Pigs: Related Cases
|Hohenstein v. Dodds||10 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1943)||This is an action against a licensed veterinarian to recover damages for his alleged negligence in the diagnosis and treatment of plaintiff's pigs. Plaintiff alleged defendant-veterinarian negligently vaccinated his purebred pigs for cholera. The court held that a n expert witness's opinion based on conflicting evidence which he is called upon to weigh is inadmissible. Further, a n expert witness may not include the opinion of another expert witness as basis for his own opinion.|
|Ruden v. Hansen||206 N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 1973)||
This appeal stems from an action against a defendant veterinarian for the alleged negligent vaccination of plaintiff’s pregnant hogs (gilts). The court articulated the standard of care: "As a veterinarian defendant was duty bound to bring to his service the learning, skill and care which characterizes the profession generally. In other words, the care and diligence required was that as a careful and trustworthy veterinarian would be expected to exercise. . . We are convinced the correct standard of the veterinarian's care should be held to that exercised generally under similar circumstances."
|Animal Legal Defense Fund v. California Exposition and State Fairs||239 Cal. App. 4th 1286 (2015)||Plaintiffs brought a taxpayer action against defendants based on allegations that defendants committed animal cruelty every summer by transporting pregnant pigs and housing them in farrowing crates at the state fair. One defendant, joined by the other, demurred, contending plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a cause of action for three distinct reasons, including that California's animal cruelty laws were not enforceable through a taxpayer action. The trial court agreed on all accounts, and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The Court of Appeals addressed only one of plaintiffs' claims, that contrary to the trial court's conclusion, plaintiffs could assert a taxpayer action to enjoin waste arising out of defendants' alleged violation of the animal cruelty laws. Like the trial court, the appeals court rejected plaintiffs' contention, concluding that they could not circumvent the prohibition recognized in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Mendes (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 136, which concluded that recognition of a private right of action under West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 597t would be inconsistent with the Legislature's entrustment of enforcement of anti-cruelty laws to local authorities and humane societies, by couching their claim as a taxpayer action. The lower court’s decision was therefore affirmed.|
|Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Miller||241 F.Supp.2d 978 (S.D.Iowa,2003)||
The Court struck down an Iowa law that banned certain producers from owning or controlling livestock in Iowa based on the Dormant Commerce Clause.
|National Meat Ass'n v. Harris||32 S.Ct. 965 (2012)||
Trade association representing packers and processors of swine livestock and pork products sued the State of California for declaratory and injunctive relief barring a ban on slaughter and inhumane handling of nonambulatory animals on federally regulated swine slaughterhouses. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted the California Penal Code provision prohibiting the sale of meat or meat product of “nonambulatory” animals for human consumption and requiring immediate euthanization of nonambulatory animals.
|Test Drilling Service Co. v. Hanor Company||322 F.Supp.2d 957 (C.D. Ill. 2003)||
Owner of oil and gas mineral rights sued the operators of commercial hog confinement facilities for negligence, claiming that the operator's allowed hog waste to escape the confines of the facility and flow into the mineral rights. The District Court held that plaintiff's alleged damages were not barred by a rule prohibiting recovery of economic loss in tort actions; that defendant's alleged violations were evidence of negligence, but not negligence per se; and that defendant's owed a duty of ordinary care to plaintiff.
|Gruber v. YMCA of Greater Indianapolis||34 N.E.3d 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)||An eleven-year-old boy was at a YMCA camp when a pig—which had never injured anyone or exhibited any dangerous propensities—stuck its head between the bars of its pen and grabbed the boy's hand, causing injuries. The boy and his mother sued the camp, and the camp filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the camp. On appeal, the boy and his mother asked the court to change the standard for liability of owners of domestic animals to that of strict liability when the animal was not a cat or dog. Since the Indiana Supreme Court precedent was clear that this general rule applied to all domestic animals—and not just cats and dogs—the court declined their invitation to alter the standard. The trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the camp was therefore affirmed.|
|Rosche v. Wayne Feed Div. Continental Grain Co.||447 N.W.2d 94 (1989)||
Pig breeder sought damages from feed manufacturer after pigs got sick, died, or became sterile after eating feed. The Court of Appeals held that jury should have been instructed that basic measure of damages for dead and injured livestock was based on market value of affected animals and did not include separate award for unborn litters. Failure to give proper instruction was prejudicial error that required a new trial on the issue of damages.
|Mills v. Guthrie County Rural Elec. Co-op. Ass'n||454 N.W.2d 846 (1990)||
Rural electric cooperative association caused fire that destroyed hog farrowing facility. Customers sued to recover damages. The Supreme Court held that: (1) punitive damages were not recoverable; (2) customers did not have claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; but (3) evidence of lost profits from future pig litters as a measure of business interruption damages should not have been excluded.
|Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah||508 U.S. 520 (1993)||
Local ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifices under the guise of an anti-cruelty concern was an unconstitutional infringement on church's First Amendment rights because (1) ordinances were not neutral; (2) ordinances were not of general applicability; and (3) governmental interest assertedly advanced by the ordinances did not justify the targeting of religious activity.
|Thompson v. Hancock County||539 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1995)||
In this case, the Supreme court of Iowa held that hog confinement buildings were agricultural buildings and thus exempt from county zoning ordinances.
|Kuehl v. Cass County||555 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 1996)||The issue before the Iowa Supreme Court was whether hog confinement buildings could be considered “agricultural” so as to fall within the state's agricultural zoning exemption. The court held that h og confinement buildings were within the agricultural building exemption and thus exempt from county zoning regulations.|
|Webber v. Patton||558 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1976)||
Veterinary costs and consequential losses are also allowed in determining damages, according this Kansas case. It should be noted that the animal at issue here was a domestic pig versus a companion animal, and the award of damages was secured by a statute that allows recovery for all damages for attacks on domestic animals by dogs.
|Goodell v. Humboldt County||575 N.W.29 486 (Iowa 1998)||
The issue of county versus local control over livestock regulations came to a head when the Iowa Supreme Court invalidated a series of ordinances that had been enacted by the Humboldt County Board of Supervisors to add additional regulations to the livestock industry and to address problems created by confined animal feeding operations in the county. The court ruled that the ordinances were inconsistent with state law and invalid under the doctrine of implied preemption.
|Bormann v. Board of Supervisors In and For Kossuth County||584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998)||
The court held that a statutory immunity provision designed to protect farming operations from nuisance litigation constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment because the right to maintain an action for nuisance at common law was considered an easement.
|State ex rel. Miller v. DeCoster||596 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa,1999)||
State of Iowa sued the owner of a hog confinement operation for violations of manure disposal and animal control regulations.
|Barnes v. City of Anderson||642 N.E.2d 1004 (Ind.App. 2 Dist. 1994)||
Virginia Barnes and Jan Swearingen appealed a trial court's decision in favor of the City of Anderson, Ind., granting a permanent injunction enjoining the women from keeping and maintaining Swearingen's pet Vietnamese pot-belly pig, Sassy, and ordering Sassy's removal from the residence. Appeals Court found for pig owner, holding that the phrase "raising or breeding" in an Anderson livestock ordinance refers to a commercial enterprise and not to the keeping of pigs as pets.
|Slay v. Spell||882 So.2d 254 (Miss. 2004)||
A slaughterhouse owner violated a Mississippi statute by failing to provide E. coli swab samples from hog carcasses for three weeks. The Circuit Court found in favor of the Mississippi Department of Commerce and the Court of appeals affirmed the decision.
|Davis v. A.S.P.C.A.||Davis v. A.S.P.C.A. 75 N.Y. 362 (1873).||
Plaintiff hog slaughterers challenged the trial court (New York) judgment in favor of defendants, American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and director, in an action seeking to enjoin defendants from arresting them for cruelty to animals pursuant to 1867 N.Y. Laws 375. The hog slaughterers asserted that they were innocent of the alleged statutory violations. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of defendants, denying the request of the hog slaughterers for an injunction to prevent defendants from arresting them for violating a statute prohibiting cruelty to animals.
|Grise v. State||Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456 (1881).||
The Defendant was charged under the Arkansas cruelty to animal statute for the killing of a hog that had tresspass into his field. The Defendant was found guilty and appealed. The Supreme Court found that the lower court commited error by instructing the jury that all killing is needless. The Court reveresed the judgment and remanded it for further consideration.
|New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Farmer Boy AG, Inc.||Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 33125128 (S.D.Ind.)||
Lightning struck a hog breeding facility, which disabled the ventilation system and killed pregnant sows. Plaintiff Insurance Company sued defendant for damages. The Court held that evidence of damages relating to the lost litters and subsequent generations was excluded because damages for future unborn litters are not recoverable when damages are recovered for the injury to or destruction of the pregnant sows.
|Stephens v. State||Stephans v. State, 3 So. 458 (Miss. 1887) (Arnold J. plurality).||
The Mississippi Cruelty to Animal statute was applied to the Defendant who killed several hogs that were eating his crops. The lower court refused to instruct the Jury that they should find him not guilty, if they believed that he killed the hogs while depredating on his crop and to protect it, and not out of a spirit of cruelty to the animals. The Supreme Court of Mississippi found it to be an error by the court to refuse to give such instructions because if the defendant was not actuated by a spirit of cruelty, or a disposition to inflict unnecessary pain and suffering, he was not guilty under the statute.
|Texas Attorney General Letter Opinion 94-071||Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. LO 94-071||
Texas Attorney General Opinion regarding the issue of whether staged fights between penned hogs and dogs constitutes a criminal offense. The Assistant Attorney General deemed these staged fights as violating the criminal cruelty laws.
|Animal Liberation Ltd v Department of Environment & Conservation|| NSWSC 221||
The applicants sought to restrain a proposed aerial shooting of pigs and goats on interlocutory basis pending the outcome of a suit claiming the aerial shooting would constitute cruelty. It was found that the applicants did not have a 'special interest' and as such did not have standing to bring the injunction. The application was dismissed.