Cases

Case name Citationsort descending Summary
Labor Commission, Antidiscrimination and Labor Division v. FCS Community Management --- P.3d ----, 2024 WL 1203693 (Utah App., 2024) This is an appeal of a complaint filed by the Utah Anti-discrimination and Labor Division (ULAD) seeking review of the determination that an HOA violated members' request for reasonable accommodation by denying homeowner's the ability to keep chickens on their property. The chickens were intended to be assistance animals for the homeowner's daughter, who has anxiety and PTSD. The district court found that the HOA constructively denied the homeowner's request for reasonable accommodation by delaying their response to the request for three months. This court reversed the decision of the lower court, finding that there was no constructive denial of the request since the HOA allowed the homeowners to keep the chickens during the interim period, did not punish them for keeping the chickens, and ultimately granted the request to keep the chickens.
Labor Commission v. FCS Community Management --- P.3d ----, 2024 WL 370160 (Utah App., 2024) This case concerns the Utah Anti-discrimination and Labor Division's (UALD) determination that a homeowner's association's three-month delay in responding to a member's request for reasonable accommodation to keep chickens on their property as assistance animals for a child with anxiety and PTSD violated the Utah Fair Housing Act. The trial court found that this three month delay was a constructive denial of the request, because under the Utah Fair Housing Act a housing provider must participate in an interactive process to evaluate and discuss the request for accommodation, and no such interactive dialogue or interactive process took place. On appeal, the court found that the three month delay in responding to the request was not unreasonably long, especially considering that the HOA had to review the status of chickens as support animals, chicken waste runoff, and possibility of rodent complaints during this time. The court of appeals also found that the members were not harmed by the HOA's alleged delay, since they were still allowed to keep the chickens at this time. The court of appeals then reversed the trial court's holding granting the members damages, fees, and other relief.
Marshall v. City of Tulsa --- P.3d ----, 2024 WL 4686865 (Okla.,2024) This Oklahoma case centers around a pit bull named Julian, who was being fostered from Tulsa Animal Welfare, a department within the City of Tulsa. The foster went on vacation and left the dog with a pet-sitter named Sarah Marshall. The foster of the dog was under contract with Tulsa Animal Welfare to provide care, but was informed that the dog could be removed at any time and she was not allowed to have others care for the dog without prior approval. The foster needed to go out of town and attempted to contact the Foster Coordinator who did not respond. Ultimately, the foster hired Marshall from Rover.com to care for the dog over the weekend. The dog arrived at Marshall's home and was placed with five other dogs. This caused a fight to break out and Marshall's hand was bitten and fractured in the process of breaking up the fight. Approximately six months later, Marshall sued the City of Tulsa alleging strict liability, common law negligence, and negligence per se. The City filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Marshall was the owner of the dog at the time of the bite and the trial court granted the City's motion, finding Marshall was an “owner” of dog and could not recover under 4 O.S. § 42.1 and the City did not owe a duty to Marshall. Marshall then filed the instant appeal, alleging that she was not an owner of Julian but only a temporary boarder and that City has the legal right of possession of Julian. This court disagreed, finding that the Tulsa ordinance's definition of "owner" applied to Marshall because she was responsible for Julian's care and maintenance at the time. This does not conflict with state law, as state law contemplates a dog having more than one owner. With regard to Marshall's common law negligence claim, the Court found that the City did not owe Marshall a duty because she was not a foreseeable plaintiff. Merely residing in city limits does not automatically make her a foreseeable plaintiff nor did the City's failure to perform a formal behavior evaluation on Julian. In addition, Marshall was not a foreseeable plaintiff from the foster's placement of Julian with her. In fact, the foster's placement of Julian with Marshall violated the Foster Agreement. The trial court's granting of summary judgment and denial of Marshall's motion for partial summary judgement was affirmed.
State v. Mercedes --- P.3d ----, 2025 WL 715789 (Wash. Mar. 6, 2025) State v. Mercedes addresses the constitutionality of a warrantless search under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, which protects against unlawful invasions of privacy. The defendant, Mary Mercedes, challenged the validity of consent given to animal control officers to search her property, where evidence of animal cruelty was discovered. The trial court suppressed the evidence, ruling that Ferrier warnings—requiring officers to inform individuals of their right to refuse, limit, or revoke consent—were necessary. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Ferrier warnings apply only to searches of a person’s home, not outdoor property. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the officers’ investigative purpose—responding to animal cruelty complaints and monitoring compliance—did not trigger Ferrier requirements. The court emphasized that Ferrier applies narrowly to warrantless searches of homes for contraband or evidence of a crime, not to outdoor property inspections for regulatory or investigative purposes. The case was remanded to determine whether consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.
State v. Doherty --- S.E.2d ---- 2024 WL 2002922 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2024) In this North Carolina case, the defendant appeals from his conviction of felony cruelty to animals and suspended sentence of imprisonment. The conviction stems from Defendant's kicking of his neighbor's dog. According to testimony of the dog's owner, Defendant would activate sprinklers in his yard anytime someone with a dog walked by his home. In November of 2019, the dog's owner was walking her fourteen-year-old dachshund-beagle mix, Davis, in front of Defendant's house when she stepped out of the roadway onto Defendant's lawn to avoid a passing car. The occupants of the car then stopped to talk with the dog's owner briefly, whereupon Defendant emerged from his home and proceeded to kick Davis in the stomach. The dog's owner called the police and the dog was transported to an emergency veterinarian because he was "lifeless" and "limp." Defendant was ultimately charged, indicted, and convicted of felonious cruelty to animals. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge of felonious cruelty to animals because a single kick was insufficient to show that Defendant "cruelly beat" the dog; and (2) that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor cruelty to animals. This court first addressed whether a single kick to a dog was sufficient to meet the definition of "cruelly beat." Looking first at the standard dictionary definition of "beat," the court found that the words, “cruelly beat” can apply to any act that causes the unjustifiable pain, suffering, or death to an animal, even if it is just one single act. In fact, the court stated, "[t]o hold otherwise would allow a person to kick a dog so hard they suffer life-threatening injuries—such as the case here—but not be subject to felonious cruelty to animals because it was 'just' one kick." Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. As to the lesser included offense instruction, this court found that there was no evidence of error, let alone plain error, since the jury would have likely found Defendant guilty of felonious animal cruelty based on the evidence presented. No reversible error occurred and Defendant's conviction was affirmed.
SAM LAMBERT & ANDRIA LAMBERT v. SALLY MORRIS & STEVE HAIR --- S.E.2d ----, 2018 WL 6314142 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2018) Plaintiffs Sam Lambert and Andria Lambert appeal the trial court's granting of summary judgment in this lost dog case. Specifically, plaintiffs filed an action against defendants Sally Morris and Steve Hair alleging conversion, civil conspiracy, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, as well as injunctive relief and damages related to the disappearance of their dog, Biscuit. Biscuit went missing in August of 2015. After searching for Biscuit for several days, plaintiffs contacted the local animal control and posted Biscuit as a lost dog on animal control's unofficial Facebook page. Over a month later, a citizen brought Biscuit (who had no microchip or collar on) to animal control where she was placed in a holding cell. After the 72-hour hold, Biscuit was transferred to the Humane Society. Biscuit was spayed and examined by a veterinarian, and a picture was posted on the Humane Society website. At the vet exam, tumors were discovered in Biscuit's mammary glands and so surgery was performed, some of it paid for by defendant Hair. Hair eventually adopted Biscuit. Almost a year later, plaintiffs found an old picture of Biscuit on the Humane Society Facebook page and attempted to claim Biscuit. Defendant Hair learned of this and requested that plaintiffs reimburse for veterinary expenses, to which they agreed. After some discussion, Hair learned plaintiffs had over 14 dogs and refused to return Biscuit without a home inspection. That caused a heated discussion and the meeting between plaintiffs and defendant ended without the dog returning. About a month later, plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, whereupon defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On appeal here, the court first noted that, per state law, an animal shelter hold a lost or abandoned dog for at least 72-hours. Here, animal control satisfied its legal duty by keeping Biscuit in custody for the required holding period before transferring her to the Humane Society. Thus, plaintiffs lost any ownership rights to Biscuit after the 72-hour mark. Moreover, almost a month had passed between the time Biscuit was taken in by animal control and the formal adoption by defendant Hair at the Humane Society. As a result, the court found that Hair was the rightful owner of Biscuit and was entitled to negotiate with plaintiffs as he saw fit. Thus, no genuine issues of material fact existed for plaintiffs at trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims.
Saulsbury v. Wilson --- S.E.2d ----, 2019 WL 493695 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2019) This Georgia involves an interlocutory appeal arising from a dog bite lawsuit. In 2016, Plaintiff Saulsbury was walking her English Bulldog past Defendant Wilson's house when Wilson's pitbull dog escaped its crate in the open garage. A fight ensued between the dogs. Wilson then attempted to break up the fight and was allegedly bitten by Saulsbury's dog, suffering a broken arm in the process and necessitating a course of rabies shots. The Saulsburys then sued the Wilsons in magistrate court to recover hospital and veterinary expenses. Wilson counterclaimed for her injuries in excess $15,000, thus transferring the case to superior court. At this time, the Saulsburys moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals here reverses that denial. The court found that Wilson assumed the risk when she intervened in a dog fight with her bare hands. In particular, the court observed that assumption of risk serves as a complete defense to negligence. That finding was bolstered by the fact that Wilson had knowledge that her dog had previously bitten other persons and had admitted to breaking up previous dog fights with a stick. The court relied on previous case law showing that all animals, even domesticated animals, pose a risk as does the act of breaking up even human fights. The court was not persuaded by the fact that Saulsbury may have been in violation of various DeKalb County ordinances related to an owner's responsibility to control his or her animal. A plain reading of those ordinances does not impose a duty on the part of an owner to "dangerously insert herself into a dog fight." The court found the lower court erred in denying the Saulsbury's motion for summary judgment and reversed and remanded the case.
State v. Johnson --- S.E.2d ----, 2024 WL 5130828 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2024) In this North Carolina case, Defendant Jeffrey Lee Johnson appeals from judgments entered upon guilty verdicts of one count of felony cruelty to animals and two counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals. The conviction stems from a search of defendant's property after a phone call was made to animal control about a strong smell was coming from the property. After failing to reach the defendant by phone, animal control officers drove to the property and observed a "very, very strong odor" of ammonia, feces, and "the smell of rot." As the officers walked up the driveway, they encountered a chained dog ("Chubby") who presented with an irritated neck, worn down teeth, overgrown nails, and multiple scabs. Other dogs were observed without access to water, including a box filled with puppies and dried feces. This prompted the officers to check on the other dogs in the backyard. One dog was breathing shallowly and appeared at first to be deceased. After sending photos of the dogs to the magistrate, probable cause was found to charge the defendant with animal cruelty and impound the dogs for their safety. In total, 21 dogs were seized, two of which had to be euthanized. At trial, the court denied defendant's motion to suppress, and defendant was ultimately convicted at trial. On Appeal, defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred by concluding that a warrantless search of his home's curtilage was reasonable due to exigent circumstances and by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that search and the search of his home. This court found that there was no unreasonable search since it occurred while officers were walking up the driveway and "in a place where the public is allowed to be." The seizure of the dog Chubby was justified under the plain view doctrine. In addition, the officers held a reasonable belief that the other dogs observed on the property needed immediate aid to prevent further suffering. Thus, exigent circumstances existed supporting the seizure of the other dogs. Finally, after the plain view discoveries, there was a substantial basis for probable cause to search the property and its buildings that supported the search warrant that was eventually granted. The dogs were present and would have fallen under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, this court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress.
Williams v. Cabrera --- S.E.2d ----, 2025 WL 1118850 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2025) The Court of Appeals affirmed, as modified, a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) granting Plaintiff custody of the parties' emotional support dog, Melo, and restraining Defendant from animal cruelty under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a)(9)(b1), but struck an overbroad social media restriction. The dispute arose when Defendant struck Plaintiff with her car while fleeing with both dogs after refusing Plaintiff’s proposed "coparenting" arrangement, causing Plaintiff physical injury and emotional distress. Though the trial court improperly incorporated Plaintiff’s complaint as findings without independent analysis, which violated Rule 52(a)(1)’s requirement for logical reasoning, the remaining findings (supported by Plaintiff’s testimony about the vehicular assault) sufficed to establish domestic violence under § 50B-3(a). The Court upheld the animal-related provisions as authorized discretionary relief, emphasizing that companion animals may be protected under DVPOs to prevent further harm, but narrowed the order to ensure proportionality.
Legal Impact for Chickens v. Case Farms, L.L.C. --- S.E.2d ----, 2025 WL 1450006 (N.C. Ct. App. May 21, 2025) This case examined whether Defendants' commercial poultry operations—including hatching, transporting, and slaughtering chickens—fell under exemptions in North Carolina's Protection of Animals Act (PAA). Plaintiff, an animal advocacy group, alleged Defendants subjected chickens to cruel treatment, such as starvation, crushing, overheating, and boiling alive, violating the PAA's prohibition on unjustifiable suffering. The appellate court affirmed dismissal, holding that the PAA's exemptions for "lawful activities conducted for the production of poultry" and "providing food for human or animal consumption" shielded Defendants' entire operation, not just isolated steps in the process. The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that each stage of production should be scrutinized individually, ruling instead that the statute's plain language protected lawful commercial farming as a whole. Because Plaintiff failed to allege Defendants' overarching business was unlawful, the court upheld the dismissal, thereby reinforcing agricultural exemptions in animal cruelty statutes and affirming the trial court's order.
Galindo v. State --- S.W.3d ----, 2018 WL 4128054 (Tex. App. Aug. 30, 2018) Appellant Galindo pleaded guilty to cruelty to nonlivestock animals and a deadly-weapon allegation from the indictment. The trial court accepted his plea, found him guilty, and sentenced him to five years in prison. The facts stem from an incident where Galindo grabbed and then stabbed a dog with a kitchen knife. The indictment indicated that Galindo also used and exhibited a deadly weapon (a knife) during both the commission of the offense and flight from the offense. On appeal, Galindo argues that the deadly-weapon finding is legally insufficient because the weapon was used against a "nonhuman." Appellant relies on the recent decision of Prichard v. State, 533 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017), in which the Texas Court of Appeals held that a deadly-weapon finding is legally insufficient where the sole recipient of the use or exhibition of the deadly weapon is a nonhuman. The court here found the facts distinguishable from Prichard. The court noted that Prichard left open the possibility that a deadly-weapons finding could occur when the weapon was used or exhibited against a human during the commission of an offense against an animal. Here, the evidence introduced at defendant's guilty plea and testimony from sentencing and in the PSIR are sufficient to support the trial court's finding on the deadly-weapons plea (e.g., the PSI and defense counsel stated that Galindo first threatened his girlfriend with the knife and then cut the animal in front of his girlfriend and her son). The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Defense Fund --- S.W.3d ----, 2018 WL 5075116 (Tex. App. Oct. 18, 2018) This is an appeal of a dismissal of appellant Landry's claims under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“the TCPA”) and the subsequent required awarding of attorney fees and sanction under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.009. Landry's is a large corporation that owns and operates more than 500 entertainment properties across the country, including the Houston Aquarium, Inc. The aquarium houses four white tigers in an human-made enclosure known as "Maharaja's Temple." Appellees, including the Animal Legal Defense Fund and its attorneys as well as a radio station owner (Cheryl Conley), asserted a variety of claims in connection with the publication of the notice to intend to sue under the Endangered Species Act due to the care and housing of the tigers. As a result of that notice and the associated publicity, Landry's asserted claims in the trial court for defamation, business disparagement, tortious interference with prospective business relations, abuse of process, trespass, conspiracy to commit each of these torts, and conspiracy to commit theft. Conley and ALDF moved to dismiss the claims under the TCPA, arguing that the claims related to exercise of free speech, petition, and association, and that Landry's could not make out a prima facie case. Additionally, they also argued that the claims were barred by the judicial-proceedings privilege. The lower court agreed and granted Conley's motion to dismiss. It also awarded $250,000 to ALDF and $200,000 to Conley. On appeal here, Landry again points to the allegedly defamatory statements released on social media (Twitter and Facebook) and through news media regarding the tigers' care. The court noted that many of the statements were non-actionable because they were not shown to be false statements of fact or were opinions. Nonetheless, even on those statements where Landry's met their burden of proving a defamation claim, the statements were protected by the judicial-proceedings privilege. The court was not convinced by Landry's contention that the statements were not made in contemplation of litigation because they were made after the required federal notice for filing suit under the ESA. Additionally, the court also rejected Landry's claim that the ALDF cannot claim attorney immunity because it is not a law firm and instead is comprised of attorneys who hold law licenses. The court observed that law licenses are not issued to business entities, but to individuals. The court also rejected Landry's remaining causes of action. As to the attorneys' fee and sanctions, the court did modify the attorneys' fees because one attorney at the trial court level did not participate in the appeal. Landry's then argued that the $450,000 in sanctions was excessive. The court first noted the TCPA mandates an award of sanctions and attorneys' fees. In reviewing the award for abuse of discretion, this court reviewed arguments by ALDF concerning Landry's hiring of the third largest law firm to defend a relatively small initial action, the filing of a 157-page response, with Landry's unwillingness to concede any points. The court took that in addition to several factors under the TCPA. The court was particularly concerned with Landry's filing of this suit on day 59 of the 60-day notice to file suit under the ESA (which may have been an indication to preempt the federal suit, according to the court). Despite that and more, the court did conclude that sanctions that were 2.4 and 2.8 times the attorneys' fees awards were excessive. The court suggested a remittitur, which would bring those awards respectively to $103,191.26 and $71,295.00. Thus, the lower court's decision to dismiss Landry's claims was affirmed, but the awards for attorneys' fee and sanctions were modified.
Boyle Ventures, LLC v. City of Fayetteville --- S.W.3d ----, 2025 Ark. 71 (Ark., 2025) This case involved a constitutional challenge to a Fayetteville ordinance that would have prohibited pet stores from selling dogs and cats unless obtained from approved shelters or rescues. The plaintiff pet store operator argued the ordinance violated both the Arkansas Retail Pet Store Consumer Protection Act and Working Animal Protection Act, constituting an unconstitutional municipal law contrary to state law. The Arkansas Supreme Court held the case was moot since the ordinance was repealed before taking effect, but clarified in dicta that the city's authority to prevent animal cruelty under Ark. Code Ann. § 14-54-103 does not extend to passing ordinances that conflict with state laws protecting lawful animal enterprises. The court reversed the circuit court's finding that the ordinance violated state law and remanded with instructions to dismiss, while dismissing the direct appeal as moot. Chief Justice Baker concurred in the result but diverged from the mootness rationale, arguing the ordinance did not conflict with the Arkansas Retail Pet Store Act or Working Animal Protection Act under a proper statutory interpretation. She contended the circuit court erred in its statutory analysis, making Boyle’s ACRA claim fail as a matter of law without reaching immunity or damages. Justice Womack dissented, asserting the circuit court erred by not first addressing the jurisdictional issue of the City’s statutory immunity under Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-301. Justice Womack criticized the majority for conflating statutory immunity with federal qualified immunity and urged remand for a factual determination on whether the City had liability insurance, which would nullify immunity. The dissent viewed the merits discussion as advisory absent this threshold ruling.
Wallen v. City of Mobile --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 3803749 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2018) Wallen appeals her convictions for six counts of violating Mobile, Alabama's public nuisance ordinances. The nuisance convictions stem from an anonymous complaint about multiple barking dogs at Wallen's property. After receiving the tip in March of 2016, an animal control officer drove to the residence, parked across the street, and, as he sat in his car, heard dogs bark continuously for approximately ten minutes. That same day, a local realtor went to house that was for sale behind Wallen's property and heard an "overwhelming" noise of dogs barking continuously for 30-45 minutes. For almost a year, officers received complaints about noise coming from Wallen's house. In May of 2017, Wallen entered a plea of not guilty for multiple charges of violating the public nuisance ordinance in Mobile Circuit Court. She also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Mobile City Code was unconstitutionally vague. Her motion was later denied, and a jury trial was held where Wallen was found guilty of six counts of violating Mobile's public-nuisance ordinance. On appeal, Wallen first argues that the public nuisance ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad because it regulates without reference to time, place, and manner. However, the court found that Wallen did not establish how the overbreadth doctrine applied to her case and how the ordinance was unconstitutional. As to her next vagueness challenge, Wallen contended that the ordinance had no objective standards to determine whether a dog's barking is disturbing or unreasonable. This court disagreed, finding the statute defines what are "disturbing noises" (which specifically states barking), and other courts previously established that the term "habit" in a dog-barking statute is not vague. Finally, the found that Wallen's last general argument, that the code is unconstitutional as applied to her, did not satisfy court rules with respect to issues presented and support with authority on appeal. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.
Strickland v. Pinellas Cty. --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 6518761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2018) Andy G. Strickland appealed an order dismissing with prejudice his complaint for declaratory relief against Pinellas County. The request stems from letters he received from Animal Services of Pinellas County about his dog. Strickland and a neighbor were involved in a dispute after their dogs attacked each other. The neighbor filed a complaint with Animal Services claiming that Strickland's dog was the "aggressor dog" and then sent a letter to the Pinellas County Board of Commissioners. The County then sent two letters to Strickland, the first informing him that his dog had exhibited dangerous propensities, and the second, from an assistant county attorney, informing him of the possible criminal ramifications for keeping a dangerous dog or being an "Irresponsible Pet Owner" under the county code. As a result of these letters, Strickland filed a complaint in circuit court saying that he was not afforded any opportunity to dispute those claims and that he is entitled to have the threat of criminal prosecution removed. The County moved to dismiss Strickland's complaint arguing that he failed to allege a justiciable controversy and a bona fide dispute between the County and him. The County claimed that there were no legal findings made with respect to Strickland's dog and that the letters were possible ramifications and explanations of law. The trial court agreed and granted the County's motion, finding the letters were not accusatory and the case presented no justiciable issue. On appeal here, this court upheld the lower court's order because Strickland's allegations did not present a bona fide dispute. Both letters emphasized that his dog had not been classified as dangerous and that no action was being taken by the county. A speculative fear by Strickland that he may be subject to future consequences does not warrant declaratory relief and does not show imminent danger of prosecution. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Strickland's complaint. Affirmed.
State v. Archer --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 6579053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018) This appeal concerns the lower court's granting of a motion to suppress evidence in an animal cruelty case. In April of 2017, a Ponce Inlet Police Department officer responded to defendant's residence after receiving a call about possible animal abuse. The caller described hearing sounds of a dog yelping and being beaten. Upon arrival, Officer Bines heard dog commands and the sounds of "striking flesh." He then knocked on defendant Archer's front door and began speaking with him on the front porch. Officer Bines told Archer that he was there to investigate a complaint of possible animal abuse to which Archer acknowledged that his dog bit him after he disciplined the dog for making a mess, so he "hit him a couple times." The officer then told Archer he had "probable cause" to enter the house or he could seek a warrant. Ultimately, Bines followed Archer to the backyard where Archer pointed to a dog in the corner that had its tongue out and was bloodied. Shortly thereafter, Bines determined the dog was dead. Archer was then cuffed and advised of his Miranda rights. After placing Archer in the police vehicle, Bines and other officers re-entered the home and yard to take pictures of the crime scene and to secure the canine's remains. After being charged with violating the cruelty to animals law (Section 828.12), Archer moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless entry of his home. The trial court granted and denied the motion in part, finding that while there were exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry, the exigency was over once it was determined that the dog was dead. The State of Florida appeals here. The appellate court first noted that while warrantless searches of homes are presumed illegal, an officer may enter when there are exigent circumstances including medical emergencies related to animals. Despite Archer's attempts to distinguish the instant facts from previous cases because there were no signs of blood or smells to indicate an emergency, the totality of the facts showed police received a call of animal cruelty in progress and the Officer Bines heard sounds of striking flesh. In addition, Archer advised Bines that he had struck the dog. Thus, the court found the officer "had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an urgent and immediate need to check on the safety and well-being of the dog and to connect the feared emergency to the house that they entered." As to suppression of the evidence found in plain view after entry onto the property, the appellate court also found the lower court erred in its decision. Under existing case law, once entry is allowed based on exigent circumstances, items found in plain view may be lawfully seized. The officer saw the dog in the corner before he knew the dog was dead, and thus, the exigency still existed. With respect to the photographs taken and the bodycam footage, the court held that re-entry into the home after Archer was in the patrol car did not require a warrant. Once an exigency that justified a warrantless search is over, law enforcement cannot go back and conduct further searches. However, in this case, the re-entry into Archer's house was a continuation of photographing evidence that was already found in plain view while the exigency existed (e.g., before the officers knew the dog was dead). The motion to suppress was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
State v. Avella --- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 2552529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2019) The Defendant was charged with practicing veterinary medicine without a license and for cruelty to animals. The Defendant made a homemade device attempting to treat his dog for a problem because he did not have the money to take his dog to the vet. The home treatment ended up injuring the dog and he took the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. The veterinarian stated that the dog needed to be taken to an advanced care veterinary facility, however, the Defendant could not do so due to lack of funds. The trial court dismissed the charges brought against the Defendant and the State of Florida appealed. Florida law forbids a person from practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The Defendant was not a veterinarian. The Defendant relied upon statutory exemptions in Florida’s statue that permit a person to care for his or her own animals and claims that he was just trying to help his dog, Thor. The Defendant also argued that the purpose of the statute was to prevent unlicensed veterinary care provided to the public rather than to criminalize the care an owner provides to his or her animals. The Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I for unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine given the stated purpose of the statute and the statutory exemptions. As for Count II, animal cruelty, the State argued that the Defendant’s conduct in using a homemade tool to remove bone fragments from the dog’s rectum and then failing to take the dog to an advanced care clinic fits under the Florida animal cruelty statute. Although the Defendant argued that he had no intention of inflicting pain upon his dog and was only trying to help him, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that “the statute does not require a specific intent to cause pain but punishes an intentional act that results in the excessive infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.” Ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Count II and remanded for further proceedings on the animal cruelty charge.
Estis v. Mills --- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 3807048 (La. App. 2 Cir. August 14, 2019) On September 11, 2017, Plaintiffs, Catherine Estis, Samuel Estis, and Thuy Estis brought this action against the Defendants, Clifton and Kimberly Mills, seeking damages for the shooting of the Plaintiff’s ten-month-old German Shepherd puppy, Bella. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants shot Bella, did not disclose to them that Bella had been shot, and dumped her body over ten miles away. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Defendants argued that they fell within the immunity afforded by a Louisiana statute that gives immunity to anyone who kills a dog that is not on the property of the owner and is harassing, wounding, or killing livestock. The Defendants alleged that Bella, the puppy, was harassing their horses. The Plaintiffs argued that the immunity afforded by the statute needed to be affirmatively pled by the Defendants and that the Defendants waived such immunity by failing to assert the affirmative defense in their original answer or any subsequent pleading. The Plaintiffs further argued that the motion for summary judgment would not have been granted if it were not for the immunity protections. The Court ultimately held that the Defendants failed to affirmatively plead the immunity statute and, therefore, it reversed and remanded the case to the lower court.
Barnes v. State --- So.3d ----, 2024 WL 5151604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2024) In this Florida case, Appellant challenges his judgment and sentence for two counts of misdemeanor animal cruelty, asserting that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. The conviction stems from an incident in 2023, where Appellant discovered two dogs that killed three of his chickens. Appellant found the offending dogs a short distance later, where he shot and killed both dogs. At trial, the state did not contest Appellant's evidence and Appellant pleaded no contest to two counts of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor animal cruelty, while specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The trial court withheld adjudication and sentenced Appellant to concurrent terms of 11 months and 29 days of probation. On appeal here, the court observed that the plain language of section 767.03, titled "Good defense for killing dog," provides Appellant with a defense and the trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss. The dogs killed chickens, defined under Florida law as "domestic animals," and section 767.03 constitutes a good defense to killing dogs who were found killing livestock or domestic animals. The court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to vacate Appellant's judgment and sentences.
Fla. Dep't of Health v. Pups Pub TPA, LLC --- So.3d ----, 2025 WL 1240026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2025) The appellate court reversed the ALJ’s determination that the Florida Department of Health (DOH) had enforced an unadopted rule by prohibiting non-service dogs in bars, holding instead that DOH’s directives merely reiterated the plain language of rule 64E-11.003(6)(c), which broadly bans live animals, including dogs, from food service establishments, defined under § 381.0072(2)(c) to include bars and lounges. Pups Pub argued DOH’s authority was limited to regulating areas where food and drinks are prepared and served, but the court rejected this narrow interpretation, finding the statute unambiguously grants DOH jurisdiction over the entire premises of such establishments. The court emphasized that DOH’s interpretation aligned with the text and purpose of the regulatory scheme, which encompasses sanitation controls beyond immediate food-handling zones, rendering formal rulemaking unnecessary. Consequently, DOH’s enforcement actions were upheld, affirming its authority to exclude dogs from bars unless exempted as service animals.
Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force v. Montana ---- F.Supp.3d ----, 2023 WL 8064884 (D. Mont. Nov. 21, 2023) This case was brought by several environmental organizations against the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission to challenge the approval or regulations that authorize the trapping and snaring of wolves within grizzly bear habitat in Montana. The grizzly bear is listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Montana trapping regulations allow wolf hunters to use foothold traps large enough to capture grizzly bears. Grizzly bears rely heavily on their front and back paws to hunt for food, so crippling their limbs with these traps will lead to the incidental killing of grizzly bears from starvation. Plaintiffs contend that allowing the trapping of wolves in grizzly bear territory is in violation of § 9 of the ESA, as it will lead to the incidental unlawful taking of grizzly bears. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the start of the wolf trapping season, raised questions on the merits, and established a reasonable threat of harm to grizzly bears if the trapping and snaring of wolves is allowed in their habitat. On the merits of the claim, although defendants could prove that no grizzly bears had been killed with such traps in Montana for several years, the court found that plaintiffs succeeded on the merits as there was evidence of grizzly bears being killed by such traps in adjacent states. Plaintiffs also showed that there was a likelihood of harm to grizzly bears, with evidence that these traps will lead to the death of grizzly bears. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in part and denied in part, and enjoined the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission from authorizing wolf trapping and snaring.
Strickland v. Medlen -397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013)

The Supreme Court of Texas considers petitioner's appeal from the court of appeals' decision holding that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. The facts underlying the action involved the improper euthanization of respondents' dog, Avery. They sued for Avery's “sentimental or intrinsic value” because the dog had little or no market value and was irreplaceable. The trial court found that Texas law barred such damages, and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The Court of Appeals of Texas became the first court to hold that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. The Supreme Court reverses that decision here, ruling that dogs are ordinary property, with damages limited to market value, and noneconomic damages based in relational attachment are not permitted.

Judgment 00017-2010-PI/TC, 2011 - Peru 00017-2010-PI/TC The Bar Association of North Lima brought this suit against the Congress of the Republic of Peru regarding several pieces of legislation promoting the development of non-sporting public shows, such as bullfights and cockfights. The Bar Association claimed that the legislation was unconstitutional as it contradicted the right to equality as well as several fiscal principles by taxing non-sporting events but not sporting events. It further claimed that through these practices, the State neglected its duty to guarantee participation in Peru’s national cultural heritage. Congress argued that the claim should be unfounded as no one had been discriminated against based on demographic factors. The court held that the claim was unfounded, as bullfighting is a regulated cultural manifestation and the Peruvian Constitution allows the legislators to use their discretion to impose taxes.
Sentencia 00017-2010-PI/TC, 2011 - Peru 00017-2010-PI/TC El Colegio de Abogados de Lima Norte interpuso esta demanda contra el Congreso de la República de Perú en relación con varias leyes que promovían el desarrollo de espectáculos públicos no deportivos, como las corridas de toros y las peleas de gallos. El Colegio de Abogados alegó que la legislación era inconstitucional, ya que contradecía el derecho a la igualdad así como varios principios fiscales al gravar los espectáculos no deportivos pero no los deportivos. Además, alegó que, mediante estas prácticas, el Estado desatendía su deber de garantizar la participación en el patrimonio cultural nacional de Perú. El Congreso argumentó que la reclamación carecía de fundamento, ya que no se había discriminado a nadie por factores demográficos. El tribunal sostuvo que la reclamación era infundada, ya que, en última instancia, las corridas de toros son una manifestación cultural regulada y la Constitución peruana permite a los legisladores hacer uso de su discrecionalidad para imponer tributos.
Decision Report 00022-2018-AI, 2020 - Peru 00022-2018-AI This report discussed issues of constitutionality against Law 30407, which allows for cockfighting and bullfighting in the name of cultural character.
Relatoría 00022-2018-AI, 2020 - Peru 00022-2018-AI Esta relatoria discutió cuestiones de constitucionalidad contra la Ley 30407, que permite las peleas de gallos y las corridas de toros en nombre del carácter cultural.
Resolucion No. 07, 2023 - Caso Kira - Peru 00045-2023-1-0905-JR-PE-02 La demandante presentó esta demanda en nombre de uno de sus perros, Kira. La demandante asistió a una reunión social con sus hijos y dejó a sus dos perros, Kira y Logan, jugando fuera. La demandante regresó a su casa y descubrió que su vecino, el demandado, había cometido un acto de zoofilia contra Kira. El tribunal examinó varias cuestiones constitucionales y teorías de la pena. Sopesó los factores de lo que el demandado había hecho a Kira con su falta de antecedentes y su escasa probabilidad de reincidencia. El tribunal decidió que el demandado debía cumplir 17 meses de encarcelamiento y pagar multas civiles por el sufrimiento tanto de la demandante como de Kira. También se basó en la cuestión del bienestar de los animales su decisión de prohibir al demandado la "tenencia" de animales para reducir aún más el riesgo de reincidencia. En definitiva, el tribunal basó sus decisiones en motivos de bienestar animal y condena de la crueldad hacia los animales.
Judgment 00048-2004-AI, 2005 - Peru 00048-2004-AI This case challenged the constitutionality of Law 28258: Mine Royalty Law. Most pertinently, articles 1-5 of the law establish guidelines and regulations regarding the use and royalty of mineral materials. The court discussed aspects of natural preservation, social equality, and liberty regarding the use and taxation of such materials. Ultimately, the court held that the claim was unfounded, and required transparency in how the funds were allocated to allow civil society to be aware of their uses.
Sentencia 00048-2004-AI, 2005 - Peru 00048-2004-AI Este caso impugnó la constitucionalidad de la Ley 28258: Ley de Regalías Mineras. Lo más pertinente es que los artículos 1-5 de la ley establecen lineamientos y regulaciones con respecto al uso y regalías de los materiales minerales. El tribunal discutió aspectos de preservación natural, igualdad social y libertad en relación con el uso y la tributación de dichos materiales. En última instancia, el tribunal consideró que la demanda carecía de fundamento y exigió transparencia en la asignación de los fondos para que la sociedad civil pudiera conocer su uso.
Sentencia 00316-2018-0-1801-SP-CI-01, 2019, La policia y el uso de caballos - Peru 00316-2018-0-1801-SP-CI-01 Este caso se refiere al uso de caballos como medio de transporte y control por parte de la policía. La demanda fue interpuesta por el Instituto Peruano de Asesoría Legal en Medio Ambiente y Biodiversidad contra el Ministerio del Interior para impugnar una ley relativa a la policía y el uso de caballos. El Instituto cita la Ley 30407, que prescribe la protección del bienestar animal, ya que los caballos corren peligro cuando se utilizan en asuntos policiales. El tribunal discutió en su dictamen cuestiones de bienestar animal, constitucionalidad y varios casos precedentes, incluida la interpretación de la palabra "montada" en el artículo 229 Reglamento de la Ley de la Policía, que especifica las funciones de la policía especial de Lima. Estas cuestiones de bienestar animal llevaron al tribunal a concluir que la demanda era parcialmente nula, eliminando la palabra “montada” del numeral 6 del artículo 229 de la mencionada ley. Sin embargo, la sentencia no prohibió el uso de caballos para controlar multitudes.
Judgment 00316-2018-0-1801-SP-CI-01, use of horses by law enforcement - Peru 00316-2018-0-1801-SP-CI-01 This case concerns the use of horses as transportation and control by police. The suit was brought by the Peruvian Institute of Legal Counsel for the Environment and Biodiversity against the Ministry of the Interior to challenge a law relating to the police force and the use of horses. The Institute cites Law 30407, which prescribes the protection of animal welfare, as the horses are put in peril when used in policing matters. In its ruling, the court discussed issues of animal welfare, constitutionality, and judicial precedent, including the interpretation of the word "mounted" in Article 229(6) of the Police Law Regulations, which specifies the functions of the special police and when the use of "mounted police" is justified. Animal welfare concerns led the court to partially invalidate the lower court decision, removing the word "mounted" from numeral 6 of Article 229 of the Police Law Regulations. However, the ruling did not prohibit the use of horses for crowd control.
Juan Enrique Martín Pendavis Pflucker v. Cañete, Exp No. 00949-2022-PA/TC - Peru 00949-2022-PA/TC Este caso trata de la tenencia de mascotas y de los derechos constitucionales de las personas en los espacios de alquiler vacacional. La opinión mayoritaria razonó que el espacio de alquiler estaba autorizado a prohibir los animales de compañía, ya que lo hacía como expresión de la voluntad compartida de los cohabitantes, y por tanto, no violaba los derechos del demandante, ya que éste entró voluntariamente en la propiedad. El tribunal señaló que los animales de servicio son animales de trabajo, y no simples "mascotas", cuya presencia es necesaria para que sus propietarios disfruten de la plena accesibilidad del inmueble en cuestión, y no pueden ser prohibidos. Las opiniones discrepantes trataron los temas de los animales como propiedad, las libertades constitucionales y el bienestar de los animales, y argumentaron que la demanda del demandante debía ser fundada.
Resolución Nro. 03, Exp 01128-2023-0-1814-JR-PE-03, Caso "Dachi" - Peru 01128-2023-0-1814-JR-PE-03 Este es el caso de un hombre apuñaló repetidamente a "Dachi," elperro de su novia. Los hechos se dieron después de que ella le confesara que tenía una aventura con su amigo. El hombre había estado bebiendo y consumiendo drogas y en su ira, actuó violentamente contra Dachi como venganza contra su novia. Dachi sobrevivió, pero los veterinarios no estaban seguros de cuánto tiempo viviría ni de su calidad de vida. Más tarde se descubrió que el hombre tenía inestabilidades psicológicas y había cometido varios delitos más. Fue declarado culpable de delitos contra la propiedad y crueldad con los animales y se le impuso una pena de encarcelamiento y una multa civil.
Resolution No. 3, Exp Resolución Nro. 03, 01128-2023-0-1814-JR-PE-03, Dachi, the dog - Peru 01128-2023-0-1814-JR-PE-03 In this matter, a man repeatedly stabbed his girlfriend’s dog, “Dachi,” after she confessed to having an affair with his friend. The man had been drinking and taking drugs, and in his anger, took violent action against Dachi as revenge against his girlfriend. Dachi survived, but veterinarians were unsure of how long Dachi would live or her quality of life. The man was later found to have psychological instabilities and had committed several other crimes. He was convicted of crimes against property and cruelty to animals and was given an incarceration sentence and a civil fine.
Judgement 01413-2017-PA/TC, 2016, animals and horizontal property - Peru 01413-2017-PA/TC The plaintiff brought this Amparo suit against the building owners where he rented his apartment for a new regulation prohibiting pets in the building and not allowing them to take the elevator. The plaintiff claims that this recent ban on pets violates his property rights, as well as his rights to the free development of personality, freedom of movement, and the principle of non-discrimination. He also raised issues of health and safety for pets with regard to not being allowed to take the elevator. The court found in favor of the plaintiff and discussed various regulations that would serve as a compromise between the parties. Additionally, the Owner's Association was instructed to revoke any warnings or sanctions imposed on the plaintiff under the application of the regulation and to apply the ruling to guide dogs. Finally, the court determined that this ruling would constitute binding legal precedent.
Sentencia 01413-2017-PA/TC, 2016, animales en propiedad horizontal - Peru 01413-2017-PA/TC El demandante interpuso esta demanda de amparo contra los propietarios del edificio en el que alquilaba su apartamento por haber prohibido la entrada de animales de compañía en el edificio y no permitirles utilizar el ascensor. El demandante alega que, con la reciente prohibición de animales de compañía, se han vulnerado su derecho de propiedad, así como sus derechos al libre desarrollo de la personalidad, la libertad de tránsito y el principio de no discriminación. También planteó cuestiones de salud y seguridad para las mascotas en relación con el hecho de que no se les permitiera coger el ascensor. El tribunal declaró fundada la demanda y discutió varias normas que sirvieran de compromiso entre las partes. El tribunal ordenó a la Junta de Propietarios dejar sin efecto cualquier advertencia o sanción del demandante en aplicación del reglamento; que se aplique la sentencia a perros guia y que se adopte la sentencia como doctrina jurisprudencial.
Chang v. Alzamora, 01936-2017-PHC/TC - Peru 01936-2017-PHC/TC The plaintiff brought a habeas corpus lawsuit on behalf of himself and his two young daughters against the defendant for violating their rights to individual liberty and family tranquility. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s dogs barked so frequently and loudly that the family could not rest at night and travel through the halls out of fear of being attacked. The court discussed the abstract subject matter’s constitutionality, the purpose of a habeas corpus lawsuit, and the right to personal integrity regarding the plaintiff’s claim. It ultimately held that the claim must be admitted for processing in the present constitutional venue on an exceptional basis.
Chang v. Alzamora, 01936-2017-PHC/TC - Peru 01936-2017-PHC/TC El demandante interpuso una demanda de habeas corpus en su nombre y en el de sus dos hijas pequeñas contra el demandado por violación de sus derechos a la libertad individual y a la tranquilidad familiar. El demandante alegó que los perros del demandado ladraban con tanta frecuencia y tan fuerte que la familia no podía descansar por la noche ni desplazarse por los pasillos por miedo a ser atacada. El tribunal debatió la constitucionalidad de la materia abstracta, la finalidad de una demanda de habeas corpus y el derecho a la integridad personal en relación con la reclamación del demandante. En última instancia, sostuvo que la demanda debía admitirse a trámite en la presente sede constitucional con carácter excepcional.
Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania ex rel. their members v. Pennsylvania Game Com'n 03 A.2d 117 (Pa.Cmwlth., 2006)

A Pennsylvania association consisting of hunters and outdoorsmen and members of the association filed a complaint/request for writ of mandamus against the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), and various state officials, seeking an order directing Commission and DCNR to provide the data and information on which the Commission relied in setting "harvest" figures for Pennsylvania's deer population. Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Game Commission , the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and certain Commonwealth officers (collectively, Respondents). The court first found that the Sportsmen indeed have standing, conferred both by statute and under the under the traditional substantial-direct-immediate test. However, Respondent Game Commission's demurrer was sustained, primarily because the court agreed that due to the ambiguous nature of Sportsmen's pleading, it is not possible to discern a legal theory to support the relief requested. Further, the court sustained Respondent's claim that the DCNR, its Secretary, and the state's Governor were not proper parties to association's suit. Despite these procedural defects, the court did not dismiss the Sportsmen's action, and instead allowed them to amend their complaint within 30 days of this order.

Judgment 07392-2013-PHC/TC, Horse Brown SAC v. El Servicio de Parques de Lima- Peru 07392-2013-PHC/TC This judgment resolves the dissents of the judges as written in the Serrano v. Horse Brown SAC case. It discusses ideas of the protection of nonhuman animals and the prevalence of positive and negative duties to nature, as well as Peruvian constitutional rights concerning property and overall personal liberty. The judgment resolves that the lawsuit was unfounded and must be understood within the framework of Amparo law.
Sentencia 07392-2013-PHC/TC, Horse Brown SAC v. El Servicio de Parques de Lima - Peru 07392-2013-PU Esta sentencia resuelve los disensos de los jueces en el caso Serrano vs. Horse Brown SAC. Se discuten las ideas de protección de los animales no humanos y la prevalencia de los deberes positivos y negativos para con la naturaleza, así como los derechos constitucionales peruanos relativos a la propiedad y a la libertad personal en general. La sentencia resuelve que la demanda era infundada y debe entenderse en el marco de la ley de Amparo.
People v. Berry 1 Cal. App. 4th 778 (1991)

In a prosecution arising out of the killing of a two-year-old child by a pit bulldog owned by a neighbor of the victim, the owner was convicted of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, §   192, subd. (b)), keeping a mischievous animal (Pen. Code, §   399), and keeping a fighting dog (Pen. Code, §   597.5, subd. (a)(1)). The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that an instruction that a minor under the age of five years is not required to take precautions, was proper. The court further held that the trial court erred in defining "mischievous" in the jury instruction, however, the erroneous definition was not prejudicial error under any standard of review. The court also held that the scope of defendant's duty owed toward the victim was not defined by Civ. Code, §   3342, the dog-bite statute; nothing in the statute suggests it creates a defense in a criminal action based on the victim's status as a trespasser and on the defendant's negligence.

Kanoa Inc., v. Clinton 1 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (1998)

Plaintiff cruise company filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt scientific research of the defendant government, alleging standing under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").

Collier v. Zambito 1 N.Y.3d 444 (N.Y. 2004)

Infant child attacked and bit by dog when he was a guest in the owner's home.  After defenses motion for summary judgment was denied, the Appellate Court reversed, and this court affirms.

State v. Murphy 10 A.3d 697 (Me.,2010)

Defendant appeals her convictions for assault of an officer, refusing to submit to arrest, criminal use of an electronic weapon, and two counts of cruelty to animals. In October 2009, a state police trooper was dispatched to defendant's home to investigate complaints that she was keeping animals despite a lifetime ban imposed after her 2004 animal cruelty conviction. The appellate found each of her five claims frivolous, and instead directed its inquiry as to whether the trial court correctly refused recusal at defendant's request. This court found that the trial court acted with "commendable restraint and responsible concern for Murphy's fundamental rights," especially in light of defendant's outbursts and provocations.

People v. Tinsdale 10 Abbott's Prac. Rept. (New) 374 (N.Y. 1868)

This case represents one of the first prosecutions by Mr. Bergh of the ASPCA under the new New York anti-cruelty law. That this case dealt with the issue of overloading a horse car is appropriate as it was one of the most visible examples of animal abuse of the time. This case establishes the legal proposition that the conductor and driver of a horse car will be liable for violations of the law regardless of company policy or orders.Discussed in Favre, History of Cruelty

Yuzon v. Collins 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2004)

In this California case, a dog bite victim sued a landlord, alleging premises liability in landlord's failure to guard or warn against tenants' dangerous dog.  On appeal from an order of summary judgment in favor of the landlords, the Court of Appeal held that the landlord owed no duty of care, as he had no actual knowledge of dog's dangerous propensities and an expert witness's declaration that the landlord should have known of the dog's vicious propensities was insufficient to warrant reconsideration of summary judgment ruling.  The landlord's knowledge that tenants may have a dog because it is allowed through a provision in the lease is insufficient to impute liability where the landlord has no knowledge of any previous attacks or incidents.

Hohenstein v. Dodds 10 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1943) This is an action against a licensed veterinarian to recover damages for his alleged negligence in the diagnosis and treatment of plaintiff's pigs.  Plaintiff alleged defendant-veterinarian negligently vaccinated his purebred pigs for cholera.  The court held that a n expert witness's opinion based on conflicting evidence which he is called upon to weigh is inadmissible.  Further, a n expert witness may not include the opinion of another expert witness as basis for his own opinion.  
Banasczek v. Kowalski 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 94 (1979)

Edward Banasczek (plaintiff) instituted an action in trespass against William Kowalski (defendant) for money damages resulting from the alleged shooting of two of plaintiff's dogs. The court held the following: “[T]he claim for emotional distress arising out of the malicious destruction of a pet should not be confused with a claim for the sentimental value of a pet, the latter claim being unrecognized in most jurisdictions.   Secondly we do not think, as defendant argues, that the owner of the maliciously destroyed pet must have witnessed the death of his or her pet in order to make a claim for emotional distress.” Pennsylvania has summarily rejected a claim for loss of companionship for the death of a dog.  

Free v. Jordan 10 S.W.2d 19 (Ark. 1928)

In a replevin action to recover possession of a lost dog from its finder, the court reversed and remanded the case so a jury could determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled due to the defendant's alleged fraudulent concealment of his possession of the dog.

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