempt. The state of New York imposed a ban on elephant ivory with even narrower exceptions than the ESA. The DEC only issued licenses authorizing trade in ivory pursuant to the State Ivory Law’s exceptions. The licenses actually issued by the DEC restricted the advertisement and display of ivory products. Plaintiff’s filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the State Ivory Law on preemption and First Amendment grounds. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Defendants and Intervenors crossed-moved to dismiss. The Court examined the ESA and determined that section 1535(f) did not preempt the State Ivory Law because the ESA prohibitions only applied to interstate or foreign commerce while the State Ivory Law applied to intrastate commerce. As result, the exceptions contained in the State Ivory Law did not prohibit what was authorized by the ESA. The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss on Count I because it was not “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt state laws restricting purely intrastate commerce in ivory.” The Plaintiff’s second count alleged that the State Ivory Law’s permit requirement violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The display restriction in the license prohibited the physical display for sale of any item not authorized for intrastate sale under the State Ivory Law even if the merchant was authorized under the ESA to sell the item in interstate commerce. The Court determined that the in-store display of ivory products constituted commercial speech because the display constituted lawful activity, New York had a substantial interest in regulating the sale of ivory within its borders and the display restriction directly advanced that interest. The Court was unable to determine whether the display restriction burdened substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. Ultimately the Court granted the Defendant’s and Intervenor’s cross-motions to dismiss with respect to preemption and denied both the Defendant’s and Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment with respect to the First Amendment Claim. |
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Sanzaro v. Ardiente Homeowners Association, LLC |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL 1049380 (D. Nev. Mar. 5, 2019) |
Deborah Sanzaro and Michael Sanzaro are the plaintiffs in this action. Plaintiffs are homeowners and members of a homeowners association ("HOA"). Three incidents occurred at the HOA clubhouse in which Deborah Sanzaro attempted to enter with her Chihuahua, which she claimed was a service animal. In each of these three incidents, Deborah was denied access to the clubhouse. The first incident occurred on March 11, 2009. Deborah entered the club house with her dog and the manager of the HOA asked her why she brought the dog into the clubhouse with her. Deborah explained that her dog assisted her with her disability and was a service animal, however, she could not provide any documentation to the manager as to that effect. She was then asked to leave the clubhouse to which she refused. Only after security was called did Deborah leave. Later, on that same day, Deborah entered the clubhouse with her service dog without any incident. The HOA sent a letter to the plaintiffs after the first incident notifying them that that Deborah had violated the HOA’s governing documents and that a hearing before the HOA board would take place on March 30, 2009. Plaintiffs never showed for this hearing which ultimately resulted in the Board finding that Deborah violated HOA rules and regulations by entering the clubhouse with her dog and not providing documentation. Deborah was assessed multiple fines. Prior to the hearing, the HOA sent out letters to the other residents letting them know that they would accommodate any legitimate service animal if their staff is properly advised of such. They also mailed out a letter regarding the incident with the plaintiffs to all of the other residents. The plaintiffs began to receive hate mail and verbal harassment regarding their dispute with the HOA board. The plaintiffs received many threats and had their property defaced by an anonymous homeowner who spray painted their garage door telling them to get out of the neighborhood. The HOA did nothing to stop this harassment. Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Nevada Real Estate Division and their claim was submitted to a non-binding arbitrator. Deborah provided a doctor’s statement requesting that her dog be registered as a service dog, a notice of entitlement to disability benefits from the SSA, a doctor’s statement regarding Deborah’s disability, and a statement from Deborah explaining how her dog had been trained to assist her. The Arbitrator found for the Ardiente Homeowners Association because she did not find Deborah’s explanation as to why she needed the dog as being persuasive. The arbitration decision was upheld by the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada as well as by the Nevada Supreme Court. On July 26, 2010, Plaintiffs entered the clubhouse again with the dog. They were told that they could not come in unless they provided more documentation despite the documentation that the Deborah had provided during the arbitration proceeding. On January 29, 2011 the plaintiffs entered the clubhouse again with the dog and they were again denied entry until the plaintiffs could provide documentation that the dog was a registered service animal. The HOA eventually foreclosed on the plaintiff’s home in order to recover the fines and attorney’s fees that were owed. Plaintiffs then brought 102 causes of action in federal court under the ADA and FHA which were pared down to two questions: (1) whether the HOA clubhouse was a place of public accommodation under the ADA and NRS § 651.075, and (2) whether Plaintiffs requested, and were ultimately refused, a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. For the plaintiff ADA claims, the District Court found that Deborah is disabled as a matter of law and that the HOA and other defendants were aware of her disability at least as of July 27, 2009 (the date of the arbitration). The Court also found that the clubhouse was not a place of public accommodation and that the entire community including the clubhouse was a private establishment. As a result the plaintiffs were not able to establish a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA. For the plaintiff’s FHA claims, the Court found the following: Deborah was qualified as handicapped under the FHA; the defendants were reasonably expected to know about her handicap; an accommodation was necessary for Deborah to use the clubhouse; the dog qualified as a service animal and permitting the dog to accompany Deborah was a reasonable accommodation; and the defendants refused to make the requested accommodation which makes them liable. For the Nevada law claim, it failed because the community and clubhouse are a private establishment and were not considered public accommodations. Plaintiffs were entitled to damages for their FHA claims only. The Court ultimately found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded $350,000 in compensatory damages, $285,000 in punitive damages and attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation.
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Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc'y v. United States Dept. of Agric. |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2018 WL 6448635 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2018). |
The American Anti-Vivisection Society and the Avian Welfare Coalition sued the Department of Agriculture and its Secretary alleging that the Department's failure to promulgate bird-specific regulations is unreasonable, unlawful, and arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. The Plaintiffs sought court-ordered deadlines by which the Department must propose such rules. The Department moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's claims arguing that the Plaintiffs lack standing to sue, that it is not required by law to promulgate regulations for birds, and that it has not taken a final action reviewable by the court. The District Court ultimately held that, although the Plaintiffs have standing to sue, both of their claims fail. The Department is not required by the Animal Welfare Act to issue avian-specific standards; rather, it must to issue welfare standards that are generally applicable to animals. Secondly, although the Department has not taken any action to develop avian-specific standards, that does not mean that will not do so in the future. The District Court granted the department's motion to dismiss. |
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Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. v. Vilsack |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2015 WL 1432069 (D. Colo. 2015) |
In an amended complaint, Plaintiffs asserted four claims against Defendants relating to a May 7, 2013 United States Department of Agriculture inspection of Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. The claims included a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Inspector Defendants “because they acted under color of state law when they induced the deputies to cut the chains and enter the premises;” a declaratory judgment “declaring that [Defendant] Thompson inappropriately overrode the medical advice of [Plaintiff] Big Cats' veterinarians and declaring that, in the future, the USDA cannot force [Plaintiff] Sculac to choose between following the medical advice of his veterinarians and the mandates of a USDA inspector;” and a declaratory judgment that the USDA must follow its own regulations and that it cannot conduct a warrantless search of the Big Cats facility outside of ‘normal business hours' solely because an inspector ‘want [s] to’ or because an inspector subjectively ‘believe[s][it] necessary to determine the welfare status of the animals....' ” In addition to declaratory relief, Plaintiffs also sought compensatory and punitive damages, costs, expenses, and prejudgment interest. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. US Magistrate Judge issued a recommendation that, to the extent the Motion argued that the declaratory judgment claims should be dismissed because Plaintiffs lack standing, the Motion be granted in part and denied in part and that the declaratory judgment claims asserted by Plaintiffs Nick Sculac, Julie Walker, and Jules Investment, Inc. be dismissed without prejudice. In all other aspects, the Magistrate recommended that the Motion be denied. A District Court judge approved and adopted these recommendations and denied defendant’s objections to the recommendations. |
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Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife v. Kelly |
--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2015 WL 1293338 (D. Idaho 2015) |
Plaintiffs brought an action against the Defendants, challenging the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”)'s November 28, 2012 Final Rule designating 30,010 acres in Idaho and Washington as critical habitat for the southern Selkirk Mountains population of woodland caribou under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged (1) that the Final Rule's critical habitat designation was arbitrary and capricious because the Defendants failed to explain how the limited amount of critical habitat designated was sufficient to recover this population of caribou and (2) that Defendants failed to provide public notice and comment on the substantially revised critical habitat designation before issuing the Final Rule. Defendants and Intervenors argued that the Final Rule satisfied the requirements of the ESA and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA").While the district court stated that the Final Rule's analysis seemed reasonably based on the best available science, it refused to make a conclusive determination on the arbitrary and capricious issue because procedural requirements necessitated a further public review and comment period. The court therefore found the error in this case was a procedural one resulting from the FWS failing to provide a period of public review and comment on the Final Rule's critical change in reasoning. The Court therefore remanded this matter to the FWS to cure the procedural error by affording the necessary public comment period and to consider anew the critical habitat designation in light of those comments. |
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Neita v. City of Chicago |
--- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 2450614 (7th Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) |
This case concerns a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from the warrantless seizure of a pit bull named Macy and the arrest of her owner, Vaughn Neita, for alleged violations of the Illinois Humane Care for Animals Act following an anonymous tip. The investigation was triggered by reports of a dog kept in inhumane conditions, specifically alleging the animal was tied up outside all day without shelter, food, or water in freezing weather. Upon arrival at the property, officers observed a fenced lot with parked vehicles where Macy was tethered to a truck bumper with two rope leashes, allowing her access to a custom-built plywood doghouse that contained an electric heater and bowls. The central animal law issue was whether the officers had probable cause to believe Neita violated the Act by failing to provide adequate shelter from the 19-degree Fahrenheit weather, sufficient unfrozen water, and by allegedly using a choke-type collar. The appellate court, reversing the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, found genuine issues of material fact, noting Macy was a robust, muscular dog, her shelter was free of feces and lacked the snow accumulation present on other vehicles, and the officers' brief investigation failed to fully ascertain the adequacy of the heater or the type of collar. The court construed the Act's "adequate shelter" and "sufficient quantity" requirements through an objective, reasonable person lens but concluded the record did not support a finding of arguable probable cause as a matter of law, thereby reviving the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims for the unlawful seizure of the animal and false arrest. A dissenting opinion contended that the law was not clearly established in a fact-specific manner and would have found the officers were entitled to qualified immunity based on the conditions observed, including the frozen water bowl and the dog's exposure to the elements. The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. |
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Krasno v. Mnookin |
--- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 2180825 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 2025) |
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the University of Wisconsin-Madison, holding that the interactive comment threads on the University's social media posts constituted limited public forums under First Amendment jurisprudence, and that the University's "off-topic" comment restriction was neither reasonable nor viewpoint-neutral as applied to plaintiff Madeline Krasno's animal rights advocacy. Krasno, a former employee at the University's primate research facility, had repeatedly posted comments criticizing the school's animal testing practices, which the University systematically suppressed while allowing other unrelated comments to remain visible. The University admitted to hiding even an on-topic comment about animal testing in response to a post about veterinary care, while maintaining keyword filters that specifically targeted terms associated with animal rights criticism. The court found that Krasno had standing to bring her as-applied challenge and that the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity permitted her claims for prospective injunctive relief against the University's ongoing use of keyword filters, though sovereign immunity barred claims related to past moderation actions. Applying forum analysis, the court determined the comment threads were not government speech but rather limited public forums where restrictions must be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral, and it held the University's vague "off-topic" rule failed this standard by disproportionately targeting terms associated with anti-animal-testing viewpoints and lacking objective criteria for moderation decisions. The dissent, authored by Judge Easterbrook, argued the comment threads constituted government speech akin to a curated alumni magazine, entitling the University to editorial control without First Amendment scrutiny. The appellate court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Krasno. |
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Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Vilsack |
--- F.4th ----, 2024 WL 3732881 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) |
The Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) sued the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the USDA violated the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by approving the labels for Perdue's “Fresh Line” chicken and turkey products. Specifically, ALDF claims that the USDA adopted a policy of evaluating only the text and not any graphics that appear on poultry-product labels. Fresh Line chickens and turkeys were raised strictly indoors and the approved product labels depict birds freely roaming outside a barn. ALDF asked the Department to reject any Perdue labels containing that kind of imagery because they claim the imagery misleads consumers into thinking the birds were raised in pastures, when they in fact spent the entirety of their lives in overcrowded warehouses. The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has been delegated to enforce the PPIA labeling requirements and rejected ALDF's request to reject Fresh Line's "misleading" labels. After denial, the ALDF sued the USDA and FSIS, alleging the Fresh Line labels violated the PPIA and APA and that FSIS has a "pattern and practice" of not reviewing such graphical imagery on poultry-label products. The government moved to dismiss both claims and the district court agreed, finding ALDF lacks both organizational and associational standing. On appeal here of only associational standing, this court found that the member who was harmed cannot show a substantial likelihood that the member will suffer non-self-imposed harm in the future. In other words, the court was not convinced that the consumer member will continue to purchase the product in the future now that she knows the label is misleading. As to ALDF's claim that FSIS' policy of not reviewing imagery on poultry labels also harms the member because it causes a "lack of confidence" in any chicken labels, the court found that injury was sufficiently concrete. However, the member did not have an ongoing or imminent injury because there was no proof presented that there were other products that exist or will exist with this labeling issue. The district court's dismissal was affirmed. |
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Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Perdue |
--- F.3d ----, 2017 WL 4320804 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29, 2017) |
The Secretary of Agriculture is directed by the Animal Welfare Act to promulgate regulations governing minimum animal housing and care standards and to issue licenses for animal exhibitionists only if they adhere to these standards. The Animal Legal Defense Fund sued the Department of Agriculture for renewing Tom and Pamela Sellner's Cricket Hollow Zoo in Iowa despite multiple violations of the animal welfare requirements set forth in the Act. In fact, the USDA had filed an administrative complaint against the Sellners and commenced a formal investigation in 2015 According to the court, the USDA has established a "bifurcated" approach to licensing, where initial applicants must comply with regulations and pass an agency compliance inspection, while license renewal applicants must only pay a fee and agree to continue to comply with regulations. After the District Court's dismissal of the case, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part but remanded back to the District Court the question whether the USDA's reliance on self-certification was an arbitrary and capricious action with instructions to get further explanation from the agency. As stated by the court, "On remand, the agency must, at a minimum, explain how its reliance on the self-certification scheme in this allegedly “smoking gun” case did not constitute arbitrary and capricious action." |
